【摘要】：我國企業(yè)的投資行為一直是一個頗受關注的問題,一方面是重復和低效率投資受到“十二五”規(guī)劃的明令禁止,另一方面是大量有投資需求的非國有企業(yè)的資金困難；一方面是企業(yè)如火如荼的海外投資并購,另一方面是國內產業(yè)結構亟待升級改造。在次背景下宏觀調控也往往陷入兩難的困境,本文試圖以公司內部治理機制的視角探討這類問題存在的產權制度背景。 本文基于我國上市公司市場化進程中所有權和控制權的分配格局和衍生的多重委托代理關系的背景,將公司治理的主要決策者—大股東和高級管理層的控制權水平為切入點,沿著“控制權—自由現金流—投資行為”的分析思路,設計多維度指標綜合衡量大股東和管理層的控制權水平,并將大股東和高級管理層的投資行為置于同一分析框架下,通過構建大股東控制權和管理層控制權對投資規(guī)模、資本投向和投資效率影響的模型,檢驗“自由現金流量假說”和“代理成本理論”在我國的適用性。 本文對2008-2010年間735個我國制造類上市公司樣本的研究發(fā)現,企業(yè)現金再投資水平與大股東和高級管理層的控制權水平顯著正相關,即存在大股東和高級管理層出于自利動機而利用或干預企業(yè)自由現金流水平擴大投資規(guī)模的可能。此外,本文也發(fā)現了大股東和管理層合謀的投資行為,可見大股東對管理層見的監(jiān)督制約力量薄弱。 在資本投向上,大股東和管理層都有在利用自由現金擴大長期經營資產投資規(guī)模、控制金融資產投資規(guī)模的動機；大股東和高級管理層與股權投資規(guī)模負相關,存在管理層出于“壕溝防御”和大股東降低控制層級而規(guī)避股權投資的可能。在投資效率上,過度投資和投資不足同時存在。60%的制造類上市公司由于投資不足導致了非效率投資,企業(yè)的投資不足并不是由于治理機制而是融資約束引起的；然而過度投資的程度更高且導致的投資效率低下確是由于代理問題引起的,即大股東和管理層控制權水平越大,企業(yè)投資效率越低。 根據上市分析可以發(fā)現,過不投資和投資不足并存的局面下,我國制造類上市公司內部治理的主要決策者—大股東和高級管理層存在利用其在投資決策中的控制權力有影響企業(yè)資本投資和投資規(guī)模,從而導致低效率投資。規(guī)范我國上市公司控制權分配和監(jiān)督方式是今后完善企業(yè)治理機制應考慮的內容。
[Abstract]:The investment behavior of Chinese enterprises has always been a subject of concern. On the one hand, repeated and inefficient investment is prohibited by the 12th Five-Year Plan, on the other hand, a large number of non-state-owned enterprises with investment needs have difficulty in capital. On the one hand, enterprises are in full swing of overseas investment mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, the domestic industrial structure needs to be upgraded and reformed. Under the secondary background, macro-control is often caught in a dilemma. This paper tries to explore the background of the property rights system of this kind of problems from the perspective of the corporate internal governance mechanism. Based on the distribution pattern of ownership and control rights in the process of marketization of listed companies in China and the background of multi-principal-agent relationship derived from it, this paper takes the level of control rights of the main decision-makers of corporate governance as the breakthrough point, that is, the level of control of the major shareholders and senior management. According to the idea of "control, free cash flow and investment behavior", the author designs multi-dimensional indexes to measure the level of control of large shareholders and management, and puts the investment behavior of large shareholders and senior management under the same analytical framework. By constructing a model of the influence of large shareholder control and management control on investment scale, capital investment and investment efficiency, this paper tests the applicability of "free cash flow hypothesis" and "agency cost theory" in China. In this paper, 735 samples of Chinese manufacturing listed companies from 2008 to 2010 are studied. It is found that the level of corporate cash reinvestment is significantly positively correlated with the level of control of large shareholders and senior management. That is, it is possible for large shareholders and senior management to use or interfere with the free cash flow to expand the scale of investment. In addition, this paper also found that the large shareholders and management collusive investment behavior, we can see that the supervision and restriction power of the large shareholders to the management is weak. In terms of capital investment, both major shareholders and management have the motive of using free cash to expand the scale of long-term operating assets investment and control the scale of financial assets investment, while large shareholders and senior management have negative correlation with the scale of equity investment. There is the potential for management to circumvent equity investments because of "trench defenses" and lower levels of control by large shareholders. In terms of investment efficiency, 60% of manufacturing listed companies invest inefficiently because of insufficient investment, which is not caused by governance mechanism but by financing constraints. However, the degree of overinvestment is higher and the inefficiency of investment is caused by the agency problem, that is, the greater the level of control of large shareholders and management, the lower the investment efficiency of enterprises. According to the analysis of listing, we can find that under the situation of over-investment and underinvestment, The main decision makers of the internal governance of the manufacturing listed companies in China are the large shareholders and senior management who make use of their power of control in the investment decision to influence the capital investment and investment scale of enterprises, which leads to inefficient investment. Standardizing the distribution and supervision of the control rights of listed companies in China is the content that should be considered to perfect the corporate governance mechanism in the future.
【學位授予單位】：華東師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F406.72;F832.51;F224

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