PPP項(xiàng)目政府擔(dān)保對(duì)項(xiàng)目效率影響研究
[Abstract]:The incomplete nature of the PPP project loan contract will lead the project company to renegotiate with the bank at the time of the expense risk. On the one hand, the result of renegotiation and the limited recourse attribute of project financing may induce the project company to choose dangerous project strategy (asset substitution) in advance, on the other hand, The project company may not be able to obtain additional bank loans, leading to early suspension of the project. Aiming at the PPP project with government payment as the return mechanism, this paper uses incomplete contract theory to construct the loan contract model, and analyzes the influence mechanism of renegotiation on asset substitution and project termination in the case of anarchic guarantee. Then it analyzes the effect of government guarantee on the efficiency of the project before and after the renegotiation between the project company and the bank, and finally discusses the effect of introducing the system of government guarantee and contract guarantee at the same time. The results show that in the case of anarchic guarantee, competitive bidding can not restrain the problem of asset substitution and project suspension at the same time; Although the government guarantee can avoid the ex post project suspension to realize the ex post efficiency, but can not restrain the ex ante asset substitution problem; At the same time, the introduction of government guarantee and contract guarantee system can ensure the social efficiency of PPP project both before and after, and can improve the financial efficiency of the government. The results provide theoretical support for government decision-making and provide guidance for the implementation of PPP projects in practice.
【作者單位】: 大連理工大學(xué)建設(shè)管理系;大連理工大學(xué)管理與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)部;
【基金】:國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71372084,71672017)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F283
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