本文關(guān)鍵詞：股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)、高管解雇壓力與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究》2017年10期 　論文類型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股票期權(quán) 解雇壓力 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān) 期權(quán)分類

【摘要】：本文融合經(jīng)典代理理論和行為代理理論兩種理論觀點(diǎn),依據(jù)激勵(lì)條件和行權(quán)有效期,將高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)區(qū)分為嚴(yán)苛型和寬松型兩類,分別研究其激勵(lì)程度與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平之間的關(guān)系,并考察高管解雇壓力對(duì)此二者關(guān)系的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)嚴(yán)苛型高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)程度與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平呈顯著非線性關(guān)系,寬松型高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)程度與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平呈顯著線性負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;(2)解雇壓力滯后了嚴(yán)苛型高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)程度與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平之間的非線性關(guān)系,并減弱了寬松型高管股票期激勵(lì)程度與公司風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:In this paper, combining the classic agency theory and behavior theory of agency two theories, on the basis of incentive conditions and the exercise period, the executive stock option incentive is divided into severe type and loose type two categories, respectively, to study the relationship between the incentive degree and firm risk level, and test the effect of observing the relationship between the two executives dismissed this pressure. The results show that: (1) severe type of executive stock option incentive and corporate risk-taking level showed a significant nonlinear relationship, loose type of executive stock option incentive and corporate risk-taking level showed a significant linear negative correlation; (2) fire pressure hysteresis nonlinear relationship between the level of risk taking harsh type of executive stock option incentive degree and the company, and weaken the negative relationship between executive stock incentive period loose and firm risk level.

【作者單位】： 東北大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“面向價(jià)值目標(biāo)導(dǎo)引的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略決策方法研究”(71271048) 教育部博士學(xué)科點(diǎn)專項(xiàng)基金(博導(dǎo)類)項(xiàng)目“長期報(bào)酬、非貨幣效用及動(dòng)態(tài)基礎(chǔ)薪酬的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)研究:基于相對(duì)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造視角”(20130042110032) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究規(guī)劃基金項(xiàng)目“在職消費(fèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)性質(zhì)、作用機(jī)理及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果研究”(16YJA630048)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.3;F272.91;F724.5
【正文快照】： 一、問題提出 股票期權(quán)是激勵(lì)高管的重要手段,不同于西方國家的傳統(tǒng)型股票期權(quán)大都采用股價(jià)作為高管行權(quán)的依據(jù),國內(nèi)公司普遍采用公司業(yè)績作為高管行權(quán)的依據(jù),即國內(nèi)公司實(shí)施的股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃為業(yè)績型股票期權(quán),但關(guān)于這些業(yè)績條件等行權(quán)條款的設(shè)置對(duì)高管進(jìn)行股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí)

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