私募股權(quán)基金對(duì)民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)公司治理的影響
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-13 08:45
【摘要】：民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)作為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的引擎,在促進(jìn)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)、擴(kuò)大就業(yè)、增加財(cái)政收入等多個(gè)方面發(fā)揮著舉足輕重的作用。黨的十八大明確定位了市場(chǎng)與政府的角色,再次重申了“兩個(gè)毫不動(dòng)搖”,并提出“提高大中型企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,支持小微企業(yè)特別是科技型小微企業(yè)發(fā)展”。伴隨著改革不斷深入,社會(huì)制度與經(jīng)濟(jì)體制不斷完善,民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)的先鋒和引導(dǎo)作用將體現(xiàn)的更為淋漓盡致,地位也將加強(qiáng)。 民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的意義不言而喻,但其功能的發(fā)揮建立在企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)、公司治理等各方面健康完善的基礎(chǔ)上。毋庸諱言,我國(guó)的民營(yíng)企業(yè),特別是民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)自身還存在許多問(wèn)題,如財(cái)務(wù)信息不透明、不準(zhǔn)確,管理制度不健全、不合理,經(jīng)營(yíng)決策隨意化、關(guān)系化等等。這些問(wèn)題的存在,導(dǎo)致資金約束瓶頸、規(guī)模發(fā)展瓶頸,制約了企業(yè)長(zhǎng)久可持續(xù)發(fā)展。 對(duì)于民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō),公司治理有其特殊性,家族化集權(quán)與關(guān)系治理特征顯著。集權(quán)化與關(guān)系化的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)中小企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展弊大于利,在信息不對(duì)稱及多股東的情況下,企業(yè)家決策權(quán)力和經(jīng)營(yíng)收益不對(duì)稱,其決策基礎(chǔ)是基于家族利益最大化而非企業(yè)利益最大化,存在利用關(guān)系交易以損害小股東和其他利益相關(guān)者權(quán)益的傾向。不完善的內(nèi)部經(jīng)營(yíng)管理機(jī)制難以承諾可預(yù)期的未來(lái),也就難以向市場(chǎng)投資者傳遞積極明確的信號(hào),純粹寄希望銀行信貸和證券市場(chǎng)解決企業(yè)融資約束,無(wú)異于隔靴搔癢,治標(biāo)不治本。若要實(shí)現(xiàn)民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)長(zhǎng)久發(fā)展,完善公司治理迫在眉睫。不過(guò),現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的建立不僅僅需要企業(yè)家的自覺(jué)意識(shí),也需要外部政策、法律環(huán)境和其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)、投資者的良性推動(dòng)。 私募股權(quán),特別是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)業(yè)基金的到來(lái),不僅拓寬了中國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的籌資渠道,其先進(jìn)的管理理念對(duì)推動(dòng)公司治理理念的改革亦是不容小覷。解救處于“融資”和“治理”雙重困境的中小企業(yè),私募股權(quán)機(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)疑是個(gè)理想選擇。正是基于上述背景和認(rèn)知,本文綜合運(yùn)用文獻(xiàn)梳理、博弈模型推導(dǎo)方法,展開(kāi)了私募股權(quán)基金對(duì)民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)公司治理影響的研究。 基于本文的研究主體和研究目的,文章從四個(gè)方面展開(kāi)文獻(xiàn)回顧：民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)、私募股權(quán)、公司治理、關(guān)聯(lián)分析。首先,通過(guò)梳理民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)在經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中的地位、對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的作用及發(fā)展中的問(wèn)題,進(jìn)一步明確改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的必要性及意義；其次,在簡(jiǎn)要概述公司治理領(lǐng)域研究框架和結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了民營(yíng)企業(yè)治理特殊性——關(guān)系治理及其特征,從而確定改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的突破口；再次,回溯了私募股權(quán)基金發(fā)展影響因素、代理問(wèn)題及退出問(wèn)題三個(gè)方面的研究狀況；最后,學(xué)習(xí)了以往研究文獻(xiàn)中分析私募股權(quán)基金和公司治理關(guān)系的研究方法及視角,以便為本文后續(xù)寫作提供借鑒。 接下來(lái)聚焦民營(yíng)中小企業(yè),通過(guò)分析其治理現(xiàn)狀及特征,指出管理資源集中化、封閉化導(dǎo)致企業(yè)家(決策者)權(quán)、責(zé)、利不對(duì)稱,而這種失衡增強(qiáng)了企業(yè)家關(guān)聯(lián)交易的沖動(dòng),容易造成對(duì)小股東權(quán)益的侵害。進(jìn)一步的,建立博弈模型,并從單一股東的分析擴(kuò)展到多個(gè)股東的分析,得出：只要不改變決策結(jié)構(gòu),企業(yè)家股權(quán)份額越低,關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生的可能性就越大。 隨后介紹了私募股權(quán)基金的發(fā)展?fàn)顩r、運(yùn)作特征,并分析其投資趨勢(shì),得出：私募股權(quán)投資行業(yè)集中在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、消費(fèi)醫(yī)療等領(lǐng)域,而從民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)覆蓋領(lǐng)域來(lái)看,私募股權(quán)基金與其有著天然的耦合性；另外,近年私募股權(quán)基金有投資階段“前移”傾向,在這種趨勢(shì)下,基金投資機(jī)構(gòu)必然會(huì)在目標(biāo)公司的治理問(wèn)題上投注更多精力。 在分析私募股權(quán)基金如何影響被投資企業(yè)公司治理之前,我們首先探究了私募機(jī)構(gòu)愿意參與目標(biāo)公司運(yùn)作的動(dòng)因——雙重委托代理關(guān)系,并通過(guò)分析進(jìn)一步指出：第一層委托代理關(guān)系(投資者與基金管理者之間)是促使基金管理者監(jiān)督企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)的根本原因；而第二層委托代理關(guān)系(風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)與目標(biāo)企業(yè)之間)的存在,是促使風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)參與到企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)的直接原因。接下來(lái),在博弈模型的分析中,逐步引入“不作為”風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)、懲罰機(jī)制、董事會(huì)機(jī)制,分析企業(yè)家與合作伙伴支付矩陣的變化,得出：懲罰機(jī)制沒(méi)有改變?cè)械臎Q策結(jié)構(gòu),但能在一定程度上降低關(guān)聯(lián)交易發(fā)生的可能性,但其抑制作用的大小與懲罰成本大小相關(guān)。董事會(huì)機(jī)制則徹底打破原有決策管理資源的封閉狀態(tài),形成多方參與的制衡結(jié)構(gòu),在企業(yè)家提議關(guān)聯(lián)交易時(shí),能夠有效降低關(guān)系交易的發(fā)生,維護(hù)企業(yè)整體及小股東利益。不過(guò),董事會(huì)的有效性受到董事會(huì)決策效率及準(zhǔn)確性的影響。 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的參與能夠推動(dòng)民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)治理機(jī)制的完善,然而需要明確的是,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)并非天使,它所有的行動(dòng)基礎(chǔ)是自身利益而非企業(yè)利益,經(jīng)營(yíng)決策權(quán)利的開(kāi)放不是出讓,將企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)完全寄托在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)身上,也是極不明智的。 這篇文章的最主要的創(chuàng)新在于將關(guān)系治理作為一個(gè)變量,引入了博弈模型,實(shí)證和理論相得益彰；當(dāng)然,所有論述都是在前人研究基礎(chǔ)上的淺顯分析,如能拋磚引玉,則不勝惶恐。另外,出于博弈分析的需要,文章將企業(yè)內(nèi)部復(fù)雜的治理關(guān)系簡(jiǎn)化為“決策者”企業(yè)家和小股東這兩個(gè)主體,同時(shí),籠統(tǒng)的將民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)公司治理的弊病歸結(jié)為“關(guān)聯(lián)交易”,具有一定的片面性。
[Abstract]:As the engine of economic development, private small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting national economic growth, expanding employment, increasing fiscal revenue and other aspects. With the deepening of reform, the improvement of social system and economic system, the pioneering and guiding role of private SMEs will be more vivid and their status will be strengthened.
The significance of private economy is self-evident, but its function is based on the sound and perfect financial and corporate governance. Needless to say, there are still many problems in private enterprises, especially private SMEs themselves, such as financial information is not transparent, inaccurate, management system is not perfect, unreasonable, and business decisions follow. These problems lead to the bottleneck of capital constraints, the bottleneck of scale development, and restrict the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.
For private small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate governance has its particularity. Family centralization and relationship governance have remarkable characteristics. Centralized and relational corporate governance structure has more disadvantages than advantages for the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of asymmetric information and multi-shareholders, entrepreneurs'decision-making power and operating income are asymmetric, and their decision-making basis is basic. There is a tendency to use relational transactions to damage the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in order to maximize the interests of the family rather than the business. Imperfect internal management mechanisms are difficult to promise a predictable future, and it is difficult to send positive and clear signals to market investors, purely hoping for bank credit and securities markets. To solve the financing constraints of enterprises on the market is tantamount to curing the symptoms without curing the root cause.To achieve the long-term development of private SMEs, it is urgent to improve corporate governance.However, the establishment of modern enterprise system needs not only the conscious awareness of entrepreneurs, but also external policies, legal environment and other financial institutions, and the benign promotion of investors.
The advent of private equity, especially venture capital funds, not only broadens the financing channels of private enterprises in China, but also promotes the reform of corporate governance ideas with advanced management concepts. Based on the above background and cognition, this paper combs the literature and deduces the game model to study the impact of private equity funds on the corporate governance of private SMEs.
Based on the research subject and research purpose of this paper, the article starts from four aspects: private small and medium-sized enterprises, private equity, corporate governance, correlation analysis. Firstly, through combing the status of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the economic system, the role of economic development and development problems, further clarify the need to improve corporate governance structure. Necessity and significance; secondly, on the basis of a brief overview of the research framework and structure in the field of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the particularity of private enterprise governance - Relationship Governance and its characteristics, so as to determine the breakthrough point to improve corporate governance structure; thirdly, it retrospects the development of private equity funds influencing factors, agency issues and exit issues. Finally, the research methods and perspectives of the relationship between private equity funds and corporate governance in the previous literature are studied, so as to provide reference for the follow-up writing of this paper.
Then focus on the private SMEs, through the analysis of their governance status and characteristics, pointed out that the centralization of management resources, closed entrepreneurs (decision makers) rights, responsibilities, benefits asymmetry, and this imbalance enhanced the impulse of entrepreneurs related transactions, easy to cause infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Further, establish a game model, and from a single share. East's analysis extends to the analysis of multiple shareholders, and draws the conclusion that as long as the decision-making structure is not changed, the lower the entrepreneur's share, the greater the possibility of related party transactions.
Then it introduces the development and operation characteristics of private equity funds, and analyzes their investment trends, and draws the following conclusions: private equity investment industry is concentrated in the Internet, consumer health and other fields, and from the coverage of private SMEs, private equity funds and its natural coupling; in addition, in recent years, private equity funds have investment levels. In this trend, fund investment institutions will inevitably devote more energy to the governance of target companies.
Before analyzing how private equity funds affect the corporate governance of the invested firms, we first explore the motivation of private equity firms'willingness to participate in the operation of the target firms - the dual principal-agent relationship, and further point out that the first principal-agent relationship (between investors and fund managers) is to urge fund managers to supervise. The basic reason for supervising the operation of enterprises is the existence of the second-level principal-agent relationship (between venture capital institutions and target enterprises), which is the direct reason for the participation of venture capital institutions in the operation of enterprises. The change of payment matrix between entrepreneurs and partners shows that the penalty mechanism does not change the original decision-making structure, but can reduce the possibility of related party transactions to a certain extent, but the size of its inhibition is related to the penalty cost. Participatory checks and balances structure can effectively reduce the occurrence of relationship transactions and protect the interests of the whole enterprise and minority shareholders when entrepreneurs propose affiliated transactions.
The participation of venture capital institutions can promote the perfection of the governance mechanism of private SMEs. However, it needs to be clear that venture capital institutions are not angels. All their actions are based on their own interests rather than enterprise interests. The opening of management decision-making rights is not transferring. It is also extremely important to place the operation of enterprises entirely on venture capital institutions. Unwise.
The main innovation of this article is that the relationship governance is introduced as a variable into the game model, which is complementary to the empirical and theoretical analysis. Of course, all the discussions are based on previous studies of shallow analysis, if you can throw a brick to attract jade, you can not be afraid. It is simplified as "decision maker" entrepreneurs and small shareholders. At the same time, it is one-sided to generalize the drawbacks of private SMEs'corporate governance into "related party transactions".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51
本文編號(hào)：2240645
[Abstract]:As the engine of economic development, private small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting national economic growth, expanding employment, increasing fiscal revenue and other aspects. With the deepening of reform, the improvement of social system and economic system, the pioneering and guiding role of private SMEs will be more vivid and their status will be strengthened.
The significance of private economy is self-evident, but its function is based on the sound and perfect financial and corporate governance. Needless to say, there are still many problems in private enterprises, especially private SMEs themselves, such as financial information is not transparent, inaccurate, management system is not perfect, unreasonable, and business decisions follow. These problems lead to the bottleneck of capital constraints, the bottleneck of scale development, and restrict the long-term sustainable development of enterprises.
For private small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate governance has its particularity. Family centralization and relationship governance have remarkable characteristics. Centralized and relational corporate governance structure has more disadvantages than advantages for the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the case of asymmetric information and multi-shareholders, entrepreneurs'decision-making power and operating income are asymmetric, and their decision-making basis is basic. There is a tendency to use relational transactions to damage the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in order to maximize the interests of the family rather than the business. Imperfect internal management mechanisms are difficult to promise a predictable future, and it is difficult to send positive and clear signals to market investors, purely hoping for bank credit and securities markets. To solve the financing constraints of enterprises on the market is tantamount to curing the symptoms without curing the root cause.To achieve the long-term development of private SMEs, it is urgent to improve corporate governance.However, the establishment of modern enterprise system needs not only the conscious awareness of entrepreneurs, but also external policies, legal environment and other financial institutions, and the benign promotion of investors.
The advent of private equity, especially venture capital funds, not only broadens the financing channels of private enterprises in China, but also promotes the reform of corporate governance ideas with advanced management concepts. Based on the above background and cognition, this paper combs the literature and deduces the game model to study the impact of private equity funds on the corporate governance of private SMEs.
Based on the research subject and research purpose of this paper, the article starts from four aspects: private small and medium-sized enterprises, private equity, corporate governance, correlation analysis. Firstly, through combing the status of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the economic system, the role of economic development and development problems, further clarify the need to improve corporate governance structure. Necessity and significance; secondly, on the basis of a brief overview of the research framework and structure in the field of corporate governance, this paper analyzes the particularity of private enterprise governance - Relationship Governance and its characteristics, so as to determine the breakthrough point to improve corporate governance structure; thirdly, it retrospects the development of private equity funds influencing factors, agency issues and exit issues. Finally, the research methods and perspectives of the relationship between private equity funds and corporate governance in the previous literature are studied, so as to provide reference for the follow-up writing of this paper.
Then focus on the private SMEs, through the analysis of their governance status and characteristics, pointed out that the centralization of management resources, closed entrepreneurs (decision makers) rights, responsibilities, benefits asymmetry, and this imbalance enhanced the impulse of entrepreneurs related transactions, easy to cause infringement on the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Further, establish a game model, and from a single share. East's analysis extends to the analysis of multiple shareholders, and draws the conclusion that as long as the decision-making structure is not changed, the lower the entrepreneur's share, the greater the possibility of related party transactions.
Then it introduces the development and operation characteristics of private equity funds, and analyzes their investment trends, and draws the following conclusions: private equity investment industry is concentrated in the Internet, consumer health and other fields, and from the coverage of private SMEs, private equity funds and its natural coupling; in addition, in recent years, private equity funds have investment levels. In this trend, fund investment institutions will inevitably devote more energy to the governance of target companies.
Before analyzing how private equity funds affect the corporate governance of the invested firms, we first explore the motivation of private equity firms'willingness to participate in the operation of the target firms - the dual principal-agent relationship, and further point out that the first principal-agent relationship (between investors and fund managers) is to urge fund managers to supervise. The basic reason for supervising the operation of enterprises is the existence of the second-level principal-agent relationship (between venture capital institutions and target enterprises), which is the direct reason for the participation of venture capital institutions in the operation of enterprises. The change of payment matrix between entrepreneurs and partners shows that the penalty mechanism does not change the original decision-making structure, but can reduce the possibility of related party transactions to a certain extent, but the size of its inhibition is related to the penalty cost. Participatory checks and balances structure can effectively reduce the occurrence of relationship transactions and protect the interests of the whole enterprise and minority shareholders when entrepreneurs propose affiliated transactions.
The participation of venture capital institutions can promote the perfection of the governance mechanism of private SMEs. However, it needs to be clear that venture capital institutions are not angels. All their actions are based on their own interests rather than enterprise interests. The opening of management decision-making rights is not transferring. It is also extremely important to place the operation of enterprises entirely on venture capital institutions. Unwise.
The main innovation of this article is that the relationship governance is introduced as a variable into the game model, which is complementary to the empirical and theoretical analysis. Of course, all the discussions are based on previous studies of shallow analysis, if you can throw a brick to attract jade, you can not be afraid. It is simplified as "decision maker" entrepreneurs and small shareholders. At the same time, it is one-sided to generalize the drawbacks of private SMEs'corporate governance into "related party transactions".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51
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