【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)業(yè)是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的大系統(tǒng),它關(guān)乎國(guó)計(jì)民生,被經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家概括為我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的兩個(gè)“火車頭”之一,一直以來(lái)都是整個(gè)社會(huì)關(guān)注的重大熱點(diǎn)民生問題。我國(guó)近幾年來(lái)出現(xiàn)的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)過熱現(xiàn)象,可以各種力量和利益集團(tuán)博弈的綜合結(jié)果：中央政府的高度集權(quán)和對(duì)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的過度市場(chǎng)化,地方政府追求利益的短期化和各部門間相互協(xié)調(diào)的困難,房地產(chǎn)商各自追求高額利潤(rùn)的本性和他們之間默契的壟斷行為,以及消費(fèi)者的投機(jī)心理和對(duì)調(diào)控政策的反向預(yù)期等等�；谝陨鲜聦�(shí),本文利用研究博弈主體的行為發(fā)生直接相互作用時(shí)的決策及這種決策的均衡問題的博弈理論,將房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)中的各個(gè)主體行為理論化為幾個(gè)典型的博弈模型,求出各博弈的合理均衡解,并試圖解讀這些均衡解的現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)意義,得到相應(yīng)結(jié)論。從而為今后的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)提供參考意見,使其健康長(zhǎng)久的發(fā)展。 本文共分五個(gè)部分,主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一部分,引言。這一部分主要介紹本文所用的研究方法及研究意義,綜述在我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)博弈中各個(gè)的主體行為特征。最后對(duì)博弈論的產(chǎn)生和發(fā)展進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)要的介紹； 第二部分,房地產(chǎn)博弈的基本要素。這一部分為房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)博弈中的要素分析,集中在對(duì)主體和客體的博弈特征分析上 第三部分,具體博弈分析。這是本文的重點(diǎn),也是理論論證的部分,結(jié)合相關(guān)的政策對(duì)各種博弈進(jìn)行理論上的分析； 第四部分,實(shí)際案例分析。這一部分將以第三部分為基礎(chǔ),引入相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),并通過建立合理的數(shù)學(xué)模型尋求最優(yōu)博弈決策。 第五部分,結(jié)語(yǔ)。一方面本部分將對(duì)全文思想概要進(jìn)行闡述,并得出中心結(jié)論,給出合理建議；另一方面,對(duì)我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展形勢(shì)進(jìn)行展望。
[Abstract]:The real estate industry is a complex system, which is related to the national economy and the people's livelihood. It is one of the two "locomotives" in the economic development of our country, which has always been a major hot issue of the people's livelihood of the whole society. The overheating of the real estate market in China in recent years can be the result of various forces and interest group games: the high centralization of the central government and the excessive marketization of the real estate industry. Local governments pursue the short-term benefits and the difficulties of coordination among different departments, the real estate developers pursue the nature of high profits and their tacit monopoly behavior, as well as the speculative psychology of consumers and the reverse expectations of regulatory policies and so on. Based on the above facts, this paper makes use of the game theory to study the decision making and the equilibrium problem of the decision when the behavior of the game agent is directly interacting, and transforms the behavior theory of each subject in the real estate market into several typical game models. The rational equilibrium solutions of each game are obtained, and the realistic economic significance of these equilibrium solutions is interpreted, and the corresponding conclusions are obtained. In order to provide reference for the future real estate market, make its healthy and long-term development. This paper is divided into five parts, the main content is as follows: the first part, introduction. This part mainly introduces the research methods and significance of this paper, and summarizes the main behavior characteristics in the game of real estate market in China. Finally, the emergence and development of game theory are briefly introduced. The second part, the basic elements of real estate game. This part is the element analysis in the real estate market game, the third part focuses on the game characteristic analysis of the subject and the object, the concrete game analysis. This is the focus of this paper, also is the theoretical part of the argument, combined with the relevant policies to carry out theoretical analysis of various games; part four, the actual case study. In this part, based on the third part, the relevant data are introduced, and the optimal game decision is obtained by establishing a reasonable mathematical model. The fifth part, conclusion. On the one hand, this part will elaborate the whole text thought outline, and draw the central conclusion, give the reasonable suggestion; on the other hand, carry on the prospect to the development situation of the real estate market of our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F299.23;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：2187361