本文關鍵詞： 高速鐵路 票價 客運通道 博弈論 廣義費用　出處：《北京交通大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：大規(guī)模的高速鐵路的建設,不但可以緩解我國長期存在的鐵路運量與運能之間的矛盾,滿足人們日益增長的多元化出行需求。同時可以將鐵路貨運和客運分開運行,進而最大程度開發(fā)鐵路運輸在貨運上的潛能。目前,國家《鐵路中長期規(guī)劃》勾勒了全國“四縱四橫”的高速鐵路宏偉藍圖,高速鐵路將成為鐵路中長期網(wǎng)絡規(guī)劃的主要方向。 同時,不難發(fā)現(xiàn)客運通道內多種交通方式并存,在市場經濟下,高速鐵路、民航、長途巴士等交通方式為了吸引更多潛在客流量,獲取更大的運營收益,不斷地改善硬件條件,提高服務質量,相互之間競爭非常激烈。由于短期內各種交通方式的硬件設施改善的空間范圍不大,因此“票價”這一環(huán)節(jié)成為了各交通方式運營者考慮的重點。此外,由于我國高速鐵路處于起步發(fā)展階段,票價策略不完善,國內一部分高速鐵路的旅客票價采用的是試運營價的形式。正是在這樣的背景下,高速鐵路旅客票價優(yōu)化調整被提上日程。 首先,本文分析了國內外高速鐵路票價體系的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,重點介紹了日本、德國、法國這三個高速鐵路技術較為成熟國家的票價體系成功經驗；進而分析了我國高速鐵路票價體系的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,介紹了我國高速鐵路票價體系及現(xiàn)行定價方式,總結了我國高速鐵路票價存在的問題；進而對國內外鐵路客票研究進行了文獻綜述,了解目前學者們所探討的定價理論和方法。 其次,本文對傳統(tǒng)的票價理論和約束因素進行了分析,總結了傳統(tǒng)票價理論的適用性；從運輸成本、市場需求、競爭因素、旅客出行特性和政府管制等幾個方面討論了高速鐵路票價制定時需要考慮的約束條件。 然后本文用博弈論的觀點對客運通道內高速鐵路票價制定博弈過程進行了分析,介紹了非合作博弈的相關理論,對客運通道內有關高速鐵路票價制定的博弈類別、原理進行了分析,并討論了票價對客運量、收益的影響。 在前面分析的基礎上,本文構建了Logit模型,分析了高速鐵路客流市場占有率,并以Logit模型為前提構建了基于高速鐵路和民航的票價非合作博弈模型,并設計了用于該模型求解的Lemke-Howson算法。 最后,本文以京滬客運通道內高速鐵路票價為例對研究成果進行了必要分析。
[Abstract]:The large-scale construction of high-speed railway can not only alleviate the contradiction between the railway capacity and the railway capacity. At the same time, railway freight and passenger transport can be operated separately, thus maximizing the potential of railway transport in freight transport. The National medium and long term Railway Plan outlines the grand blueprint of "four vertical and four horizontal" high-speed railway, which will become the main direction of railway network planning in the medium and long term. At the same time, it is not difficult to find a variety of transport modes co-exist in passenger transport channels, in the market economy, high-speed rail, civil aviation, long-distance buses and other modes of transport to attract more potential passenger traffic, to obtain greater operating income. Continuously improve the hardware conditions, improve the quality of service, the competition between each other is very fierce, because in the short term, there is not much space for the improvement of the hardware facilities of various modes of transportation. Therefore, the link of "ticket price" has become the focus of consideration for the operators of various modes of transportation. In addition, because the high-speed railway in our country is in the initial stage of development, the fare strategy is not perfect. The passenger fare of some high-speed railway in China is in the form of trial operating price. It is under this background that the optimization and adjustment of passenger ticket price of high-speed railway is put on the agenda. First of all, this paper analyzes the development of high-speed railway ticket system at home and abroad, focusing on the introduction of Japan, Germany, France, the three countries with more mature technology of the fare system successful experience; Then it analyzes the development status of China's high-speed railway fare system, introduces the high-speed railway fare system and the current pricing methods, summarizes the problems of China's high-speed railway ticket price. Then the domestic and foreign railway passenger ticket research literature review to understand the current scholars discussed pricing theory and methods. Secondly, this paper analyzes the traditional fare theory and its constraint factors, and summarizes the applicability of the traditional fare theory. From the aspects of transportation cost, market demand, competitive factors, passenger travel characteristics and government regulation, this paper discusses the constraints that should be considered in the formulation of high speed railway fares. Then this paper uses the game theory point of view to analyze the process of the high-speed railway ticket pricing game in the passenger transport channel, and introduces the related theory of non-cooperative game. This paper analyzes the game types and the principle of the high speed railway fare determination in the passenger transport channel, and discusses the influence of the ticket price on the passenger transport volume and income. On the basis of the previous analysis, this paper constructs the Logit model and analyzes the market share of high-speed railway passenger flow. On the premise of Logit model, the non-cooperative game model of ticket price based on high-speed railway and civil aviation is constructed, and the Lemke-Howson algorithm for solving the model is designed. Finally, this paper takes the ticket price of high-speed railway in Beijing-Shanghai passenger corridor as an example to analyze the research results.
【學位授予單位】：北京交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F532.5;F224.32

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