【摘要】：會計誠信問題影響著市場經(jīng)濟秩序的穩(wěn)定，是整個會計行業(yè)乃至全社會所關(guān)注和討論的熱點話題。雖然國內(nèi)外諸多學(xué)者已從不同角度對此進行了相關(guān)研究并取得了一定成果，但其在具體治理方面卻收效甚微。近年來，博弈論作為一種前沿的經(jīng)濟學(xué)方法論開始應(yīng)用于會計領(lǐng)域，這為研究會計誠信問題提供了新的切入點。本文基于博弈論獨特的經(jīng)濟視角對會計誠信問題進行了分析，旨在得出各博弈的影響因素及納什均衡解，據(jù)此提出相應(yīng)的治理措施。 本文主要利用博弈分析法，以會計誠信問題為研究對象，具體討論了企業(yè)、證監(jiān)會、注冊會計師、投資者、債權(quán)人和競爭者六大博弈主體在各博弈場中的策略選擇及相互間的作用。首先，綜述了會計誠信問題的研究成果。通過引入博弈論，介紹博弈分析法在會計領(lǐng)域中的主要應(yīng)用及會計博弈方法的主要特征，研究了博弈論與會計的關(guān)系。其次，結(jié)合博弈論的經(jīng)典思想，界定了會計誠信的概念。繼而選取2009—2012年證監(jiān)會行政處罰決定書中典型的企業(yè)失信案例并對其進行梳理，，分析注冊會計師、投資者和債權(quán)人對企業(yè)會計誠信問題的評價意見，總結(jié)出目前會計誠信問題現(xiàn)狀的特點、成因和危害。最后，從博弈論的角度，確立了博弈局中人和博弈策略，構(gòu)建了企業(yè)與其他五個博弈主體之間的不完全信息非合作混合策略博弈模型，通過數(shù)理方法計算求得各模型相應(yīng)的納什均衡解，研究出各因素對博弈局中人在博弈場中策略選擇的影響，并進行了六方博弈的綜合分析。 通過博弈研究，本文得出如下結(jié)論：第一，企業(yè)最優(yōu)誠信概率與證監(jiān)會懲罰力度和監(jiān)管概率、注冊會計師機構(gòu)獨立性和專業(yè)水平、投資者風(fēng)險意識、競爭者失信額外收益呈同向變動；與證監(jiān)會監(jiān)管成本、投資者和債權(quán)人調(diào)查成本、債權(quán)人放貸風(fēng)險、競爭者受罰概率和受罰成本呈反向變動。第二，證監(jiān)會最優(yōu)監(jiān)管概率、注冊會計師最優(yōu)違規(guī)操作概率、競爭者最優(yōu)誠信概率與企業(yè)失信額外收益呈同向變動；投資者最優(yōu)投資概率、債權(quán)人最優(yōu)放貸概率均與企業(yè)受罰概率及受罰成本呈同向變動。 基于博弈分析結(jié)論，本文從企業(yè)、證監(jiān)會、注冊會計師、投資者、債權(quán)人、競爭者的角度提出了通過健全會計法律法規(guī)、改善內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)、重塑注冊會計師誠信、提高投資鑒別力、完善會計信用制度這幾個具體治理對策，以期營造良好的博弈環(huán)境，為解決會計誠信問題提供了參考和建議。同時本文的研究也促進了博弈論在會計領(lǐng)域中的應(yīng)用，提高了其現(xiàn)實意義和理論價值。
[Abstract]:Accounting honesty affects the stability of market economic order and is a hot topic that the whole accounting industry and even the whole society pay attention to and discuss. Although many scholars at home and abroad have carried on the related research from different angles and obtained certain achievements, but it has little effect in the concrete governance. In recent years, game theory, as a forward economic methodology, has been applied to the field of accounting, which provides a new entry point for the study of accounting honesty. Based on the unique economic perspective of game theory, this paper analyzes the problem of accounting honesty and credit in order to obtain the influencing factors of each game and Nash equilibrium solution, and then puts forward the corresponding management measures. This article mainly uses the game analysis method, taking the accounting good faith question as the research object, specifically discusses the enterprise, the Securities Regulatory Commission, the certified accountant, the investor, The choice of strategy between creditor and competitor in each game field and the interaction between them. First of all, the paper summarizes the research results of accounting integrity. By introducing game theory, this paper introduces the main application of game analysis in accounting field and the main characteristics of accounting game method, and studies the relationship between game theory and accounting. Secondly, combined with the classical thinking of game theory, the concept of accounting integrity is defined. Then select and comb the typical enterprise dishonesty cases in the 2009-2012 CSRC administrative penalty decision, and analyze the evaluation opinions of CPA, investors and creditors on the enterprise accounting integrity. This paper summarizes the characteristics, causes and harm of the present situation of accounting honesty and credit. Finally, from the point of view of game theory, this paper establishes the game strategy of "person and game" in the game bureau, and constructs a game model of incomplete information non-cooperative mixed strategy between the enterprise and the other five players. The corresponding Nash equilibrium solution of each model is obtained by mathematical method, and the influence of various factors on the selection of strategy in game field is studied, and the comprehensive analysis of six-party game is carried out. Through the game study, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the optimal probabilities of good faith of enterprises and the punishment and supervision probability of CSRC, the independence and professional level of CPA institutions, the risk consciousness of investors, The additional earnings of competitors in breach of credit fluctuate in the same direction; they vary inversely with the CSRC's regulatory costs, investor and creditor investigation costs, creditor lending risks, competitors' penalty probability and penalty costs. Second, the CSRC's optimal supervision probability, the CPA's optimal violation operation probability, the competitor's optimal integrity probability and the enterprise's dishonest extra income are in the same direction; the investor's optimal investment probability, The optimal lending probability of creditors varies in the same direction as the penalty probability and penalty cost. Based on the conclusion of game analysis, this paper puts forward to improve the internal governance structure and rebuild the integrity of CPA by perfecting accounting laws and regulations from the point of view of enterprise, CSRC, CPA, investor, creditor and competitor. To improve investment discrimination and perfect accounting credit system, the author hopes to create a good game environment and provide reference and suggestions for solving the problem of accounting credit. At the same time, the research of this paper also promotes the application of game theory in the field of accounting, and improves its practical significance and theoretical value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F233;F224.32

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