發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-08-05 19:47

【摘要】：公交服務(wù)效益不佳而引發(fā)了國(guó)有化回潮的現(xiàn)象,其關(guān)鍵在于政府、公交企業(yè)和社會(huì)群體三方主體在合作中控制權(quán)配置不合理。針對(duì)此問(wèn)題,基于合作治理的背景,運(yùn)用非對(duì)稱信息條件下的委托代理理論構(gòu)建公交服務(wù)合作的效益模型,探討公交服務(wù)各主體控制權(quán)配置及其對(duì)效益的影響,并以上海市公交服務(wù)的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明:公交企業(yè)控制權(quán)配置受其自身產(chǎn)出水平的影響,產(chǎn)出水平越高的企業(yè),其獲得的控制權(quán)也就更大;公交企業(yè)控制權(quán)與效益是"倒U型"關(guān)系,只有控制權(quán)在合理范圍內(nèi)時(shí)才有利于效益的增加;各方主體在自身控制權(quán)范圍內(nèi),其努力水平與效益是"倒U型"關(guān)系,表明政府過(guò)度干預(yù)、社會(huì)群體無(wú)效參與均不利于效益的提高。據(jù)此提出在合作中的戰(zhàn)略、戰(zhàn)術(shù)和執(zhí)行層級(jí)中合理安排各主體控制權(quán)。
[Abstract]:The poor benefit of public transport service has led to the phenomenon of nationalization, the key of which lies in the unreasonable allocation of control rights among the three main bodies of the government, public transport enterprises and social groups in the cooperation. In order to solve this problem, based on the background of cooperative governance, the benefit model of public transport service cooperation is constructed by using the principal-agent theory under the condition of asymmetric information, and the allocation of control rights of each subject of public transport service and its influence on the benefit are discussed, and the empirical test is carried out with the data of Shanghai public transport service. The results show that the allocation of control rights of public transport enterprises is affected by their own output level, and the higher the output level is, the greater the control rights are, and the control rights and benefits of public transport enterprises are "inverted U" relationship, which is beneficial to the increase of benefits only when the control rights are within a reasonable range. Within the scope of their own control, the level of efforts and benefits of all parties are "inverted U", which indicates that excessive government intervention and ineffective participation of social groups are not conducive to the improvement of benefits. Based on this, it is put forward that the control rights of each subject should be arranged reasonably in the strategic, tactical and executive levels of cooperation.
【作者單位】： 大連理工大學(xué)公共管理與法學(xué)學(xué)院;江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)旅游與城市管理學(xué)院;同濟(jì)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社科重點(diǎn)資助項(xiàng)目(12AGL010) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71173157) 遼寧社科基金資助項(xiàng)目(L12BGL007)
【分類號(hào)】：F572.88;F224

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本文編號(hào)：2523301