股權激勵對股價崩盤風險的影響研究
本文選題:股價崩盤風險 切入點:股權激勵 出處:《安徽大學》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
【摘要】:股價崩盤作為股價非對稱波動下的一種極端性現(xiàn)象,具體的表現(xiàn)多為股票價格或者大盤指數(shù)在短時間內(nèi)大幅下跌。一旦股市面臨崩盤的風險將帶來嚴重后果,諸如1987年美國股市暴跌、亞洲金融危機和全球金融危機等崩盤事件的發(fā)生不僅損害市場參與者的切身利益、危及股票市場的平穩(wěn)有序,更可能動搖資本市場的信心。所有權與經(jīng)營權的分離導致委托代理雙方由于訴求的天然差異引發(fā)的利益沖突,隨著公司的擴張和經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,利益沖突日益深化影響公司長遠發(fā)展。股權激勵旨在以股份或期權等形式聯(lián)結(jié)委托代理雙方的利益,使代理人的回報與企業(yè)發(fā)展狀況、股市表現(xiàn)掛鉤從而激勵管理層更加勤勉盡責以消彌代理成本。然而,相關的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)卻指向與此矛盾的結(jié)果。那么,股權激勵的引入將給股價崩盤風險帶來什么樣的影響?產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)在其中又將發(fā)揮怎樣的作用?作為一個成長中的新興經(jīng)濟體,我國股市雖整體穩(wěn)健但現(xiàn)階段受到諸如投資者不夠理性成熟、法律機制不夠健全以及金融風險日益累積等問題的嚴峻考驗,相較于發(fā)達國家面臨更高的股市崩盤風險。因此,我國特殊的制度背景為開展股價崩盤風險的研究提供了理想的實證研究樣本,相關的研究成果對于管控金融風險、助推資本市場規(guī)范發(fā)展有著重要的理論和現(xiàn)實意義。本文基于行為金融、委托代理和薪酬契約等理論,以2006-2014年間滬深兩市首次公告股權激勵方案的上市公司為研究對象,實證檢驗股權激勵與股價崩盤風險之間的互動關系,并進一步考察產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)在其中發(fā)揮怎樣的作用。研究結(jié)論如下:(1)股權激勵與股價崩盤風險呈顯著正相關的關系;(2)進一步考慮產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)差異,分組回歸結(jié)果表明國有的產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)顯著增強二者的正相關程度。本文主要由五個章節(jié)組成,第一章即緒論,著重對研究相關的背景、方法與思路以及創(chuàng)新點進行介紹,并簡要梳理了國內(nèi)外關于股價崩盤風險影響因素、股權激勵以及產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的相關文獻,為后續(xù)研究做好鋪墊。第二章為概念界定與理論基礎,對股權激勵、股價崩盤風險進行理論界定,在此基礎上從行為金融理論、委托代理理論和薪酬契約理論三方面簡要闡述本文的理論基礎。第三章為現(xiàn)狀分析與研究假設,在制度背景和現(xiàn)狀分析的基礎上提出本文的研究假設。第四章為實證研究,借鑒相關文獻設計研究變量、構建研究模型、進行描述性統(tǒng)計和相關性分析,在此基礎上對全樣本進行多元回歸,并按照產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的差異將樣本分為國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)兩類進行分組回歸以檢驗本文的研究假設。第五章為研究結(jié)論、建議與展望。本文的研究不僅進一步拓展了股價崩盤風險的研究思路和視野,而且有利于正確定位和引導股權激勵在我國的實踐,此外也為引導中國資本市場的平穩(wěn)發(fā)展提供了一種有益參考和治理思路。
[Abstract]:Stock price crash is an extreme phenomenon under asymmetric fluctuation of stock price. The concrete manifestation is that the stock price or market index falls sharply in a short period of time. Once the stock market is exposed to the risk of collapse, there will be serious consequences. Events such as the collapse of the US stock market in 1987, the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis not only hurt the vital interests of market participants, but also endanger the stability and order of the stock market. It is more likely to shake the confidence of the capital market. The separation of ownership and management rights leads to conflicts of interest caused by the natural differences in the demands of the principal and agent. With the expansion of the company and the development of the economy, The purpose of equity incentive is to connect the interests of both principal and agent in the form of shares or options, so as to make the return of the agent and the development of the enterprise. Stock market performance is linked to encourage management to work harder to offset agency costs. However, empirical evidence points to conflicting outcomes. So what will be the impact of the introduction of equity incentives on the risk of a stock price crash? What role will the nature of property rights play in it? As a growing emerging economy, although the stock market of our country is sound as a whole, it is severely tested at this stage by such problems as the investors are not rational and mature, the legal mechanism is not perfect enough and the financial risks are accumulating day by day. Compared with the developed countries, the risk of stock market crash is higher. Therefore, the special institutional background of our country provides an ideal sample of empirical research for the research on the risk of stock price collapse. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to promote the normative development of the capital market. Based on the theories of behavioral finance, principal-agent and salary contract, this paper focuses on the listed companies with the first announcement of equity incentive schemes in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2006 and 2014. An empirical study of the interaction between equity incentives and the risk of stock price collapse, The conclusion of the study is as follows: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between equity incentives and the risk of stock price collapse. The results of grouping regression show that the nature of state-owned property rights significantly enhances the positive correlation between the two. This paper is mainly composed of five chapters, the first chapter is the introduction, focusing on the research background, methods and ideas, as well as innovation points are introduced. And briefly combs the domestic and foreign related literature on the risk factors of stock price crash, equity incentive and property right nature, for the follow-up study. Chapter two is the definition and theoretical basis of the concept, equity incentive, On the basis of the definition of the risk of stock price collapse, the theoretical basis of this paper is briefly expounded from three aspects: behavioral finance theory, principal-agent theory and salary contract theory. Chapter three is the current situation analysis and research hypothesis. Based on the analysis of institutional background and current situation, this paper puts forward the research hypotheses of this paper. Chapter 4th is an empirical study, drawing on the relevant literature design research variables, constructing research model, carrying out descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. On this basis, the whole sample is regressed by multivariate regression. According to the difference of property rights, the samples are divided into state-owned enterprises and private enterprises to test the research hypotheses of this paper. Chapter 5th is the conclusion of the study. Suggestions and prospects. This study not only further expands the research ideas and horizons of the risk of stock price collapse, but also helps to correctly position and guide the practice of equity incentives in China. In addition, it also provides a useful reference and management idea to guide the smooth development of Chinese capital market.
【學位授予單位】:安徽大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F832.51;F272.92
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