發(fā)布時間：2018-06-28 14:31

  本文選題：公司治理 + 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《遼寧大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：眾所周知,獨立審計產(chǎn)生于所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離。近些年來,無論是公眾、媒體還是學術(shù)界都在關(guān)注著審計程序的實施和審計報告的質(zhì)量,這是因為獨立審計作為一種擔保機制,是公司外部監(jiān)督的一種重要形式。獨立審計代表委托人對代理人的監(jiān)督,作為公司的外部監(jiān)督的一種重要途徑,對控制和發(fā)現(xiàn)公司是否有財務(wù)舞弊行為有很大作用,所以,近年來審計問題得到了學術(shù)界的關(guān)注和探討,公眾也要求審計方保證審計服務(wù)的質(zhì)量。審計收費作為被審計方和審計方的聯(lián)系樞紐,很大程度上代表了審計質(zhì)量。對于審計收費問題的研究,在上個世紀后期得到了重視,并逐漸發(fā)展和完善。2001年,我國證監(jiān)會頒布了一個政策,《公開發(fā)行證券的公司信息披露規(guī)范問答第6號——支付會計師事務(wù)所報酬及其披露》。這個政策對財務(wù)報表提出了新的要求,從第二年起上市公司需要在年報中披露審計費用,這一舉措為關(guān)于審計收費的研究提供了大量的數(shù)據(jù)來源,對該方面研究提供了有力支持。目前,我國對審計收費影響因素的研究通常采取審計風險這個中間變量,通過對審計風險的評估來預(yù)計審計收費。然而,審計方即注冊會計師的審計風險,被審計方即上市公司的重大錯報的風險,從兩個方面影響審計風險,這種影響非常復(fù)雜。本文對審計收費進行研究,是從公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面選擇變量,也是選擇了被審計單位重大錯報風險這一角度。本文用Simunic審計收費模型來研究我國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對審計收費的影響,選取了2013年我國滬市A股上市公司作為研究樣本。研究結(jié)果顯示,我國上市公司股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)集中度、獨立董事比例、高管薪酬對審計收費產(chǎn)生了顯著影響,與審計收費呈現(xiàn)正向相關(guān)的是股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)性質(zhì),與審計收費呈現(xiàn)顯著負相關(guān)的是獨立董事比例和高管薪酬。研究結(jié)果顯示,董事會規(guī)模和高管持股對審計收費影響不顯著。最后,本文根據(jù)實證研究結(jié)果歸納了結(jié)論,并提出了關(guān)于提高我國上市公司治理效率和促進公平和有效的審計市場發(fā)展的建議和意見。
[Abstract]:As we all know, independent audit comes from the separation of ownership and management rights. In recent years, both the public, the media and the academia have paid attention to the implementation of audit procedures and the quality of audit reports. This is because independent audit is a guarantee mechanism and an important form of external supervision of the company. Independent audit representative is a proxy for the agent. As an important way of the external supervision of the company, the supervision of people is an important way to control and discover whether the company has financial fraud or not. Therefore, in recent years, the audit problem has been paid attention to and discussed in the academic circle. The public also requires auditors to guarantee the quality of the audit service. The audit fee is a combination of the auditor and the auditor. The research on the issue of audit fees has been paid attention to in the late last century and gradually developed and perfected in.2001 years. China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a policy, "public issuance of securities company information disclosure standard Q & A No. sixth" - pay and disclosure of accounting firms >. This policy provides new requirements for the financial statements. From the second years, the listed companies need to disclose the audit fees in the annual report. This measure provides a large number of data sources for the research on audit fees, and provides strong support for the research. At present, the research on the influencing factors of the charge for the trial is usually taken by the audit risk. This intermediate variable is expected to estimate the audit fees by assessing the audit risk. However, the audit risk, that is, the risk of the auditor, that is, the risk of the major misstatement of the listed company, affects the audit risk from two aspects. This effect is very complicated. This paper studies the charge of the auditor, which is selected from the corporate governance structure. In this paper, the Simunic audit fee model is used to study the influence of the governance structure of the listed companies on the audit fees in China. This paper selects the A shares listed companies in Shanghai stock market in 2013 as the research sample. The proportion of independent directors, executive compensation has a significant impact on audit fees, and audit fees are positively related to the ownership concentration and ownership nature, and audit fees have a significant negative correlation with the proportion of independent directors and executive compensation. The results show that the board rules and executive stock ownership have no significant impact on audit fees. After that, this paper summarizes the conclusions based on the results of the empirical study, and puts forward some suggestions and suggestions on improving the efficiency of the governance of Listed Companies in China and promoting the development of a fair and effective audit market.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F271;F239.4

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