【摘要】：本文是一個對政府憑借行政權力作出的管制行為所進行的研究，目的在于分析和說明是否需要以及在多大程度上需要政府管制。本文的研究主要從以下幾個方面展開： 首先，為了能夠系統(tǒng)全面地回答是否需要以及在多大程度上需要政府管制這一問題，我們在第一章的導論中確立了本文的研究范圍、研究方法和分析思路。 對于研究范圍的確定，我們選擇了從政府管制的理由和政府與市場的關系方面入手進行分析。經過對市場機制在資源配置方面的效率及其缺陷的分析，以及對政府本質的分析，我們認為，盡管存在市場缺陷，市場仍是進行資源配置的一種主要的和有效的機制；而政府的起源決定了政府的本質只是公眾轉讓的社會權力的一種執(zhí)行機構，而不是資源配置的主導力量，只是由于市場在引導社會資源的配置過程中存在這樣或那樣的缺陷，才存在了政府參與資源配置的可能�？紤]到市場缺陷的多樣性和政府參與資源配置方式的多樣性(政府管制只是其中的一種)，我們進而對市場缺陷的類別和政府參與資源配置的方式與手段進行了分析，并由此將政府管制的理由確定在了自然壟斷、負外部性、正外部性和信息不對稱等市場缺陷方面。但是，我們指出，自然壟斷、負外部性、正外部性和信息不對稱等市場缺陷只是為致府管制提供了可能，最終是否真正需要政府管制需要經過仔細地比較分析政府管與不管的結果方可確定�？梢哉J為，本文的研究過程正是這樣一個比較分析政府管與不管的過程。因此，本文的研究范圍便很清晰地確定在了政府對自然壟斷的管制、政府對負外部性的管制、政府對正外部性的管制和政府對信息不對稱的管制等四個方面；政府管制的經濟分析過程實際上也就是為了回答是否需要以及在多大程度上需要政府管制這一問題而對上述四個領域的政府管與不管進行比較分析的過程。 在對政府管制進行經濟分析的過程中，本文主要采取了理論實證研究方法，因而論述的過程比較多的將是一種抽象的推理過程。在一些場合中我們也使用到了經驗實證的研究方法，有時也涉及到了實驗經濟學的研究方法。 本文的分析思路簡單說起來，大致上可以歸納為四個步驟：第一步分析市場缺陷的經濟表現(xiàn)及其效率損失；第二步分析市場條件下解決市場缺陷的可能性及其約束條件：第三步分析政府管制解決市場缺陷的可能性及其約束條件；第四步比較分析兩種解決市場缺陷的機制并對是否需要以及在多大程度上需要政府管制的問題作出傾向性的評價。評價的依據主要是效率標準。 其次，根據在導論中確定的研究范圍、研究方法和分析思路，我們在第二章至第五章的內容中分別對自然壟斷、負外部性、正外部性和信息不對稱等市場缺陷的政府管制逐個展開了研究分析。 第二章是對政府對自然壟斷的管制所做的經濟分析。在這一章里，，我們首先規(guī)范地描述了自然壟斷的經濟特性及其由該經濟特性所決定的對管制的需求；然后主要圍繞價格管制手段對政府管制自然壟斷的可能性進行了詳盡的分析。分析的基本結論是不存在任何一種既能保證生產效率又能避免壟斷弊端的解決自然壟斷問題的管制方案。由此，我們進而對政府管制自然壟斷的合意性提出了質疑，并對價格歧視及其福利含義作了詳盡的理論與經驗實證分析。質疑和分析的結果表明，即使壟斷會因自然(技術)原因而存在，我們也不一定有充
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to analyze and explain the need for and to what extent government regulation is needed by the government by administrative power. The research of this paper is mainly carried out in the following aspects:
First of all, in order to answer the question of whether the system needs to be fully answered and to what extent the government needs to be regulated, we have established the scope of the study, the method of research and the thinking of the analysis in the introduction to the first chapter.
To determine the scope of the study, we choose to analyze the reasons for government regulation and the relationship between the government and the market. Through the analysis of the efficiency and defects of the market mechanism in the allocation of resources and the analysis of the nature of the government, we believe that the market is still a resource allocation, although it is in the market defect. The origin of the government determines that the nature of the government is only an executive agency for the social power transferred by the public, not the dominant force in the allocation of resources, but only because the market exists in the process of guiding the allocation of social resources so that the government participates in the allocation of resources. Yes. Considering the diversity of market defects and the diversity of government participation in the allocation of resources (government regulation is only one of them), we then analyze the categories of market defects and the ways and means of government participation in the allocation of resources, and thus determine the reason for government regulation in natural monopoly, negative externality and positive externality. However, we point out that market defects such as natural monopoly, negative externality, positive externality and information asymmetry are only possible for government regulation, and ultimately whether government regulation is really needed is to be carefully compared and analyzed by government management and no matter the result. The research process is a comparative analysis of the process of government management and no matter. Therefore, the scope of this study is clearly defined in the government's control of natural monopoly, the government's control of the negative externality, the government's control of the positive externality and the government's control of information asymmetry, and the economic analysis of government regulation. The process is actually a process of comparative analysis of government management in the above four areas in order to answer the question of whether or not it needs to be regulated by the government.
In the process of economic analysis of government regulation, this paper mainly adopts a theoretical empirical research method, so the process of discussion will be an abstract reasoning process. In some cases, we also use empirical empirical research methods, and sometimes it also involves the research methods of experimental economics.
The analysis of this paper can be simply summed up in four steps: the first step is to analyze the economic performance of market defects and the loss of efficiency; the second step is to analyze the possibility and constraints of market defects under market conditions: the third step analysis the possibility and constraints of government regulation to solve market defects; The fourth step is to compare and analyze the two mechanisms to solve market defects and to make a tendency to evaluate the need for and to the extent to which the government needs to be regulated. The basis of the evaluation is mainly the efficiency standard.
Secondly, according to the scope of research, research methods and analysis ideas in the introduction, we analyze the government regulation of market defects such as natural monopoly, negative externality, positive externality and information asymmetry in the contents of second chapters to fifth chapters.
The second chapter is the economic analysis of the government's control of natural monopoly. In this chapter, we first describe the economic characteristics of natural monopoly and the demand for regulation determined by the economic characteristics, and then the possibility of the self monopoly control of government regulation is analyzed in detail around the price control means. The basic conclusion of the analysis is that there is no control scheme to solve the problem of natural monopoly which can not only guarantee the efficiency of production but also avoid the abuse of monopoly. In this way, we then question the consensual nature of the government's control of natural monopoly, and make a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of price discrimination and its welfare. The analysis shows that even if monopolies exist due to natural (technological) reasons, we will not necessarily have sufficient charges.
【學位授予單位】：上海財經大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2003
【分類號】：F062.6

【引證文獻】

相關博士學位論文 前1條

1 白濤;房地產業(yè)的政府管制[D];暨南大學;2008年

本文編號：2161318