不同動機盈余管理與審計意見
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-17 11:02
【摘要】：作為公司盈余調節(jié)的經常性行為,盈余管理一直頗受學術界的關注,相關研究領域的文章也是百花齊放�？v觀國內外盈余管理的相關文獻,可以發(fā)現如今涉及盈余管理的課題大都偏向對機會主義主義動機的研究,卻極少將注意力放在可能會有助于企業(yè)發(fā)展的其他盈余管理動機上。管理者會為了向市場傳遞公司利好的消息而運用盈余管理手段來美化公司的經營業(yè)績,當然在這個過程中,少不了管理層自利行為性質的盈余管理。那么,管理層以自身利益放在第一位,進而可能給公司及利益相關方造成損失的機會主義盈余管理,以及與企業(yè)價值最大化目標一致的非機會主義盈余管理,對審計意見是否存在差異化影響呢?考慮到涉及盈余管理的兩種動機分類的文獻并未深入研究兩種動機的區(qū)分,因此本文在探究不同動機盈余管理與審計意見關系之前,首先引入了企業(yè)價值這一變量對兩種動機的盈余管理進行分析對比。管理者可以基于自利動機(投機主義)投機操縱應計項目,以實現自身利益,自利行為下的盈余管理的程度越強,企業(yè)價值越小,是一種“壞”的盈余管理動機。盈余管理對企業(yè)價值的影響,也可以通過應計項目向市場傳遞企業(yè)信息來實現,在這種“好”的盈余管理動機下,盈余管理的程度越強,企業(yè)價值越大。伴隨著相關審計法律法規(guī)的完善及資本市場的發(fā)展,對審計師的要求愈發(fā)嚴格,風險導向型審計促使審計師更加關注執(zhí)業(yè)過程中的各種風險,對盈余管理活動愈加關注。盈余管理與審計意見的關系是學術界較為常見的研究課題,然而對于二者之間的關系,至今也沒有較為準確的結論。本文從機會主義和非機會主義兩種不同動機盈余管理出發(fā),分別探究其與審計意見的相關性,實證研究結果表明:機會主義動機的盈余管理更容易被出具非標準審計報告,而另一方面,審計意見的出具與非機會主義動機盈余管理之間并不存在顯著的相關性。
[Abstract]:As a regular behavior of earnings regulation, earnings management has been paid much attention by academic circles. Looking at the relevant literature of earnings management at home and abroad, we can find that most of the topics involved in earnings management nowadays tend to focus on opportunistic motivation, but very little attention is paid to other earnings management motives that may be helpful to the development of enterprises. In order to convey the good news to the market, managers will use earnings management to beautify the business performance of the company, of course, in this process, the management of self-interest behavior of earnings management. Then, the management takes the self-interest as the first, and then the opportunistic earnings management, which may cause losses to the company and its stakeholders, and the non-opportunistic earnings management, which is consistent with the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. Is there any difference in the audit opinion? In view of the fact that the literature on the classification of the two motivations involved in earnings management has not thoroughly studied the distinction between the two motivations, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management with different motivations and the audit opinion. Firstly, this paper introduces the variable of enterprise value to analyze and compare the earnings management of two kinds of motivation. Managers can manipulate accrual items on the basis of self-profit motive (opportunism) in order to realize their own interests. The stronger the degree of earnings management under self-interest behavior, the smaller the enterprise value is, which is a "bad" earnings management motivation. The influence of earnings management on enterprise value can also be realized by transferring enterprise information to the market by accrual items. Under this kind of "good" earnings management motivation, the stronger the degree of earnings management is, the greater the enterprise value is. With the improvement of relevant audit laws and regulations and the development of the capital market, the requirements of auditors become more stringent. Risk-oriented audit urges auditors to pay more attention to various risks in the practice process, and pay more attention to earnings management activities. The relationship between earnings management and audit opinion is a common research topic in academic circles. However, there is no more accurate conclusion on the relationship between them. Starting from two different motivational earnings management of opportunism and non-opportunism, this paper probes into the correlation between earnings management and audit opinions. The empirical results show that earnings management with opportunistic motivation is more likely to be issued a non-standard audit report. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between audit opinion and non-opportunistic motivation earnings management.
【學位授予單位】：首都經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F239.4
本文編號：2187397
[Abstract]:As a regular behavior of earnings regulation, earnings management has been paid much attention by academic circles. Looking at the relevant literature of earnings management at home and abroad, we can find that most of the topics involved in earnings management nowadays tend to focus on opportunistic motivation, but very little attention is paid to other earnings management motives that may be helpful to the development of enterprises. In order to convey the good news to the market, managers will use earnings management to beautify the business performance of the company, of course, in this process, the management of self-interest behavior of earnings management. Then, the management takes the self-interest as the first, and then the opportunistic earnings management, which may cause losses to the company and its stakeholders, and the non-opportunistic earnings management, which is consistent with the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. Is there any difference in the audit opinion? In view of the fact that the literature on the classification of the two motivations involved in earnings management has not thoroughly studied the distinction between the two motivations, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management with different motivations and the audit opinion. Firstly, this paper introduces the variable of enterprise value to analyze and compare the earnings management of two kinds of motivation. Managers can manipulate accrual items on the basis of self-profit motive (opportunism) in order to realize their own interests. The stronger the degree of earnings management under self-interest behavior, the smaller the enterprise value is, which is a "bad" earnings management motivation. The influence of earnings management on enterprise value can also be realized by transferring enterprise information to the market by accrual items. Under this kind of "good" earnings management motivation, the stronger the degree of earnings management is, the greater the enterprise value is. With the improvement of relevant audit laws and regulations and the development of the capital market, the requirements of auditors become more stringent. Risk-oriented audit urges auditors to pay more attention to various risks in the practice process, and pay more attention to earnings management activities. The relationship between earnings management and audit opinion is a common research topic in academic circles. However, there is no more accurate conclusion on the relationship between them. Starting from two different motivational earnings management of opportunism and non-opportunism, this paper probes into the correlation between earnings management and audit opinions. The empirical results show that earnings management with opportunistic motivation is more likely to be issued a non-standard audit report. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between audit opinion and non-opportunistic motivation earnings management.
【學位授予單位】：首都經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F239.4
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前10條
1 林翔;張雅思;;高管薪酬、關聯交易和企業(yè)價值的實證研究——基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司[J];商;2016年12期
2 黃芳;章貴橋;;關聯交易、新審計準則與審計意見——來自2006~2012年A股上市公司的經驗證據[J];證券市場導報;2015年06期
3 董淑蘭;左丹;;盈余管理與公司價值關系研究——基于生命周期的視角[J];會計之友;2015年08期
4 倪敏;黃世忠;;非機會主義動機盈余管理:內涵分析與實證研究述評[J];審計與經濟研究;2014年01期
5 曹瓊;卜華;楊玉鳳;劉春艷;;盈余管理、審計費用與審計意見[J];審計研究;2013年06期
6 張斌成;白少衛(wèi);黃謙;;中國企業(yè)盈余管理方法選擇與企業(yè)價值關系的實證研究——基于滬市A股的數據[J];統(tǒng)計與信息論壇;2013年06期
7 劉漢洋;;盈余質量與企業(yè)價值關系的實證研究[J];財經界(學術版);2012年06期
8 薄仙慧;吳聯生;;盈余管理、信息風險與審計意見[J];審計研究;2011年01期
9 朱景鋒;趙文平;;基于權衡理論視角下的最優(yōu)盈余管理模型存在性檢驗[J];中國鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)會計;2011年01期
10 高潔;;關聯交易對企業(yè)價值的影響——基于中國上市公司的實證研究[J];稅務與經濟;2008年05期
相關碩士學位論文 前3條
1 呂榮霞;盈余質量對企業(yè)價值影響的實證研究[D];哈爾濱工業(yè)大學;2013年
2 尚柏宇;盈余質量對企業(yè)價值的影響研究[D];江蘇大學;2011年
3 吳繼儒;基于關聯交易的盈余管理與企業(yè)價值研究[D];新疆財經大學;2009年
，本文編號：2187397
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/jingjilunwen/sjlw/2187397.html
最近更新
教材專著
