固定價格合同和成本加酬金合同選擇研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-10 10:41
【摘要】：本文針對建設(shè)工程施工合同中固定價格和成本加酬金兩種合同類型的選擇，尋找建設(shè)項目與合同類型之間的適配，旨在避免業(yè)主和承包商由于固定價格合同和成本加酬金合同選擇不當，而出現(xiàn)的如資源浪費、糾紛、違約、停工等現(xiàn)象，減少因此而蒙受的巨大經(jīng)濟損失，以達到雙方利益最大化。 由于業(yè)主在合同類型的選擇中起決定性作用，因此，本文就文站在業(yè)主角度對合同類型選擇的進行研究。為了解決這一選擇問題，本文運用系統(tǒng)分析法，對兩種合同進行分析，在理論研究和現(xiàn)狀調(diào)研的基礎(chǔ)上，，從委托代理理論視角出發(fā)建立了兩種合同模型，并對其選擇情況進行分析，本文的主要內(nèi)容包括： 通過對“建設(shè)工程施工合同類型選擇”進行問卷調(diào)查，系統(tǒng)分析兩種合同的使用與選擇現(xiàn)狀，結(jié)合選擇兩種合同的依據(jù)和方法，歸納選擇方法存在的不足。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文根據(jù)委托代理理論，構(gòu)建兩種合同類型的委托代理模型，利用此效用函數(shù)模型，通過設(shè)定模型中參數(shù)的變化分析兩種合同的選擇情況，從費用最小化和效率最大化兩個方面，直觀地反映出不同參數(shù)對兩種合同類型選擇的影響，彌補了選擇方法存在的不足。 基于兩種合同模型，針對兩種合同存在的風險，從工作內(nèi)容、工程量和工程單價的風險以及建立的效用模型的基礎(chǔ)上引入風險因素，分析這四方面對合同類型的分析分配情況，根據(jù)業(yè)主自身風險承受能力，為分析如何選擇適合自己的合同類型提供依據(jù)和幫助。
[Abstract]:According to the choice of fixed price and cost plus gratuities in construction contract, this paper tries to find the fit between construction project and contract type. The aim is to avoid such phenomena as waste of resources, disputes, breach of contract, suspension of work and so on, due to improper selection of fixed price contracts and cost plus gratuities contracts, so as to reduce the huge economic losses incurred as a result of this. To maximize the benefits of both parties. Since the owner plays a decisive role in the choice of contract type, this paper studies the choice of contract type from the angle of owner. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses the system analysis method to analyze the two kinds of contracts. On the basis of theoretical research and current investigation, two contract models are established from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The main contents of this paper are as follows: through the questionnaire survey of "Construction contract selection", the use and selection of the two kinds of contracts are systematically analyzed. Combined with the basis and method of selecting two kinds of contracts, the deficiency of the selection method is summarized. On this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of two types of contracts, using the utility function model to analyze the choice of the two contracts by setting the parameters in the model. From two aspects of cost minimization and efficiency maximization, this paper intuitively reflects the influence of different parameters on the choice of two contract types, and makes up for the deficiency of the selection method. Based on the two kinds of contract models, the risk factors are introduced from the work content, the risk of engineering quantity and the unit price of the project, and the established utility model, and the analysis and distribution of the contract types in these four aspects are analyzed in the light of the risks existing in the two kinds of contracts. According to the owner's own risk bearing ability, it provides the basis and help for analyzing how to choose the suitable contract type.
【學位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F406.7;TU723.1
本文編號：2261466
[Abstract]:According to the choice of fixed price and cost plus gratuities in construction contract, this paper tries to find the fit between construction project and contract type. The aim is to avoid such phenomena as waste of resources, disputes, breach of contract, suspension of work and so on, due to improper selection of fixed price contracts and cost plus gratuities contracts, so as to reduce the huge economic losses incurred as a result of this. To maximize the benefits of both parties. Since the owner plays a decisive role in the choice of contract type, this paper studies the choice of contract type from the angle of owner. In order to solve this problem, this paper uses the system analysis method to analyze the two kinds of contracts. On the basis of theoretical research and current investigation, two contract models are established from the perspective of principal-agent theory. The main contents of this paper are as follows: through the questionnaire survey of "Construction contract selection", the use and selection of the two kinds of contracts are systematically analyzed. Combined with the basis and method of selecting two kinds of contracts, the deficiency of the selection method is summarized. On this basis, according to the principal-agent theory, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of two types of contracts, using the utility function model to analyze the choice of the two contracts by setting the parameters in the model. From two aspects of cost minimization and efficiency maximization, this paper intuitively reflects the influence of different parameters on the choice of two contract types, and makes up for the deficiency of the selection method. Based on the two kinds of contract models, the risk factors are introduced from the work content, the risk of engineering quantity and the unit price of the project, and the established utility model, and the analysis and distribution of the contract types in these four aspects are analyzed in the light of the risks existing in the two kinds of contracts. According to the owner's own risk bearing ability, it provides the basis and help for analyzing how to choose the suitable contract type.
【學位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F406.7;TU723.1
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