【摘要】：我國以建立市場經(jīng)濟為目標(biāo)推進(jìn)經(jīng)濟體制改革以來,企業(yè)間以價格競爭為 主要手段,輔之以技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、品牌、質(zhì)量、售后服務(wù)等措施,惡性競爭一浪高 過一浪,其中尤以彩電行業(yè)的價格戰(zhàn)更令人注目。本文即以對我國整個國民經(jīng) 濟市場化進(jìn)程具有深遠(yuǎn)影響的彩電行業(yè)價格戰(zhàn)為背景,對寡頭價格競爭模式進(jìn) 行探討和研究。 本文對影響廠商定價的諸多因素進(jìn)行了有重點的全面分析,指出了各種因 素是如何影響廠商定價的,以及影響的強度和方式。 本文在對現(xiàn)有的寡頭競爭理論模型分析之后,指出了這些模型在解釋寡頭 競爭行為時存在的問題,即假設(shè)條件太多,只能對已有的經(jīng)濟行為進(jìn)行解釋, 無法預(yù)測寡頭未來的行為走向,以及寡頭競爭是如何達(dá)到均衡點的(即暫時休 戰(zhàn))。 本文從對無鞍點贏得矩陣的討論引出了混合博弈的概念,即寡頭在參與市 場競爭時往往不是采取某個單一行動,而是采取多種行動的組合來回?fù)羝涓偁?對手。對于混合博弈,則將其求解最終歸結(jié)為求解兩個線性規(guī)劃問題,并進(jìn)一 步得出了在某些情況下LP問題的求解可轉(zhuǎn)化為求解兩個線性方程組問題。利 用所討論的有關(guān)混合博弈性質(zhì),進(jìn)一步簡化了求解過程,給出了某些簡單混合 博弈的求解公式和圖解法。文中給出的迭代算法具有一般性,不僅可以求解一 般情況下的二人混合博弈或多人博弈,求解結(jié)果還能解釋寡頭競爭的未來走向 以及到達(dá)均衡點的過程。本文的模型,對其他行業(yè)也有借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of the economic system has been promoted with the goal of establishing a market economy, the main means among enterprises have been price competition, supplemented by measures such as technological innovation, brand, quality, after-sales service, etc. Vicious competition is higher than the wave, especially in the color TV industry price war is more noticeable. Based on the price war of color TV industry, which has a profound influence on the marketization process of the whole national economy of China, this paper discusses and studies the oligopoly price competition mode. This paper makes a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affect the pricing of the firm, and points out how the factors affect the pricing of the firm, as well as the intensity and manner of the influence. After analyzing the existing oligopoly competition theory models, this paper points out the problems of these models in explaining oligopoly competition behavior, that is, if there are too many conditions, we can only explain the existing economic behavior. It is impossible to predict the future behavior of oligarchs, and how oligarchic competition reaches equilibrium point. In this paper, the concept of mixed game is derived from the discussion of the win matrix without saddle point, that is, when oligarchs take part in market competition, they often do not take a single action. It is a combination of actions to fight back at its competitors. For mixed game, the solution is finally reduced to solving two linear programming problems, and it is further obtained that the solution of LP problem can be transformed into solving two linear equations in some cases. By using the properties of the mixed game discussed, the solution process is further simplified, and the solution formulas and graphical methods of some simple mixed games are given. The iterative algorithm presented in this paper is of a general nature and can not only solve a two-person mixed game or a multi-player game in a given case. The results can also explain the future trend of oligopoly and the process of reaching equilibrium point. The model of this paper can also be used for reference by other industries.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F016

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前9條

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3 王倩;城市軌道交通定價模型研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2008年

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6 王勝蘭;基于期權(quán)契約的三級品牌專營供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究[D];西南財經(jīng)大學(xué);2010年

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9 年欣;我國上市公司所得稅優(yōu)惠產(chǎn)生的隱性稅收效應(yīng)研究[D];合肥工業(yè)大學(xué);2013年

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本文編號：2405882