本文選題：配股政策 + 盈余管理��； 參考：《江蘇大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文

【摘要】： 中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管(如配股政策、ST、PT政策等)的剛性政策,誘發(fā)了上市公司盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī),而這種政策剛性通過壓力傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制影響到提供外部監(jiān)督和鑒證的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師(CPA)的審計(jì)行為。脫離這一背景而孤立地研究中國(guó)CPA的審計(jì)行為以及其審計(jì)獨(dú)立性問題,這樣的研究結(jié)論容易誤導(dǎo)我們的審計(jì)理論和實(shí)踐。遵循現(xiàn)代審計(jì)理論與實(shí)務(wù)(風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向?qū)徲?jì))中一個(gè)重要概念——審計(jì)重要性水平,公司經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、審計(jì)重要性水平與審計(jì)意見類型三者之間存在下列因果關(guān)系:公司經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提高,審計(jì)師傾向于降低審計(jì)重要性水平,給定同樣的盈余管理水平,較之于低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的公司,高經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的公司被出具非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見的概率增大。遵循上述思路,本文將審計(jì)重要性水平納入上述研究框架中來考察配股政策誘發(fā)的盈余管理行為與審計(jì)獨(dú)立性問題。 本文第一章為導(dǎo)論,第二章為文獻(xiàn)回顧,第三章從配股政策對(duì)凈資產(chǎn)收益率計(jì)算方法的變化出發(fā),在總結(jié)以往盈余管理研究所使用的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)的缺陷基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建了文中使用的新財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo),并對(duì)2001-2005年配股公司的盈余管理行為進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),研究發(fā)現(xiàn)配股公司的盈余質(zhì)量在提高,盈余管理行為在逐步減弱。第四章對(duì)配股區(qū)間公司的審計(jì)獨(dú)立性缺失提出疑問,本部分主要為理論分析,為后一章的實(shí)證研究作鋪墊。第五章選用2001-2005年上市公司作為樣本,采用總應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)替代法、帶長(zhǎng)期投資項(xiàng)的截面Jones模型和帶長(zhǎng)期投資項(xiàng)的調(diào)整的KS模型三種方法計(jì)算操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)。通過同等經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平下標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見組的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)與非標(biāo)意見組的對(duì)比,估計(jì)審計(jì)師設(shè)置的重要性水平,并通過對(duì)配股公司操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的統(tǒng)計(jì),研究發(fā)現(xiàn)配股公司的確存在盈余管理行為,但由于其操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)并未達(dá)到審計(jì)師設(shè)置“重要性水平”的界限,所以研究結(jié)論并不支持審計(jì)師對(duì)配股企業(yè)的獨(dú)立性缺失的觀點(diǎn)。第六章為研究結(jié)果和研究局限。
[Abstract]:The rigid policy of China's capital market supervision (such as stock rights issue policy and STPT-policy, etc.) induces the motive of earnings management of listed companies. This policy rigidity influences the audit behavior of CPA (CPA) which provides external supervision and authentication through the pressure conduction mechanism. It is easy to mislead our audit theory and practice to study the audit behavior and audit independence of CPA in China in isolation from this background. Following an important concept in modern audit theory and practice (risk-based auditing), which is the level of audit materiality, the management risk of a company, There is a causal relationship between the audit materiality level and the type of audit opinion: the operating risk of the company is increased, the auditor tends to reduce the audit importance level, and given the same earnings management level, compared with the low-risk company, High risk companies are more likely to issue non-standard audit opinions. Following the above thinking, this paper brings the audit importance level into the above research framework to investigate the earnings management behavior and audit independence induced by the rights issue policy. The first chapter of this paper is the introduction, the second chapter is the literature review, the third chapter starts from the change of equity policy to the net assets return calculation method, on the basis of summing up the defect of the financial index used in the earnings management research in the past, the third chapter is the literature review. This paper constructs the new financial index used in this paper and makes an empirical test on earnings management behavior of rights issue companies from 2001 to 2005. It is found that earnings quality of rights issue companies is improving and earnings management behavior is gradually weakening. The fourth chapter questions the lack of audit independence of the interval companies, this part is mainly theoretical analysis, for the latter chapter of the empirical research to pave the way. In the fifth chapter, the listed companies from 2001 to 2005 are selected as samples, the total accrual profit substitution method, the cross-section Jones model with long-term investment term and the adjusted KS model with long-term investment term are used to calculate the operating accrual profits. By comparing the operating accrual profit of the standard audit opinion group with that of the non-standard opinion group under the same operating risk level, the importance level of auditor setting is estimated, and the statistics of the operating accrual profit of the rights issue company are also given. It is found that the earnings management behavior does exist in the rights issue companies, but the operating accrual profits do not reach the threshold of the "materiality level" set by the auditor. Therefore, the findings do not support the auditor's lack of independence. The sixth chapter is the research results and limitations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F239.6;F224

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