本文選題：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌 + 運(yùn)作模式��； 參考：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：眾籌,簡單來說就是向普通社會大眾籌集閑置的社會資金用于某一特定的社會活動或生產(chǎn)勞動。隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展和自媒體時(shí)代的到來,眾籌實(shí)現(xiàn)了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)化,正式登上了金融融資的舞臺�；ヂ�(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌高效、便捷、對融資需求者的準(zhǔn)入門檻低的特點(diǎn)與我國一直困擾與融資難題的小微企業(yè)具有很高的契合度,近幾年在我國得到了飛速發(fā)展。但由于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌模式在國內(nèi)外都處于發(fā)展初期,從國外成熟互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺中獲得的經(jīng)驗(yàn)有限,國內(nèi)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌的發(fā)展只能“摸著石頭過河”。不健全的商業(yè)模式、不成熟的運(yùn)作機(jī)制及不健全的市場環(huán)境等問題的存在,使大量互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺在百花齊放中卻只能曇花一現(xiàn),被迫停業(yè)或轉(zhuǎn)型,而各互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺上發(fā)布的融資項(xiàng)目成功率普遍很低,作為項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人的小微企業(yè)融資問題沒能得到明顯改善。從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌各參與主體間的博弈關(guān)系出發(fā)研究互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌的運(yùn)作模式對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌未來的健康發(fā)展有積極的作用。本文在整理和分析現(xiàn)有研究的基礎(chǔ)上梳理了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌中各參與主體之間的博弈關(guān)系,并選擇以互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺和項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人之間的合作沖突為研究切入點(diǎn),運(yùn)用演化博弈理論的分析方法,構(gòu)建互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌模式下互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺與項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人策略行為的演化博弈模型,對各方分別建立復(fù)制動態(tài)方程進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)定性分析,并通過數(shù)值仿真探求影響互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺與項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人博弈均衡的關(guān)鍵因素。研究表明:項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人的融資需求量,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺收取的服務(wù)費(fèi)率,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺提供高服務(wù)的效率,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺提供高服務(wù)的機(jī)會成本以及政府對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌行業(yè)的監(jiān)管程度是影響博弈均衡的關(guān)鍵因素。針對研究結(jié)果,本文對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺如何運(yùn)作轉(zhuǎn)型提出了一些建設(shè)性意見。本文從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺與項(xiàng)目發(fā)起人的合作博弈行為視角思考了影響互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺運(yùn)作模式的關(guān)鍵因素,在研究選題和研究方法上有所創(chuàng)新,拓寬了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌的研究思路,具有一定的理論價(jià)值。同時(shí)本文根據(jù)研究結(jié)論對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌平臺如何運(yùn)作轉(zhuǎn)型提出了一些建設(shè)性意見,對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌發(fā)展具有一定的指導(dǎo)作用。
[Abstract]:Crowdfunding is simply raising idle social funds from the general public for a particular social activity or productive labour.With the rapid development of Internet technology and the arrival of the era of self-media, crowdfunding has realized the Internet and formally stepped onto the stage of financial financing.Internet crowdfunding is efficient and convenient. The characteristics of low entry threshold for financing demanders have a high degree of agreement with the small and micro enterprises which have been puzzling and financing problems in our country. In recent years, it has been developing rapidly in our country.However, because the mode of Internet crowdfunding is in the early stage of development both at home and abroad, the experience gained from foreign mature Internet crowdfunding platforms is limited, so the development of domestic Internet crowdfunding can only "touch the stone and cross the river".The existence of unsound business models, immature operating mechanisms and imperfect market environments has made a large number of Internet crowdfunding platforms ephemeral and forced to close down or transform.However, the success rate of financing projects published on various Internet crowdfunding platforms is generally very low, and the financing problems of small and micro enterprises, as project sponsors, have not been significantly improved.Starting from the game relationship among the participants of Internet crowdfunding, the study of the operation mode of Internet crowdfunding has a positive effect on the healthy development of Internet crowdfunding in the future.On the basis of sorting out and analyzing the existing research, this paper combs the game relationship among the participants in the Internet crowdfunding, and chooses the cooperative conflict between the Internet crowdfunding platform and the project sponsors as the starting point.Based on the evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary game model between the Internet crowdfunding platform and the project sponsors' strategic behavior is constructed, and the stability of the replicating dynamic equations is analyzed.The key factors influencing the game equilibrium between the Internet crowdfunding platform and the project sponsors are explored by numerical simulation.The research shows that the financing demand of the project sponsors, the service rates charged by the Internet crowdfunding platform, and the efficiency of the Internet crowdfunding platform in providing high service,The high opportunity cost of the Internet crowdfunding platform and the degree of government supervision over the Internet crowdfunding industry are the key factors affecting the game equilibrium.In view of the research results, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions on how to operate and transform the Internet crowdfunding platform.From the perspective of cooperative game behavior between Internet crowdfunding platform and project sponsors, this paper considers the key factors that affect the operation mode of Internet crowdfunding platform, innovates in research topics and research methods, and broadens the research ideas of Internet crowdfunding.It has certain theoretical value.At the same time, this paper puts forward some constructive suggestions on how to operate and transform the Internet crowdfunding platform according to the conclusion of the research, which has a certain guiding effect on the development of Internet crowdfunding.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F224.32;F724.6;F832

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本文編號：1761103