【摘要】：董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)是以公司董事、經(jīng)理等高級(jí)管理人員向公司或第三者(股東、債權(quán)人等)承擔(dān)的民事賠償責(zé)任為保險(xiǎn)標(biāo)的的一種保險(xiǎn)。為了探討影響我國上市公司董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求的因素，本文在總結(jié)及學(xué)習(xí)前人的研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，，選取2007-2010年上半年的董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了分析研究和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，得到以下結(jié)論： 1、現(xiàn)階段我國上市公司董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求不足。我國購買董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)的上市公司主要集中在制造業(yè)和金融行業(yè)，其次是交通運(yùn)輸、倉儲(chǔ)業(yè)等。 2、在實(shí)證分析中，獨(dú)立董事比例與公司的董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求顯著正相關(guān)；股權(quán)集中度、控股股東的影響力與公司對(duì)董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)的需求顯著負(fù)相關(guān)；國有公司控股與公司的董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求顯著正相關(guān)；股權(quán)國際化在一定程度上促進(jìn)了我國上市公司董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)的需求；公司的收購與剝離行為與公司董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求顯著正相關(guān)；公司規(guī)模、公司違約記錄與公司董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求正相關(guān)，但其影響并不顯著；資產(chǎn)收益率和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率等財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)與公司的董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)需求微弱負(fù)相關(guān)。 文章最后，論文提出了幾點(diǎn)原則性的建議：制度層面，應(yīng)建立健全股東訴訟機(jī)制，進(jìn)一步完善獨(dú)立董事制度；監(jiān)管層面，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該公開董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)相關(guān)信息；保險(xiǎn)公司層面，應(yīng)該設(shè)計(jì)出更加實(shí)用和靈活的董事責(zé)任險(xiǎn)保單；公司層面，應(yīng)加強(qiáng)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化，健全董事保護(hù)機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Director liability insurance is a kind of insurance which takes the civil liability of directors, managers and other senior managers to the company or the third party (shareholders, creditors, etc.) as the subject matter of insurance. In order to explore the factors that affect the demand of directors liability insurance of listed companies in China, this paper, on the basis of summarizing and studying the previous research results, selects the relevant data of directors liability insurance in the first half of 2007-2010 to carry on the analysis research and the empirical test. The conclusions are as follows: 1. At present, the demand for directors liability insurance of listed companies in China is insufficient. The listed companies buying directors liability insurance mainly focus on manufacturing and finance, followed by transportation, storage and so on. (2) in the empirical analysis, the proportion of independent directors is significantly positively correlated with the demand for directors liability insurance, and the ownership concentration, the influence of controlling shareholders and the demand for directors liability insurance are significantly negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the demand for directors liability insurance. There is a significant positive correlation between the holding of state-owned companies and the demand for directors' liability insurance, and the internationalization of equity promotes the demand of directors' liability insurance to some extent. The behavior of acquisition and divestiture is positively correlated with the demand for directors liability insurance, the company size, the record of corporate default and the demand for directors liability insurance are positively correlated, but the influence is not significant. The financial indexes such as the return on assets and the ratio of assets to liabilities have a weak negative correlation with the demand for directors' liability insurance. At the end of the article, the paper puts forward some suggestions in principle: at the institutional level, the shareholder litigation mechanism should be established and the independent director system should be further improved, and at the supervisory level, the supervisor should disclose the relevant information of directors' liability insurance. At the level of insurance company, we should design a more practical and flexible director liability insurance policy, and at the company level, we should strengthen the optimization of corporate governance structure and perfect the protection mechanism of directors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F842.6;F832.51;F224

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