發(fā)布時(shí)間：2022-01-15 16:14

　　這項(xiàng)研究調(diào)查了在上海和深圳證券交易所上市的中國(guó)公司的高管薪酬。我通過(guò)董事會(huì)規(guī)模,董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性,CEO二元性,基于會(huì)計(jì)的公司業(yè)績(jī),以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的公司業(yè)績(jī),內(nèi)部所有者和工資薪酬動(dòng)態(tài)變量來(lái)分析高管薪酬。此外,這項(xiàng)研究還考察了影響CEO薪酬的因素。利用2008年至2011年間上海和深證券交易所上市的中國(guó)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)。最終樣本公司包括所有在當(dāng)?shù)毓善笔袌?chǎng)上市的中國(guó)公司,即上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所。本研究將代理理論和工資動(dòng)態(tài)理論結(jié)合起來(lái)考察公司治理背景下董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績(jī)效對(duì)前三名高管薪酬的影響。采用董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司業(yè)績(jī)變量,我發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)與高管薪酬之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)。另一方面,企業(yè)績(jī)效對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)高管薪酬的整體影響顯著。因此,本研究得出結(jié)論,董事會(huì)規(guī)模,董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性,以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的公司業(yè)績(jī),基于會(huì)計(jì)的公司業(yè)績(jī),內(nèi)部所有者和高管人員的工資薪酬動(dòng)態(tài)變量是決定中國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬的主要因素。這篇論文對(duì)研究人員,投資者和決策者有很多實(shí)際意義。 

【文章來(lái)源】：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)北京市 211工程院校 教育部直屬院校

【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】：163 頁(yè)

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士

【文章目錄】：
摘要
abstract
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW
    3.1 DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
    3.2 INTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
    3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA
    3.4 CORPORATE BOARD STRUCTURE
    3.5 RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    3.6 EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION IN CHINA
CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
    4.1 THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER 5 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
    5.1 VARIABLE’S EXPLANATIONS
        5.1.1 Dependent Variables
        5.1.2 Main Independent Variables
        5.1.3 Control Variables
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
    6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
    6.2 Correlations Matrix of the Variables
    6.3 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    6.4 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION
    6.5 REGRESSIONS RESULTS: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVE’S COMPENSATION
    6.6 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.7 BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.8 FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (FIXED EFFECTS)
    6.9 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.10 BOARD STRUCTURE AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.11 FIRM PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE, AND TOP THREE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION (RANDOM EFFECTS)
    6.12 HAUSMAN TEST: CHOOSING BETWEEN FIXED EFFECTS OR RANDOM EFFECTS
    6.13 BREUSCH AND PAGAN LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST FOR RANDOM EFFECTS
    6.14 DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ESTIMATES:
    6.15 ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM
    6.16 CEO PAY REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS
    6.17 ROBUSTNESS TESTING
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
    7.1 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
    7.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
    7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PERSONAL RESUME, ACADEMIC PAPERS PUBLISHED AT SCHOOL AND RESEARCH RESULTS


【參考文獻(xiàn)】：
期刊論文
[1]中國(guó)企業(yè)高管薪酬差距研究（英文）[J]. 方芳,李實(shí),Liu Yi.  Social Sciences in China. 2016(03)



本文編號(hào)：3590929