本文選題：地方債務(wù) + 債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)�。� 參考：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,在化解國(guó)際金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)負(fù)面影響,國(guó)家為了保持經(jīng)濟(jì)平穩(wěn)較快發(fā)展出臺(tái)了一系列經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激政策,在刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)也帶來負(fù)面效應(yīng),導(dǎo)致地方政府在中央政策引導(dǎo)下,為了促進(jìn)地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),大量進(jìn)行基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)投資拉動(dòng)內(nèi)需。但由于地方政府的自身財(cái)力無法承擔(dān)規(guī)模巨大的資金投入,為了彌補(bǔ)資金不足只能選擇債務(wù)融資,嚴(yán)重影響了地方財(cái)政的健康發(fā)展。地方政府債務(wù)雖然在推動(dòng)地方經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)籌集資金等方面具有積極促進(jìn)作用,但如果缺乏科學(xué)有效的地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理,沒有對(duì)地方政府自身的財(cái)政承受能力進(jìn)行評(píng)估,盲目擴(kuò)大債務(wù)融資規(guī)模,導(dǎo)致地方政府無法承擔(dān)還本付息的義務(wù),地方政府就會(huì)爆發(fā)債務(wù)危機(jī),影響社會(huì)穩(wěn)定及經(jīng)濟(jì)健康發(fā)展。地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的協(xié)同管理機(jī)制研究以協(xié)同理論為核心,強(qiáng)調(diào)各個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)主體之間的合作,能夠?qū)φe債行為進(jìn)行全過程、全方位的監(jiān)督,提高地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理水平。在對(duì)地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)協(xié)同管理機(jī)制的研究中,以協(xié)同理論、公共產(chǎn)品理論、委托代理理論以及財(cái)政分權(quán)等為理論依據(jù),對(duì)地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行界定,綜合運(yùn)用文獻(xiàn)分析法、理論分析法、定性分析法以及比較分析法,分析我國(guó)地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)現(xiàn)狀以及地方政府性債務(wù)管理現(xiàn)狀,發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理存在:債務(wù)資金規(guī)模大使用效率低、政府債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與市場(chǎng)聯(lián)動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加劇、缺乏第三方協(xié)同管理、政府間缺乏合作監(jiān)督、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警機(jī)制缺乏等問題。深度剖析地方債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)生的原因,運(yùn)用博弈分析方法,揭示協(xié)同管理對(duì)于防范地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)擴(kuò)散中的作用。在研究過程中積極借鑒國(guó)際先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn),提出構(gòu)建地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)協(xié)同管理機(jī)制的具體指導(dǎo)意見:完善地方政府債務(wù)相關(guān)法律法規(guī)、構(gòu)建有效的地方政府債務(wù)協(xié)同管理框架、構(gòu)建地方政府間信息實(shí)時(shí)共享平臺(tái)和建立風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估與預(yù)警機(jī)制。針對(duì)我國(guó)地方債務(wù)的具體問題,提出切實(shí)有效的指導(dǎo)意見:構(gòu)建多級(jí)政府間債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)協(xié)同管理機(jī)制、構(gòu)建政府與市場(chǎng)間協(xié)同管理機(jī)制以及人大與政府間協(xié)同管理機(jī)制。通過建立多方位、跨領(lǐng)域、跨區(qū)域的地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)協(xié)同管理機(jī)制,提高我國(guó)地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理水平。
[Abstract]:In recent years, in order to resolve the negative impact of the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the state has introduced a series of economic stimulus policies in order to maintain a steady and rapid economic development, which not only stimulates economic growth but also brings negative effects. In order to promote regional economic growth, local governments, under the guidance of central policies, invest in infrastructure construction to boost domestic demand. However, the local government can not afford the huge scale of capital investment, in order to make up for the lack of funds can only choose debt financing, which seriously affects the healthy development of local finance. Although local government debt plays an active role in promoting local economic development and raising funds for infrastructure construction, but in the absence of scientific and effective local government debt risk management, Without the evaluation of the local government's financial affordability and blindly expanding the scale of debt financing, the local government can not bear the obligation of servicing capital and interest, and the local government will break out the debt crisis and affect the social stability and the healthy development of the economy. The research on the cooperative management mechanism of local government debt risk is based on the synergetic theory, which emphasizes the cooperation among various risk subjects, and can supervise the whole process of the government borrowing behavior. We will raise the level of risk management for local government debt. In the research of local government debt risk coordination management mechanism, based on the coordination theory, public goods theory, principal-agent theory and fiscal decentralization, this paper defines the related concepts of local government debt risk. This paper analyzes the present situation of risk of local government debt and the present situation of management of local government debt in China by means of literature analysis, theoretical analysis, qualitative analysis and comparative analysis. It is found that the risk management of local government debt exists in the following aspects: low efficiency of large scale use of debt funds, aggravation of government debt risk and market linkage risk, lack of third party coordination management and lack of cooperative supervision between governments. Lack of risk warning mechanism and other problems. The causes of local debt risk are analyzed in depth, and the role of cooperative management in preventing the transmission and diffusion of local government debt risk is revealed by using the game analysis method. In the course of the research, the author actively draws lessons from the international advanced experience, and puts forward the concrete guidance to construct the local government debt risk coordination management mechanism: to perfect the local government debt related laws and regulations, to construct the effective local government debt coordination management frame. To build a real-time information sharing platform between local governments and establish a risk assessment and early warning mechanism. Aiming at the specific problems of local debt in China, this paper puts forward some practical and effective guidance opinions: to construct a multi-level intergovernmental debt risk coordination management mechanism, to construct a cooperative management mechanism between the government and the market, and to establish a cooperative management mechanism between the people's Congress and the government. In order to improve the level of local government debt risk management in China, a multi-directional, cross-domain and cross-regional cooperative management mechanism of local government debt risk is established.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F812.5

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本文編號(hào)：1980259