本文關(guān)鍵詞：“裁判潛規(guī)則”的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 裁判潛規(guī)則 效率 政策組合

【摘要】： 隨著體育全球化、市場(chǎng)化、商業(yè)化的發(fā)展,競(jìng)技體育在人們的生活中扮演著越來(lái)越重要的角色。在體育產(chǎn)業(yè)高速成長(zhǎng)的同時(shí),許多聯(lián)賽卻相繼暴露出嚴(yán)重的裁判問(wèn)題,阻礙了競(jìng)技體育市場(chǎng)健康、有序地運(yùn)行。在眾中的裁判問(wèn)題中,又以足球比賽中的“黑哨”是最為典型,“假球黑哨”風(fēng)波、“電話門”事件都曾鬧得沸沸揚(yáng)揚(yáng)。國(guó)際足聯(lián)也于2005年3月在蘇黎世舉行會(huì)議,專門討論了“黑哨”問(wèn)題。然而,在“黑哨”的基礎(chǔ)上衍生出來(lái)的“裁判潛規(guī)則”卻為人所忽視。所謂“裁判潛規(guī)則”,是指俱樂(lè)部需要向裁判支付一定的費(fèi)用以保證球隊(duì)在公平的環(huán)境下進(jìn)行比賽,避免遭遇“黑哨”,這在圈內(nèi)被視為“行規(guī)”。由此可見(jiàn),“裁判潛規(guī)則”是更為隱蔽的尋租方式。 在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中,社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的許多領(lǐng)域都存在一些灰色地帶,各種“潛規(guī)則”蔓延,“顯規(guī)則”與潛規(guī)則之間關(guān)系也比較緊張�！安门袧撘�(guī)則”是商業(yè)體育發(fā)展過(guò)程中的產(chǎn)物,是社會(huì)上眾多的“潛規(guī)則”之一。那么,“潛規(guī)則”是如何產(chǎn)生和演進(jìn)的,其效率又如何?這些都是值得研究的問(wèn)題。 本文試圖通過(guò)對(duì)“裁判潛規(guī)則”的分析來(lái)揭示上述問(wèn)題。首先,本文借助博弈論對(duì)“裁判潛規(guī)則”的產(chǎn)生與演進(jìn)展開(kāi)了理論分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文對(duì)“裁判潛規(guī)則”的效率進(jìn)行了探討,提出了兩個(gè)評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn):一是制度本身的效率,即制度本身運(yùn)行所需要的成本及其所帶來(lái)的收益;二是制度對(duì)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響,即制度是促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展還是阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。通過(guò)對(duì)私人成本和社會(huì)成本兩方面的分析,本文得出“裁判潛規(guī)則”缺乏效率的結(jié)論。最后,本文對(duì)“裁判潛規(guī)則”問(wèn)題提出了治理措施,并嘗試從制度效率出發(fā),通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)方法,尋找最優(yōu)政策組合。 本文主要分為四個(gè)部分:第一部分是緒論,概述了研究背景與意義,并且在回顧相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,介紹了本文的研究方法與思路。第二部分,探討“裁判潛規(guī)則”的產(chǎn)生與演進(jìn)。第三部分,評(píng)價(jià)“裁判潛規(guī)則”的效率。第四部分,對(duì)“裁判潛規(guī)則”問(wèn)題的治理提出政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the development of sports globalization, marketization and commercialization, competitive sports play a more and more important role in people's life. However, many league matches have exposed serious referee problems one after another, hindering the healthy and orderly operation of the competitive sports market. Among the public referees, the "black whistle" in football matches is the most typical. "false ball black whistle" the storm, "phone door" incident has been in full swing. FIFA also held a meeting in Zurich on March 2005, devoted to the "black whistle" issue. However. On the basis of "black whistle", the "latent rules of referee" have been ignored. The club has to pay a fee to the referee to ensure that the team plays in a fair environment, avoiding the "black whistle", which is regarded as the "rules" in the circle. The latent rules of judgment is a more covert way of rent-seeking. In real life, there are some grey areas in many fields of social economy, and various "hidden rules" spread. The relationship between "explicit rules" and latent rules is also tense. "latent rules" is the product of the development of commercial sports and one of the many "latent rules" in the society. How does the "latent rules" come into being and evolve, and what is its efficiency? These are all worthy of study. This paper attempts to reveal the above problems through the analysis of "the latent rules of the referee". Firstly, this paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the emergence and evolution of the "latent rules of the referee" with the help of game theory. On this basis. This paper probes into the efficiency of the "latent rules of judgment" and puts forward two evaluation criteria: first, the efficiency of the system itself, that is, the cost required by the operation of the system itself and the benefits it brings; The second is the impact of institution on social and economic development, that is, whether the institution promotes economic development or hinders economic development, through the analysis of private cost and social cost. This paper draws the conclusion that "the latent rules of the referee" is inefficient. Finally, this paper gives a conclusion on the "latent rules of the referee". This paper puts forward some measures to solve the problem, and tries to find the optimal policy combination through the experimental method from the point of view of system efficiency. This paper is mainly divided into four parts: the first part is the introduction, summarized the research background and significance, and on the basis of reviewing the relevant literature, introduced the research methods and ideas. The second part. The third part is to evaluate the efficiency of the latent rules of adjudication. Part 4th, to put forward some policy suggestions on how to solve the problems of the latent rules of referees.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：F091.3;F224.32

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 趙鵬;成民鐸;;足球裁判不公正執(zhí)法行為的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析與制度干預(yù)[J];運(yùn)動(dòng);2011年07期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 孫強(qiáng);哲學(xué)視域下的潛規(guī)則研究[D];中共中央黨校;2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1357907