本文選題：基礎(chǔ)設施產(chǎn)業(yè) + 不完全合約　； 參考：《江西財經(jīng)大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：基礎(chǔ)設施產(chǎn)業(yè)是經(jīng)濟事業(yè)發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ),為了減輕政府的財政負擔、促進有效競爭、提高服務的效率,特許經(jīng)營逐漸成為主流模式,隨之越來越多的地方政府選擇特許經(jīng)營合約代替原來的管理模式。但不完全合約理論告訴我們,因為人的有限理性、外在情況的復雜性及不確定性等因素的存在,合約天然是不完全的。結(jié)合基礎(chǔ)設施產(chǎn)業(yè)的特性,特許經(jīng)營合約同樣是不完全的,當事后的一些問題和爭端發(fā)生時,再談判則是不可避免的。再談判的現(xiàn)象在拉美地區(qū)早已盛行,在我國也頻頻出現(xiàn)。依據(jù)已有的案例事實可以說明,再談判是存在正面影響的,可以不斷調(diào)整合約中出現(xiàn)的各種問題,實現(xiàn)帕累托改進。但是再談判的負面影響更為突出,機會主義的再談判嚴重損害了消費者利益,主要形式分為兩種:一是運營商對政府敲竹杠,以涉及面較大的項目為主,運營商出現(xiàn)機會主義行為向政府發(fā)起再談判,要求政府把初始合約修改為對自己更有利的合約,提高收費標準或延長收費年限,為了保證供給的可持續(xù)性,再談判的結(jié)果是政府對運營商妥協(xié),損害公眾利益;二是政府對運營商敲竹杠,以涉及面較小的項目為主,政府會利用自身強大的行事權(quán)力對運營商敲竹杠,出于自身的利益或迫于消費者的壓力提前修改合約,表現(xiàn)為政府承諾缺失,導致投資激勵下降,消費者不能獲得基礎(chǔ)設施的充分供給,利益受損。針對再談判的結(jié)果都是以犧牲消費者的利益為代價,各方利益失去平衡,合約不能順利履行,基礎(chǔ)設施產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展受到限制,所以對再談判機制的設計成為必要。再談判的結(jié)果是損害消費者的利益,對此進行機制設計,使得再談判能夠兼顧各方的利益,達到共贏。一是運營商對政府敲竹杠機制設計模型,由于發(fā)起再談判的情況有要求提價、延長收費年限或提高收益分配等多種情況,本文主要是針對于運營商要求提價發(fā)起再談判的機會主義行為,對此政府主要通過參與約束和激勵相容約束設計一個再談判機制激勵運營商報告自己真實的信息,保證再談判的結(jié)果是運營商實現(xiàn)利潤最大化的同時也不損害消費者的利益,達到一個共贏。而政府對運營商敲竹杠的機制設計模型,本文主要給以政府一個懲罰機制,來有效約束政府的承諾行為,保證再談判的結(jié)果能達到政府履約,企業(yè)投資的均衡,同時,也滿足了消費者的需求。通過上述的案例和模型得出,應該從提高公眾參與、引入第三方、保證信息公開透明、完善制度稟賦等方面優(yōu)化再談判程序,使再談判過程更加公平公正,最好能兼顧到消費者的利益,實現(xiàn)三方共贏,促進基礎(chǔ)設施健康持續(xù)地發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Infrastructure industry is the foundation of economic development. In order to lighten the financial burden of the government, promote effective competition and improve the efficiency of service, franchise has gradually become the mainstream mode. More and more local governments choose franchise contracts instead of the original management model. However, the incomplete contract theory tells us that the contract is naturally incomplete because of the limited rationality of human beings, the complexity of external conditions and the existence of uncertainty. Combined with the characteristics of the infrastructure industry, franchise contracts are also incomplete, and when problems and disputes arise afterwards, renegotiation is inevitable. The phenomenon of re-negotiation has already prevailed in Latin America and has frequently appeared in China. According to the existing case facts, the renegotiation has a positive effect, and can constantly adjust the various problems in the contract to achieve Pareto improvement. However, the negative impact of renegotiation is more prominent. The opportunistic renegotiation has seriously damaged the interests of consumers. The main forms can be divided into two forms: first, the operators are ripping off the government, mainly involving a larger number of projects. Operators, acting as opportunists, renegotiate with the government, asking the government to change the initial contract to a contract that is more beneficial to them, to raise fees or to extend fees for a longer period of time, in order to ensure the sustainability of the supply. The result of the renegotiation is that the government compromises to the operators and harms the public interests; the second is that the government takes advantage of the operators, mainly involving smaller projects, and the government will use its powerful power to abuse the operators. For their own benefit or under the pressure of consumers to amend the contract in advance, the lack of government commitment, resulting in reduced investment incentives, consumers can not get adequate supply of infrastructure, the interests of the damage. The results of renegotiation are at the expense of consumers, the interests of all parties are out of balance, the contracts can not be carried out smoothly, and the development of infrastructure industry is restricted, so it is necessary to design the renegotiation mechanism. The result of renegotiation is to harm the interests of consumers, so that the mechanism can be designed so that the interests of all parties can be taken into account to achieve a win-win situation. The first is that operators design models for the mechanism of government racketeering. As a result of the launching of the renegotiation, they require price increases, extend the number of years of charge or increase the distribution of income, and so on. This paper is mainly aimed at the opportunistic behavior of operators asking for higher prices to initiate renegotiation. The government mainly designs a renegotiation mechanism to encourage operators to report their true information through participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints. The result of renegotiation is that the operator maximizes profits and does not harm the interests of consumers to achieve a win-win situation. And the mechanism design model of the government to the operators, this article mainly gives the government a punishment mechanism to restrain the government's commitment behavior effectively, guarantees the renegotiation result can achieve the government performance, the enterprise investment equilibrium, at the same time, It also meets the needs of consumers. Through the above cases and models, we should improve the public participation, introduce third parties, ensure the transparency of information, perfect the system endowment and optimize the renegotiation procedure, so that the renegotiation process can be more fair and just. It is best to take into account the interests of consumers, achieve a tripartite win-win, and promote the healthy and sustainable development of infrastructure.
【學位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F282

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