本文選題：控股股東 + 銀行債權(quán)人��； 參考：《東北大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：控股股東的利益侵占問題已經(jīng)成為國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究的重點(diǎn),目前國(guó)內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)大多研究控股股東對(duì)中小股東的利益侵占,部分學(xué)者開始關(guān)注控股股東對(duì)債權(quán)人的利益侵占,認(rèn)為由于信息不對(duì)稱,控股股東可能利用已簽訂的債務(wù)契約中的不完善條款來損害債權(quán)人的利益,例如通過資產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移、資產(chǎn)替代等手段進(jìn)行利益侵占。已有的研究大都將債權(quán)人和中小股東共同作為外部投資者,作為控股股東利益侵害的對(duì)象。實(shí)際上,在控股股東保障債權(quán)人債務(wù)安全的前提下,債權(quán)人會(huì)對(duì)控股股東的利益侵占行為聽之任之,甚至?xí)c控股股東合謀來侵占中小股東的利益,進(jìn)而影響企業(yè)價(jià)值。本文主要從理論和模型兩個(gè)方面探討控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀存在的可能性,對(duì)控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀的影響因素進(jìn)行了理論分析,并通過實(shí)證對(duì)合謀的影響因素進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)。這將為探討控股股東新的利益侵占方式、有效約束控股股東的利益侵占、切實(shí)保護(hù)中小股東利益、進(jìn)而完善公司治理機(jī)制提供了一個(gè)新的視角。本文首先界定了合謀的含義、合謀理論基礎(chǔ),并將債權(quán)人分為銀行債權(quán)人和中小債權(quán)人,主要研究控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀的利益侵占問題。本文不僅從理論上說明了控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀的可能性,而且通過模型分析得到控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人存在合謀的可能性。對(duì)于控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀的影響因素,主要從公司治理因素和外部環(huán)境因素進(jìn)行理論分析,并且根據(jù)2007年至2011年我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),結(jié)果表明：(1)控股股東持股比例越高,控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越高。(2)控股股東為企業(yè)集團(tuán)的股東時(shí),控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越高。(3)控股股東為國(guó)有企業(yè)股東時(shí),控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越低。(4)獨(dú)立董事比例越高,控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越低。(5)政府干預(yù)程度越高,控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越高。(6)投資者保護(hù)越好,控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越低。(7)審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)為四大會(huì)計(jì)事務(wù)所時(shí),控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀程度越低。最后根據(jù)已證實(shí)的影響因素并結(jié)合我國(guó)實(shí)際,提出了抑制控股股東與銀行債權(quán)人合謀的建議。
[Abstract]:The interest encroachment of controlling shareholders has become the focus of scholars at home and abroad. At present, most of the existing literature at home and abroad has studied the interests of controlling shareholders on minority shareholders, and some scholars have begun to pay attention to the interests of controlling shareholders encroaching on creditors. Because of the asymmetric information, the controlling shareholder may use the imperfect clause in the signed debt contract to damage the interests of the creditor, such as through asset transfer, asset substitution and other means of interest usurpation. Most of the existing studies take creditors and minority shareholders as external investors and as the object of interest infringement of controlling shareholders. In fact, on the premise that controlling shareholders guarantee the creditor's debt safety, the creditor will let the controlling shareholder's interest encroach on it, even conspire with the controlling shareholder to encroach on the interests of the minority shareholder, and then affect the enterprise value. This paper mainly discusses the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors from two aspects of theory and model, and analyzes theoretically the influencing factors of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors. And through the empirical evidence of the influence of collusion factors were tested. This will provide a new angle of view for exploring the new ways of controlling shareholders' interest encroachment, effectively constraining the interests of controlling shareholders, protecting the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, and then perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. This paper first defines the meaning of collusion and the theoretical basis of collusion and divides creditors into bank creditors and small and medium creditors. This paper not only explains theoretically the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholder and bank creditor, but also obtains the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholder and bank creditor through model analysis. The influencing factors of controlling shareholders' collusion with bank creditors are theoretically analyzed from corporate governance factors and external environmental factors, and empirical tests are made according to the financial data of listed companies from 2007 to 2011. The results show that the higher the proportion of controlling shareholders is, the higher the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is. (2) when controlling shareholders are shareholders of enterprise groups, the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is higher. (3) when controlling shareholders are shareholders of state-owned enterprises, The lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, the higher the proportion of independent directors, the lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, the higher the degree of government intervention, and the higher the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors. The lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is, the lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is when the audit institution is the four major accounting firms. Finally, according to the confirmed influencing factors and the reality of our country, the paper puts forward some suggestions to restrain the collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 閆鄒先;孫玉梅;;獨(dú)立董事能否防范上市公司合謀:一項(xiàng)基于上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2008年10期

，

本文編號(hào)：1838489