本文關鍵詞：獎勵型眾籌創(chuàng)新項目激勵效用及利潤博弈研究　出處：《中國科學技術大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 創(chuàng)新 創(chuàng)新項目 眾籌 激勵效用 期望理論 利潤博弈

【摘要】：在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)推動經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的全球浪潮下,我國的經(jīng)濟形勢已然面臨創(chuàng)新發(fā)展驅(qū)動新格局。互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融行業(yè)的迅速發(fā)展為"大眾創(chuàng)業(yè)、萬眾創(chuàng)新"提供了新思路。以眾籌促融資已成為有效拓寬金融體系服務創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)的新渠道。眾籌模式因其具有低門檻、多樣性、創(chuàng)新性和參與性等特點,通過整合社會分散財力資源,成為實現(xiàn)投籌資雙方共同獲利的一種有效的新型投融資模式。眾籌模式主要包括獎勵型眾籌、股權型眾籌、債權型眾籌、公益型眾籌等等。在實際運行過程中,由于眾籌模式還處在新興發(fā)展階段,一半以上的眾籌項目籌資都將面臨失敗的風險。如何提高眾籌項目融資成功率已成為亟待解決的研究熱點。目前比較成功的眾籌平臺有Kickstarter、眾籌網(wǎng)、京東眾籌等,而這些平臺主要是在運行獎勵型眾籌項目。因此本文選取獎勵型眾籌,分別從前期和中期階段對眾籌籌資成功率的相關影響因素進行了兩階段模型研究。首先在第一階段模型中,針對兩大參與主體投資方和籌資方各自的特征,依據(jù)成本收益理論,建立激勵效用模型,考慮項目質(zhì)量和折扣系數(shù)兩大因素的變化對眾籌雙方的期望效用的影響作用。研究結果表明:在三種不同的假設條件下,項目質(zhì)量和折扣系數(shù)這兩大因素通過影響眾籌雙方期望效用,對雙方主體均有一定的激勵效用存在,并提出存在雙方效用最優(yōu)化狀態(tài)的合理猜想。隨后在第二階段模型中探討了如何達到雙方效用最優(yōu)化狀態(tài),并通過分析眾籌情境中不同信息條件下投資方和籌資方兩方的利潤博弈過程,基于產(chǎn)量、產(chǎn)品投放度、折扣系數(shù)和創(chuàng)新度四個解釋變量,對雙方利益及決策的影響進行探究,最終促使投資方和籌資方進行相應的策略選擇。研究結果表明:在完全信息條件下和不完全信息條件下,投資方和籌資方最終都能達到均衡狀態(tài),并獲取各自最大收益,同時提出創(chuàng)新合作是一種雙贏策略。本文的研究成果豐富了眾籌相關研究成果,從提高獎勵型眾籌項目成功率的視角,構建了激勵效用模型,同時創(chuàng)新性地選取利潤博弈方法,探究了投籌資雙方創(chuàng)新合作的雙贏策略選擇,最終提出創(chuàng)新合作是一種雙贏策略,為眾籌市場中的投籌資方提供了新思路,對進一步深入研究眾籌具有創(chuàng)新意義和參考價值。
[Abstract]:Under the global tide of promoting economic development by the Internet, the economic situation of our country has already faced a new pattern of innovation and development, and the rapid development of the Internet financial industry has become "mass entrepreneurship". Mass innovation "provides a new way of thinking. Promoting financing by means of crowdfunding has become a new channel to effectively broaden the financial system's service innovation and entrepreneurship. The crowdfunding model is characterized by its low threshold, diversity, innovation and participation." Through the integration of social decentralized financial resources, it becomes an effective new mode of investment and financing, which includes incentive crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding, creditor's rights crowdfunding. Public welfare crowdfunding and so on. In the actual operation process, because the mode of crowdfunding is still in a new stage of development. More than half of the crowdfunding projects will face the risk of failure. How to improve the success rate of crowdfunding projects has become a research hotspot to be solved. At present, the more successful crowdfunding platform is Kickstarter. . Crowdfunding network, JingDong crowdfunding, and so on, and these platforms are mainly in the operation of incentive crowdfunding projects. In the first stage of the model, aiming at the characteristics of the two main players, the investors and the financing parties, the paper studies the influencing factors of the success rate of crowdfunding in the early and middle stages. According to the cost-benefit theory, the incentive utility model is established. Considering the influence of the two major factors of project quality and discount coefficient on the expected utility of both parties, the results show that: under three different assumptions. By influencing the expected utility of both parties, the project quality and discount coefficient have a certain incentive utility to both parties. A reasonable conjecture about the existence of the optimal state of utility between two parties is put forward, and then in the second stage model, how to achieve the optimal state of utility of both parties is discussed. And through analyzing the profit game process of investors and fund-raising parties under different information conditions in crowdfunding situation, based on the output, product delivery, discount coefficient and innovation four explanatory variables. To explore the interests of both sides and the impact of decision-making, and finally to promote the investors and financing parties to carry out the corresponding strategy choice. The research results show that: under the condition of complete information and incomplete information conditions. Both the investor and the financier can achieve the equilibrium state and obtain their own maximum income. At the same time, the innovative cooperation is a win-win strategy. The research results of this paper enrich the research results of crowdfunding. From the perspective of improving the success rate of incentive crowdfunding projects, the incentive utility model is constructed, and the profit game method is innovatively selected to explore the win-win strategy choice of innovative cooperation between investment and financing parties. Finally, it is put forward that innovation cooperation is a win-win strategy, which provides a new way of thinking for investors in crowdfunding market, and has innovative significance and reference value for further research on crowdfunding.
【學位授予單位】：中國科學技術大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;F832.4

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