本文選題：家族企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：管理模式　出處：《財(cái)會(huì)通訊》2017年33期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文選取2011-2015年A股民營(yíng)企業(yè)為樣本,分析了家族企業(yè)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量與代理成本的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):家族企業(yè)與非家族企業(yè)在代理成本上存在顯著差異,且非家族代理成本顯著大于家族企業(yè);在家族企業(yè)中,審計(jì)質(zhì)量與代理成本存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即審計(jì)質(zhì)量越高,代理成本越高;在家族企業(yè)中,家族化管理模式與代理成本成正比,即家族化管理模式下的代理成本比職業(yè)化管理模式下高;家族企業(yè)中,家族化管理模式下審計(jì)質(zhì)量越高,代理成本越高。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the relationship between family firm and audit quality and agency cost, and finds that there are significant differences in agency cost between family firm and non-family firm. The non-family agency cost is significantly higher than that of the family firm; in the family business, there is a significant positive correlation between the audit quality and the agency cost, that is, the higher the audit quality, the higher the agency cost; in the family business, The family management mode is directly proportional to the agency cost, that is, the agency cost under the family management mode is higher than that under the professional management mode; in the family business, the higher the audit quality in the family management mode, the higher the agency cost.
【作者單位】： 中南民族大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：全國(guó)教育科學(xué)“十二五”規(guī)劃2013年度教育部重點(diǎn)課題(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):DIA130323)的階段性研究成果
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.4;F275;F276.5

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