我國(guó)保險(xiǎn)公司獨(dú)立董事制度的現(xiàn)狀及改進(jìn)建議
[Abstract]:The study of the independent director system of insurance companies is based on the actual needs of the current situation of independent directors of insurance companies in China, is also the internal requirements of the industry to standardize the governance structure of insurance companies, and is also the requirements of the domestic corporate governance system and the external environment of the international market.
From a realistic point of view, China's insurance industry formally introduced the independent director system in 2007, after five years of development, China's insurance company independent director system has made certain progress, there are also such as some insurance companies to establish an independent director system is not enthusiastic, part of the independent director performance is relatively slack, the insurance company is independent. The director's independence is weakening.
Inside the industry, the board of directors is the core part of the corporate governance structure, and to some extent determines the effectiveness and role of insurance company governance. Standing, objectivity and effective performance of the board of directors to play the role of supervision and promote the scientific and democratic decision-making of the board of directors, and the functions of the board of supervisors complement each other, play a role in standardizing and improving the governance structure of insurance companies.
As a part of financial institutions, insurance companies have the functions of financing, social management and so on. Steady and safe operation is of great importance to the market economic system and even social stability. Independent director system, as a part of corporate governance system, is also important for Chinese insurance companies to maintain competitiveness in the open domestic insurance market and even in the international market environment.
From the perspective of the management mechanism of the independent director system, this paper constructs an evaluation system of the status quo of independent directors in China's insurance companies, further analyzes the status quo of independent directors in China's insurance companies according to the evaluation system, and finally puts forward policy recommendations to improve the system of independent directors in China's insurance companies.
The preface is an overview of the research. Firstly, the purpose of this study is clarified. Then, according to the purpose of this study, the scope of this study is defined. The research methods of some of the contents are briefly explained. The logical framework of the study is clarified by integrating the above contents. Finally, the innovation and significance of this study are expounded.
The first chapter is a theoretical exposition of the independent director and the independent director system. The first section outlines the origin of the independent director system, defines the connotation of the independent director according to the provisions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and related theories, and expounds the role of the independent director in the corporate governance system. The second section analyzes the independent director system from the perspective of institutional economics. The first chapter is the theoretical basis of the whole paper, which lays the foundation for the follow-up study of this paper.
Chapter two reviews the establishment and evolution of the independent director system of China's insurance companies. Section one explains the reasons for the establishment of the independent director system of China's insurance companies from two aspects: solving the problem of "insider control" and strengthening the internal checks and balances of corporate governance structure. Section two first defines the broad sense of the independent director system of China's insurance companies. The third section takes the system of broad scope as a whole and analyzes the evolution path of each part of the management mechanism by using the method of institutional analysis. The second chapter is the institutional background of the whole paper, clarifying the independent director system of insurance companies in China. The evolution path of degree is one of the realistic bases for putting forward policy recommendations.
Chapter three discusses the present situation evaluation system of independent directors of insurance companies in China. Section one classifies the mechanisms involved in the historical literature and briefly reviews the literature on the role of independent directors at home and abroad. Section two discusses the starting point of constructing the present situation evaluation system of independent directors of insurance companies in China, including the purpose and structure of the system. The third section elaborates the framework of the current situation evaluation system. Firstly, six first-level indicators are set up according to the connotation of independent directors and the management mechanism of the independent directors system. Then, according to the theoretical basis, the system background and the recognized research results, sixteen second-level indicators and their evaluation criteria are set up respectively. The characteristics of the evaluation system, that is, the problems needing special attention in choosing the calculation method, and then expounds the advantages of the analytic hierarchy process and the reasons for choosing the analytic hierarchy process. Finally, the steps of the analytic hierarchy process are briefly explained and a series of calculation formulas for the evaluation system score are obtained.
The fourth chapter analyzes the status quo of independent directors in China's insurance companies. The first section reviews the literature on the status quo of independent directors in China's insurance companies; the second section first describes the scope of sample selection, methods, and on this basis, clarifies the analysis of the status quo, according to the collection of data for grading, respectively from the statistical units and evaluation indicators. The third section summarizes the current situation from the point of view of the first-level indicators.
The fifth chapter mainly puts forward some suggestions to improve the independent director system of insurance companies in China. The first section reviews the literature on improving the independent director system of insurance companies in China; the second section reviews some basic principles of improving the system; the third section puts forward improvement on the premise of basic principles, comprehensive theoretical basis and practical basis. The policy recommendations of independent director system in China's insurance companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F842.3
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