【摘要】：改革開放以來,地方政府工作模式從“命令—執(zhí)行”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樨斦謾?quán),其對地方資源配置擁有政治和經(jīng)濟上的權(quán)威。上市公司通過資本市場進行資源配置的功能有助于地方經(jīng)濟發(fā)展。因此,地方政府從追求政績的角度出發(fā),有動機也有能力通過財政手段幫助上市公司盈余管理以致其在資本市場再融資。本文認為,地方政府參與上市公司盈余管理這一話題值得深入研究。 本文構(gòu)建地方政府目標效用函數(shù),從地方政府利益和上市公司發(fā)展掛鉤的角度解釋地方政府幫助上市公司盈余管理的強烈動機。同時,具體分析了地方政府在上市公司上市、上市后發(fā)展和戴帽退市三個階段幫助其盈余管理的可能及手段。 本文實證部分,首先將2006-2008年數(shù)據(jù)完整的樣本上市公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率劃分為重虧、虧損、增、配股邊緣、一般和績優(yōu)五區(qū)間,通過SPSS完成卡方檢驗,證明地方政府稅收優(yōu)惠和財政補貼與上市公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率分布顯著相關(guān),稅收優(yōu)惠對上市公司“摘帽”作用明顯,財政補貼有針對性地給予虧損或增、配股邊緣區(qū)間上市公司。然而,以上海證交所2008年增發(fā)上市公司為樣本,卡方檢驗結(jié)果表明,增發(fā)前三年政府補貼與上市公司補貼前凈資產(chǎn)收益率是否達到再融資要求無關(guān),也即部分地方政府財政補貼納入非經(jīng)常性損益后,其對上市公司增發(fā)資格的影響減弱。當然,政策有效期高于三年的政府補貼仍然對上市公司資本市場再融資發(fā)揮積極作用。 此外,本文利用Eviews構(gòu)建logistic回歸模型檢驗地方政府財政支持式盈余管理與上市公司增發(fā)、配股獲批概率之間的關(guān)系。實證結(jié)果顯示,地方政府能夠有效幫助上市公司盈余管理以實現(xiàn)增發(fā)目的。該結(jié)論也暴露出我國證券監(jiān)管部門對上市公司增發(fā)、配股資格的審核存在漏洞,地方政府財政支持式盈余管理應(yīng)被特別關(guān)注。 在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文對地方政府政績考核體系、會計準則,尤其是2006年《企業(yè)會計準則第16號—政府補助》、企業(yè)所得稅優(yōu)惠政策和證券監(jiān)管部門的監(jiān)督原則提出了規(guī)范和改進的建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the working mode of local government has changed from "order-execution" to fiscal decentralization, which has political and economic authority over the allocation of local resources. The function of resource allocation through capital market is helpful to the development of local economy. Therefore, from the point of view of pursuing achievements, local governments have the motivation and the ability to help listed companies with earnings management through financial means so that they can refinance in the capital market. This paper holds that the topic of local government participation in earnings management of listed companies is worthy of further study. This paper constructs the objective utility function of the local government to explain the strong motivation of the local government to help the earnings management of the listed companies from the perspective of the link between the interests of the local government and the development of the listed companies. At the same time, this paper analyzes the possibility and means of local government to help the earnings management of listed companies in three stages: listing, post-listing development and delisting. In the empirical part of this paper, first of all, the return on net assets of listed companies with complete data from 2006 to 2008 is divided into five ranges: heavy loss, increase, allotment edge, general and excellent performance. Through SPSS chi-square test, it is proved that local government tax concessions and financial subsidies are significantly related to the distribution of return on net assets of listed companies, and the effect of tax concessions on listed companies is obvious. Financial subsidies targeted to give losses or increases, allotment edge range of listed companies. However, taking the additional listed companies issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008 as a sample, the chi-square test results show that the government subsidy in the first three years of the additional issue has nothing to do with whether the rate of return on net assets of the listed companies meets the refinancing requirements before the subsidy, that is to say, after some local government financial subsidies are included in the non-recurrent profits and losses, their influence on the qualification of the listed companies is weakened. Of course, government subsidies, which are valid for more than three years, still play an active role in refinancing the capital market of listed companies. In addition, this paper uses Eviews to construct logistic regression model to test the relationship between local government financial support earnings management and the probability of additional issuance and rights issue of listed companies. The empirical results show that the local government can effectively help the earnings management of listed companies to achieve the purpose of additional issuance. This conclusion also reveals that there are loopholes in the examination and approval of the rights issue and rights issue of listed companies by the securities regulatory departments of our country, and the local government financial support earnings management should be paid special attention to. On this basis, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the local government performance evaluation system, accounting standards, especially the 2006 Accounting Standards No. 16-Government subsidy, the preferential policies of enterprise income tax and the supervision principles of securities supervision departments.
【學位授予單位】：浙江大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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