外部審計(jì)、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與成本費(fèi)用粘性
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-08-23 19:20
【摘要】：我國(guó)上市公司普遍存在成本費(fèi)用粘性,近年來(lái)更是成為學(xué)者們研究的熱點(diǎn)。成本費(fèi)用粘性是指成本費(fèi)用隨著業(yè)務(wù)量上升時(shí)的變化幅度大于隨著業(yè)務(wù)量下降時(shí)的變化幅度,即成本費(fèi)用呈現(xiàn)“易漲難跌”的非對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象。成本費(fèi)用粘性的存在降低了管理層的決策行為和成本控制效率,嚴(yán)重制約著企業(yè)的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展。在我國(guó)特殊的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)下,企業(yè)成本費(fèi)用粘性程度存在差異,因此了解我國(guó)不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)存在的成本費(fèi)用粘性以及如何抑制企業(yè)存在的成本費(fèi)用粘性,已經(jīng)成為緩解企業(yè)代理問(wèn)題,提高經(jīng)營(yíng)管理的重中之重。通過(guò)文獻(xiàn)的閱讀和梳理,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)關(guān)于成本費(fèi)用粘性的研究,國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者主要集中在成本費(fèi)用粘性的特征、成因及影響因素和經(jīng)濟(jì)后果等方面,很少?gòu)耐獠恐卫頇C(jī)制這一視角出發(fā)進(jìn)行研究,而文章結(jié)合我國(guó)特殊的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì),考察外部審計(jì)作為有效的外部公司治理能夠在一定程度緩解管理層與股東的代理沖突,降低管理層機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī),從而抑制企業(yè)的成本費(fèi)用粘性。文章從最為流行和最受學(xué)者認(rèn)同的委托代理理論引起的成本費(fèi)用粘性展開論述,然后從外部審計(jì)作為外部治理機(jī)制發(fā)揮的治理效應(yīng)探討外部審計(jì)如何抑制成本費(fèi)用粘性,以及將不同類型的成本費(fèi)用作為被解釋變量進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),通過(guò)研究設(shè)計(jì)將2007-2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司按照實(shí)際控制人不同劃分為國(guó)有企業(yè)和非國(guó)有企業(yè),并進(jìn)一步將國(guó)有企業(yè)細(xì)分為中央國(guó)企和地方國(guó)企,考察外部審計(jì)對(duì)不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)成本費(fèi)用粘性的作用后得出以下結(jié)論:(1)外部審計(jì)對(duì)于成本費(fèi)用粘性具有抑制作用,且外部審計(jì)質(zhì)量越高,抑制作用更強(qiáng)。對(duì)于不同類型成本費(fèi)用粘性,外部審計(jì)發(fā)揮的抑制作用存在差異。其中外部審計(jì)對(duì)于管理費(fèi)用粘性抑制作用最強(qiáng),銷售費(fèi)用次之,營(yíng)業(yè)成本最弱。(2)我國(guó)上市公司普遍存在成本粘性,國(guó)有企業(yè)的成本粘性高于非國(guó)有企業(yè);在國(guó)有企業(yè)中,中央國(guó)企的費(fèi)用粘性高于地方國(guó)企。(3)對(duì)于不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的上市公司,外部審計(jì)的抑制作用存在差異,相對(duì)于非國(guó)有企業(yè)而言,外部審計(jì)對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)的成本費(fèi)用粘性抑制作用更強(qiáng);相對(duì)于地方國(guó)企,中央國(guó)企的外部審計(jì)對(duì)成本費(fèi)用粘性發(fā)揮的作用更強(qiáng)。根據(jù)文章的研究,在文章的最后部分對(duì)不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)如何抑制成本費(fèi)用粘性提出政策建議:(1)緩解不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)代理問(wèn)題,完善成本費(fèi)用管理制度;(2)加強(qiáng)外部審計(jì)的治理效應(yīng),與內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制形成協(xié)同作用;(3)規(guī)范事務(wù)所審計(jì)收費(fèi),提升會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的審計(jì)質(zhì)量。
[Abstract]:Cost-cost stickiness is common in listed companies in China, and it has become a hot topic for scholars in recent years. The stickiness of cost means that the change range of cost with the increase of business volume is greater than that with the decline of business volume, that is, the cost presents the asymmetric phenomenon of "easy to rise and not to fall". The existence of cost-cost stickiness reduces the decision-making behavior and cost control efficiency of management and seriously restricts the further development of enterprises. Under the special property right of our country, there are differences in the stickiness degree of cost and expense of enterprises, so we can understand the stickiness of cost and cost of enterprises with different property rights in our country and how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense of enterprises. It has become the most important to alleviate the agency problem and improve the management. Through the reading and combing of the literature, we find that the researches on the stickiness of cost and expense mainly focus on the characteristics, causes, influencing factors and economic consequences of the stickiness of cost and expense. Few studies are carried out from the perspective of external governance mechanism, and the article, combined with the special property right nature of our country, investigates that external audit, as an effective external corporate governance, can alleviate the agency conflict between management and shareholders to a certain extent. Reduce the management opportunism motive, thus restrain the cost-expense stickiness of the enterprise. This paper discusses the cost-cost stickiness caused by the principal-agent theory, which is the most popular and accepted by the most scholars, and then discusses how the external audit can restrain the cost-cost stickiness from the governance effect of external audit as an external governance mechanism. As well as taking different types of cost and expenses as explanatory variables to carry out empirical tests, the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2015 are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the actual controllers. Furthermore, the state-owned enterprises are divided into central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises. After investigating the effect of external audit on the cost and cost stickiness of enterprises with different property rights, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) external audit can restrain the cost and expense stickiness. And the higher the quality of external audit, the stronger the inhibition. For different types of cost-cost stickiness, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different. Among them, external audit has the strongest restraining effect on management cost viscosity, sales cost is second, and operating cost is the weakest. (2) the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The cost stickiness of central state-owned enterprises is higher than that of local state-owned enterprises. (3) for listed companies with different property rights, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, The external audit has a stronger restraining effect on the cost and cost stickiness of the state-owned enterprises, and the external audit of the central state-owned enterprise has a stronger effect on the cost stickiness than that of the local state-owned enterprise. According to the research of this paper, in the last part of the article, some suggestions on how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense among enterprises with different property rights are put forward: (1) to alleviate the agency problem of enterprises with different property rights. Improve the cost and expense management system; (2) strengthen the governance effect of external audit and form a synergy with the internal governance mechanism; (3) standardize the audit fees, improve the audit quality of accounting firms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4;F271
本文編號(hào)：2199668
[Abstract]:Cost-cost stickiness is common in listed companies in China, and it has become a hot topic for scholars in recent years. The stickiness of cost means that the change range of cost with the increase of business volume is greater than that with the decline of business volume, that is, the cost presents the asymmetric phenomenon of "easy to rise and not to fall". The existence of cost-cost stickiness reduces the decision-making behavior and cost control efficiency of management and seriously restricts the further development of enterprises. Under the special property right of our country, there are differences in the stickiness degree of cost and expense of enterprises, so we can understand the stickiness of cost and cost of enterprises with different property rights in our country and how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense of enterprises. It has become the most important to alleviate the agency problem and improve the management. Through the reading and combing of the literature, we find that the researches on the stickiness of cost and expense mainly focus on the characteristics, causes, influencing factors and economic consequences of the stickiness of cost and expense. Few studies are carried out from the perspective of external governance mechanism, and the article, combined with the special property right nature of our country, investigates that external audit, as an effective external corporate governance, can alleviate the agency conflict between management and shareholders to a certain extent. Reduce the management opportunism motive, thus restrain the cost-expense stickiness of the enterprise. This paper discusses the cost-cost stickiness caused by the principal-agent theory, which is the most popular and accepted by the most scholars, and then discusses how the external audit can restrain the cost-cost stickiness from the governance effect of external audit as an external governance mechanism. As well as taking different types of cost and expenses as explanatory variables to carry out empirical tests, the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2015 are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the actual controllers. Furthermore, the state-owned enterprises are divided into central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises. After investigating the effect of external audit on the cost and cost stickiness of enterprises with different property rights, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) external audit can restrain the cost and expense stickiness. And the higher the quality of external audit, the stronger the inhibition. For different types of cost-cost stickiness, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different. Among them, external audit has the strongest restraining effect on management cost viscosity, sales cost is second, and operating cost is the weakest. (2) the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the cost viscosity of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. The cost stickiness of central state-owned enterprises is higher than that of local state-owned enterprises. (3) for listed companies with different property rights, the inhibitory effect of external audit is different, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, The external audit has a stronger restraining effect on the cost and cost stickiness of the state-owned enterprises, and the external audit of the central state-owned enterprise has a stronger effect on the cost stickiness than that of the local state-owned enterprise. According to the research of this paper, in the last part of the article, some suggestions on how to restrain the stickiness of cost and expense among enterprises with different property rights are put forward: (1) to alleviate the agency problem of enterprises with different property rights. Improve the cost and expense management system; (2) strengthen the governance effect of external audit and form a synergy with the internal governance mechanism; (3) standardize the audit fees, improve the audit quality of accounting firms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4;F271
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，本文編號(hào)：2199668
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