本文選題：新三板　切入點：財務(wù)造假　出處：《沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：新三板市場是給未上市中小企業(yè)提供股份轉(zhuǎn)讓服務(wù)的交易場所,自2013年新三板市場擴容以來,掛牌公司規(guī)模迅速擴張,截至到2016年末掛牌公司已突破10,000家,中國的場外市場進入到了加速發(fā)展時期。然而,掛牌公司數(shù)量的大規(guī)模增加也導(dǎo)致部分資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量不好的公司摻雜進新三板市場,新三板掛牌公司信息披露違規(guī)、公司股東占用資金、違規(guī)使用募集資金等問題層出不窮。新三板掛牌公司參仙源參業(yè)股份有限公司于2016年7月收到證監(jiān)會《行政處罰決定書》,公司因少計成本、虛增關(guān)聯(lián)交易收入進行利潤造假,成為新三板市場首例因財務(wù)造假被處罰的掛牌公司。論文對新三板首例財務(wù)造假案例進行分析,希望論文的研究有助于提升新三板掛牌公司信息披露的質(zhì)量,從而緩解信息不對稱問題,提高新三板市場的資源配置效率。論文采用理論分析和案例分析相結(jié)合的方法。理論部分闡述了財務(wù)造假的定義、動因、手段等內(nèi)容,并介紹了我國新三板市場的發(fā)展歷程、現(xiàn)行制度規(guī)范以及與場內(nèi)市場的區(qū)別。案例分析部分首先介紹了參仙源公司的基本情況、財務(wù)造假事件的過程以及參仙源對財務(wù)造假事件的回應(yīng);其次,從多角度對參仙源財務(wù)造假進行剖析,具體分析了參仙源財務(wù)造假主觀動機、客觀條件、財務(wù)造假手段以及造假影響等方面。通過分析發(fā)現(xiàn):參仙源對融資的追求以及控股股東獲得股權(quán)質(zhì)押機會是其財務(wù)造假的主觀動機;其公司治理存在漏洞及新三板市場制度不完善、信息披露要求不嚴(yán)格、主辦券商未起到盡職調(diào)查等情況是公司造假的客觀條件;公司采用少計成本、虛增關(guān)聯(lián)交易的手段進行利潤造假為公司自身及新三板市場帶來較大負(fù)面影響。最后,針對于案例分析的結(jié)論論文從四個方面總結(jié)出啟示建議,具體包括:規(guī)范掛牌公司管理制度的建設(shè)和執(zhí)行、確保公司的獨立性;完善新三板的分層制度,推進摘牌機制,確保市場的良好運行;加強信息披露的充分性,對信息披露要求加以細(xì)化,對違法違規(guī)信息披露的掛牌公司加大處罰力度;提高主辦券商的執(zhí)業(yè)能力,提高內(nèi)核工作質(zhì)量,做好全面的自查工作,積極發(fā)揮對掛牌公司的持續(xù)督導(dǎo)作用。
[Abstract]:The new third board market is a trading place for offering share transfer services to unlisted small and medium-sized enterprises. Since the expansion of the new third board market in 2013, the scale of listed companies has expanded rapidly. By the end of 2016, the number of listed companies had exceeded 10000. China's over-the-counter market has entered a period of accelerated development. However, the large-scale increase in the number of listed companies has also led some companies with poor asset quality to be adulterated into the new third-board market, and the information disclosure of the new third-board listed companies has been violated. In July 2016, the company received the CSRC's "decision on Administrative penalty", which was due to undercalculation of costs. It becomes the first listed company in the new third board market to be punished for financial fraud. This paper analyzes the first financial fraud case of the new three boards. It is hoped that the research in this paper will help to improve the quality of information disclosure of the new third board listed companies, thereby alleviating the problem of information asymmetry. To improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the new third board market, the paper adopts the method of combining theoretical analysis with case analysis. In the theoretical part, it expounds the definition, motivation and means of financial fraud, and introduces the development course of the new third board market in China. The case analysis part firstly introduces the basic situation of Shenxianyuan Company, the process of financial fraud and the response of Shen Xianyuan to financial fraud. This paper analyzes the financial fraud of Shen Xianyuan from many angles, and analyzes the subjective motive and objective conditions of the financial fraud. Through the analysis, it is found that the pursuit of financing by Shen Xianyuan and the opportunity for controlling shareholders to obtain equity pledge are the subjective motives of financial fraud; The existence of loopholes in corporate governance and the imperfect market system of the new third Board, the lack of strict requirements for information disclosure, the lack of due diligence on the part of the sponsoring securities companies, and so on, are the objective conditions for the company to fake. The method of inflating related party transactions has brought negative influence to the company itself and the new third board market. Finally, the conclusion of the case analysis is summarized from four aspects. It includes: standardizing the construction and implementation of the management system of listed companies to ensure the independence of the company; perfecting the stratification system of the new three boards, promoting the delisting mechanism and ensuring the good operation of the market; strengthening the adequacy of information disclosure, The requirements for information disclosure should be refined, the listed companies that violate the laws and regulations should be penalized more vigorously, the practicing ability of the sponsoring securities companies should be improved, the quality of their core work should be improved, and the comprehensive self-inspection work should be done well. Actively play the role of continuous supervision of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F326.12;F302.6

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