【摘要】：2007爆發(fā)的次貸危機(jī)以至禍及至全球的金融危機(jī),直到最近愈演愈烈的主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī),顛覆了人們關(guān)于只有發(fā)展中國(guó)家才會(huì)發(fā)生債務(wù)危機(jī)的傳統(tǒng)觀念,也讓人們對(duì)于央行獨(dú)立性進(jìn)行重新審視。近日,原中國(guó)貨幣政策委員會(huì)委員李稻葵先生在媒體撰文,徹底顛覆了人們對(duì)于央行獨(dú)立性的固有認(rèn)識(shí),即將央行獨(dú)立性視之為一種神話。言下之意,當(dāng)前這種由內(nèi)閣來(lái)給貨幣政策最終拍板的模式相當(dāng)良好,所謂的央行獨(dú)立性根本是一個(gè)不值得追求的目標(biāo),按他的話來(lái)說(shuō)“獨(dú)立性是一種無(wú)益的迷信”。 “財(cái)政為庶政之母”,中國(guó)目前正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的增長(zhǎng)及經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)深刻調(diào)整的關(guān)鍵時(shí)期。政府債務(wù)是如何產(chǎn)生的?當(dāng)前暴露出來(lái)的中國(guó)地方政府債務(wù)危機(jī)應(yīng)如何應(yīng)對(duì)?本文正是在這一背景下,通過(guò)分析政府債務(wù)及央行獨(dú)立性,望對(duì)于如今的政府債務(wù)危機(jī)的解決提出可行之路。 本文在對(duì)政府債務(wù)和央行獨(dú)立性的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)梳理的基礎(chǔ)上,深入分析了政府債務(wù)的形成機(jī)制。通過(guò)從國(guó)債依存度、國(guó)債負(fù)擔(dān)率、赤字率三個(gè)指標(biāo)對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)債規(guī)模進(jìn)行考察,得出我國(guó)國(guó)債負(fù)擔(dān)率和赤字率兩個(gè)指標(biāo)較低,而國(guó)債依存度偏高,總體來(lái)說(shuō),國(guó)債規(guī)模是處于警戒線以下的。央行獨(dú)立性的高低是決定財(cái)政貨幣政策協(xié)調(diào)度的關(guān)鍵因素,通過(guò)對(duì)財(cái)政貨幣政策協(xié)調(diào)理論和實(shí)證方面的研究,論證了加強(qiáng)財(cái)政貨幣政策配合協(xié)調(diào)從而減少政策摩擦損失對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)穩(wěn)定增長(zhǎng)的重要性。本文最后參照西方國(guó)家財(cái)政部和中央銀行的溝通途徑,給出了關(guān)于我國(guó)政府債務(wù)管理及加強(qiáng)政府對(duì)于央行管制的政策建議：一是在國(guó)務(wù)院的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下成立專(zhuān)門(mén)的公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)操作機(jī)構(gòu),在貨幣政策委員會(huì)的框架內(nèi)建立完善的貨幣政策協(xié)調(diào)溝通機(jī)制；二是完善貨幣、國(guó)債等金融工具對(duì)于財(cái)政貨幣政策配合的作用；三是建立長(zhǎng)期有效的政府債務(wù)監(jiān)管機(jī)制,防止我國(guó)政府及地方政府債務(wù)危機(jī)的發(fā)生。 本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)主要包括： 一是本文一反加強(qiáng)中央銀行獨(dú)立性的常論,從減少政策摩擦損失、加強(qiáng)財(cái)政貨幣政策配合方面充分論證了加強(qiáng)政府對(duì)于中央銀行的管制的必要性,創(chuàng)新性的提出了要減弱中央銀行獨(dú)立性以及加強(qiáng)政府對(duì)于央行的控制。 二是本文從國(guó)債依存度、國(guó)債負(fù)擔(dān)率、赤字率三個(gè)指標(biāo)對(duì)于我國(guó)國(guó)債規(guī)模進(jìn)行了考察,得出我國(guó)國(guó)債負(fù)擔(dān)率和赤字率兩個(gè)指標(biāo)較低,而國(guó)債依存度偏高,但總體來(lái)說(shuō),國(guó)債規(guī)模是處于警戒線以下的。因此只要我國(guó)保持目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)態(tài)勢(shì),我國(guó)的政府債務(wù)占GDP的比重將趨于穩(wěn)定,不會(huì)無(wú)限制的持續(xù)增長(zhǎng),我國(guó)的國(guó)債規(guī)模是可持續(xù)的。
[Abstract]:The subprime mortgage crisis that broke out in 2007 and even the global financial crisis, until recently the growing sovereign debt crisis, overturned the traditional notion that only developing countries would have a debt crisis. It has also revisited the independence of central banks. Recently, Li Daokui, a former member of China's Monetary Policy Committee, wrote in the media, which completely overturned the inherent understanding of the central bank's independence, which is regarded as a myth. By implication, the current model of cabinet giving monetary policy final approval is good. The so-called central bank independence is an unworthy goal, and in his words, "independence is a useless superstition." China is now in a critical period of sustained and stable economic growth and profound adjustment of its economic structure. How did government debt come into being? How to deal with the current local government debt crisis in China? Under this background, this paper, by analyzing the government debt and the independence of the central bank, hopes to put forward a feasible way to solve the present government debt crisis. On the basis of systematically combing the literature on government debt and the independence of central bank, this paper deeply analyzes the formation mechanism of government debt. By investigating the scale of our country's national debt from the three indicators of national debt dependence, national debt burden rate and deficit rate, it is concluded that the national debt burden rate and deficit rate of our country are low, while the degree of national debt dependence is on the high side. Generally speaking, The scale of national debt is below the warning line. The independence of central bank is the key factor to determine the degree of coordination of fiscal and monetary policy. The importance of strengthening the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies to reduce the loss of policy friction for the sustained and stable economic growth is demonstrated. Finally, referring to the communication channels between finance ministries and central banks of western countries, This paper gives some policy suggestions on government debt management and strengthening the government's control over the central bank: first, the establishment of a special open market operation agency under the leadership of the State Council. To establish a perfect monetary policy coordination and communication mechanism within the framework of the Monetary Policy Committee; The second is to perfect the role of financial instruments such as money and treasury bonds in the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, and the third is to establish a long-term and effective government debt supervision mechanism to prevent the occurrence of debt crisis between our government and local governments. The innovations of this paper mainly include: first, this paper reverse the common theory of strengthening the independence of the central bank, from reducing the loss of policy friction, Strengthening the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy fully demonstrates the necessity of strengthening the government's control over the central bank, and creatively proposes to weaken the independence of the central bank and strengthen the government's control over the central bank. Secondly, this paper investigates the scale of China's national debt from the three indicators of national debt dependence, national debt burden rate and deficit rate, and concludes that the national debt burden rate and deficit rate of our country are relatively low, while the degree of national debt dependence is on the high side, but generally speaking, The scale of national debt is below the warning line. So long as our country maintains the present economic growth situation, our country government debt the proportion of GDP will tend to be stable, will not be unlimited and sustainable growth, our national debt scale is sustainable.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F812.5;F832.31

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