本文關鍵詞： 排放限額 硬性限額 軟性限額 政企博弈　出處：《合肥工業(yè)大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：環(huán)境污染排放限額制度是一種廣泛使用的環(huán)境政策工具,但在實際執(zhí)行過程中往往難以取得令人滿意的效果。其原因之一就是企業(yè)相對于政府擁有信息優(yōu)勢(企業(yè)的成本為私人信息),這使得企業(yè)有充足的動機利用此優(yōu)勢為其自身爭取更加寬松的政策環(huán)境(即較小的環(huán)保壓力)。文章以此為出發(fā)點,嘗試建立排放限額制度在信息不對稱條件下的政企動態(tài)博弈模型,根據(jù)排放限額實施過程中不同變量的決策順序不同,將排放限額分為軟性限額與硬性限額,進而分析政企雙方在其中的行為模式。同時,通過實證對信息不對稱與企業(yè)環(huán)境壓力之間的關系進行分析。具體而言,分別從行業(yè)與企業(yè)的角度收集數(shù)據(jù),采用環(huán)境規(guī)制強度和國企比例作為行業(yè)層面環(huán)境壓力和信息不對稱程度的度量,采用企業(yè)排污費占管理費用比重和環(huán)境信息披露程度作為企業(yè)層面環(huán)境壓力和信息不對稱程度的度量,分別考察兩個層面中變量之間的關系。最后,在理論分析與實證的基礎上,根據(jù)既有模型提出一個改進的政府博弈方案,以使政府彌補信息不對稱導致的排放限額制度的失效。文章的理論模型顯示,當政府只能依靠企業(yè)的自覺匯報與名義賬目調(diào)查來推測企業(yè)成本時,企業(yè)有足夠的動機誤導政府,以使政府設置更為寬松的限額。行業(yè)層面的實證認為,行業(yè)的國有企業(yè)占比與該行業(yè)的環(huán)境規(guī)制相對強度呈正相關關系,即政府很可能對國企的強力掌握收集了更準確的信息,從而在擁有大量國企的行業(yè)中制定了相對嚴苛的限額。企業(yè)層面的實證認為,環(huán)境信息披露程度較高的企業(yè),其排污費占管理費用的比例也較高,從而信息不對稱程度的減弱可能使企業(yè)(至少是上市公司)不得不面臨較大的環(huán)保支出。最后的改進博弈方案認為,在不考慮更換政策工具的前提下,政府如果對信息不對稱束手無策,則理論上可以采用一種混合策略,即政府可以以一定的概率采用軟性限額,且將最終所要采取的監(jiān)管形式事先保密,直到企業(yè)支付了環(huán)保投資才對其公布。政府通過這種方法可以獲得更小的社會成本期望值。
[Abstract]:Environmental pollution emission limitation system is a widely used environmental policy tool. However, it is difficult to achieve satisfactory results in the actual implementation process. One of the reasons is that enterprises have information advantages over the government (the cost of enterprises is private information). This gives enterprises ample incentive to take advantage of this advantage to fight for a more relaxed policy environment for themselves (that is, less environmental pressure). This is the starting point of the article. This paper attempts to establish a dynamic game model of government and enterprise under the condition of asymmetric information. According to the different decision order of different variables in the implementation of emission quota, the emission limit can be divided into soft limit and hard limit. At the same time, through empirical analysis of the relationship between information asymmetry and enterprise environmental pressure. Specifically, from the perspective of industry and enterprises to collect data. The intensity of environmental regulation and the proportion of state-owned enterprises are used as the measurement of environmental pressure and asymmetric degree of information at the industry level. Using the proportion of enterprise sewage charges in management expenses and the degree of environmental information disclosure as a measure of environmental pressure and information asymmetry at the enterprise level, the relationship between the variables in the two levels is investigated respectively. Finally. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, an improved government game scheme is put forward according to the existing model, so that the government can make up for the failure of the emission quota system caused by asymmetric information. When the government can only rely on the conscious reporting of enterprises and nominal accounting surveys to estimate the costs of enterprises, enterprises have enough motivation to mislead the government, in order to make the government set more lenient quotas. The proportion of state-owned enterprises in the industry is positively correlated with the relative intensity of environmental regulation in the industry, that is, the government may have collected more accurate information about the strength of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, in a large number of state-owned enterprises in the industry to establish a relatively strict quota. The empirical evidence at the enterprise level, the environmental information disclosure degree of enterprises, its sewage charges in the proportion of management costs is also higher. As a result, the reduction of information asymmetry may make enterprises (or at least listed companies) have to face larger environmental expenditure. Finally, the improved game scheme believes that, without considering the replacement of policy tools. If the government is unable to deal with the information asymmetry, it can adopt a mixed strategy in theory, that is, the government can adopt the soft limit with a certain probability and keep the final regulatory form confidential in advance. Companies don't announce their environmental investments until they pay for them. In this way, the government can achieve lower social cost expectations.
【學位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F279.2;F224.32;F205

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1 盧越;環(huán)境污染排放限額制度下的政企博弈分析與實證研究[D];合肥工業(yè)大學;2015年

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