本文選題：家族企業(yè) + 控制機制��； 參考：《當代經(jīng)濟科學(xué)》2010年02期

【摘要】：基于家族控制的競爭優(yōu)勢與控制權(quán)私人收益兩種理論基礎(chǔ),本文以2003-2008年的家族上市公司為樣本,論文考察了家族公司家族管理、控制機制與外部審計師選擇之間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相對于以間接方式上市的家族公司,直接上市更有可能選擇審計質(zhì)量較高的"四大";家族管理即實際控制人擔(dān)任董事長或總經(jīng)理、家族指定管理層與高管持股比例較高的企業(yè)更有動機選擇高質(zhì)量審計,而家族控制機制即金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)、控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流分離程度對高質(zhì)量審計的需求有顯著的負向影響。進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),家族管理對高質(zhì)量審計師需求的正向作用在直接上市的家族公司中更為顯著;家族控制對審計師需求的負向作用僅在控制權(quán)比例大于30%的子樣本中顯著;當家族管理控制人參與家族管理時,會降低兩權(quán)分離所帶來的外部審計師需求的負效應(yīng)。本文的貢獻在于對家族上市公司的管理與控制特征進行了更為細致的分類,并從家族偏好、家族管理與控制機制三方面考察了其外部審計師選擇行為。研究增進了對我國家族上市公司的認識,對理解家族上市公司控制手段與管理模式提供了新的視角。
[Abstract]:Based on the competitive advantage of family control and the private income of control, this paper studies the relationship between family management, control mechanism and the choice of external auditor with the sample of family listed companies from 2003 to 2008. The study found that direct listing is more likely to select the "Big four" with higher audit quality than the family companies listed indirectly, and that the family management, that is, the actual controller, is the chairman or general manager of the company. Enterprises with higher proportion of family-appointed management and senior management have more incentive to choose high-quality audit, and family control mechanism is pyramid structure, the degree of separation of control and cash flow has a significant negative impact on the demand for high-quality audit. Further research shows that the positive effect of family management on the demand for high-quality auditors is more significant in the directly listed family companies, and the negative effect of family control on auditor demand is only significant in the subsamples with more than 30% of control rights. When the family management controller participates in the family management, it will reduce the negative effect of the external auditor demand caused by the separation of the two powers. The contribution of this paper lies in a more detailed classification of the management and control characteristics of family-listed companies, and the selection of external auditors from three aspects: family preference, family management and control mechanism. The research improves the understanding of the family listed companies in China and provides a new perspective for understanding the control means and management mode of the family listed companies.
【作者單位】： 對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際財務(wù)與會計研究中心;對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(70872050,70672060) 教育部人文社科重點研究基地重大項目(06JJD630008) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)規(guī)劃項目(06JA630014) 對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)“211工程”三期重點學(xué)科建設(shè)項目等資助
【分類號】：F239.4;F276.5;F224

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本文編號：1811197