本文選題：定向增發(fā)　切入點：財富轉移　出處：《華南理工大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：定向增發(fā)也叫非公開發(fā)行，是指上市公司采用非公開方式，向特定對象發(fā)行股票的行為。在股權分置改革之前，我國上市公司權益再融資方式主要是配股、公開增發(fā)；股權分置改革之后，定向增發(fā)憑借“一簡三低”的優(yōu)勢一度成為上市公司最受青睞的權益再融資方式，并在近幾年得到迅速發(fā)展，無論在增發(fā)數量還是融資規(guī)模上都取得驚人成績�？梢哉f，股權分置改革的成功為定向增發(fā)的實施提供了制度動因和有力保證。但目前我國關于定向增發(fā)的相關法律法規(guī)不夠健全，制度缺陷為大股東在定向增發(fā)過程中進行財富轉移提供了“溫床”。那么，現實中大股東控制下的定向增發(fā)是否存在財富轉移？如果存在，又是通過怎樣的途徑進行財富轉移？在財富轉移過程中如何更好地保護中小股東利益？這些問題都是值得人們思考和關注的。 本文選取2008年至2010年間我國成功實施定向增發(fā)的250家滬深A股上市公司作為研究樣本，，對我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的財富轉移進行研究。首先介紹研究背景，提出本文所要研究的問題，整理國內外文獻，闡述研究思路和研究方法，為本文的研究打下基礎。其次，對定向增發(fā)的制度背景、發(fā)展歷程和我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的融資現狀進行分析。再次，利用事件研究法和回歸分析法對我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的財富轉移存在性進行檢驗。最后，考察了定向增發(fā)的財富轉移途徑。 本文研究發(fā)現：（1）大股東認購定向增發(fā)新股比例大于其增發(fā)前所持上市公司股份比例時的市場反應弱于大股東認購定向增發(fā)新股比例小于其增發(fā)前所持股份比例時的市場反應，說明定向增發(fā)過程中存在財富轉移；（2）大股東完全認購定向增發(fā)新股時，定價基準日前會出現股價表現弱于大盤的情況，即超額收益為負，這說明存在大股東進行財富轉移的可能；（3）大股東完全認購定向增發(fā)新股時的折價水平最高，大股東不參與認購時的折價水平最低，而且存在顯著的組間差異，即上市公司大股東在定向增發(fā)中可能利用定向增發(fā)折價進行財富轉移；（4）財富轉移（即大股東認購定向增發(fā)新股比例與其在定向增發(fā)前所持上市公司股份比例之差）與定向增發(fā)折價水平顯著正相關；（5）大股東采用資產方式認購定向增發(fā)新股時的市場反應要弱于非資產方式認購時的市場反應�？傊�，在定向增發(fā)過程中，大股東會通過操縱折價和利用資產認購進行財富轉移。
[Abstract]:Directional additional issuance, also called private issuance, refers to the behavior of a listed company issuing shares to a specific target in a non-public manner. Before the split share structure reform, the main way of refinancing the rights and interests of listed companies in our country is rights issue, public issuance; After the split share structure reform, directional additional issuance, with the advantage of "one simple, three low", once became the most popular way of refinancing the rights and interests of listed companies, and developed rapidly in recent years. Both in terms of the number of additional offerings and the size of the financing, they have achieved amazing results. The success of the reform of split share structure has provided the system motivation and powerful guarantee for the implementation of the directional additional offering, but the relevant laws and regulations of our country about the directional additional offering are not perfect at present. Institutional defects provide a "hotbed" for the wealth transfer of large shareholders in the process of directional issuance. So, is there wealth transfer under the control of large shareholders in reality? If so, what are the ways to transfer wealth? How to better protect the interests of minority shareholders in the process of wealth transfer? These problems are worthy of people's consideration and attention. This paper selects 250 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2010 as the research sample to study the wealth transfer of China's listed companies. First, it introduces the research background. Put forward the problems to be studied in this paper, collate the domestic and foreign literature, elaborate the research ideas and research methods, lay the foundation for the research of this paper. Secondly, the system background of directional additional issuance, Thirdly, using event research method and regression analysis method to test the existence of wealth transfer of listed companies in China. The way of wealth transfer is investigated in this paper. In this paper, we find that the market reaction when the proportion of large shareholders subscribing for the new shares of the listed company before the IPO is larger than the proportion of the shares held by the listed companies before the issuance is weaker than the market reaction when the proportion of the large shareholders subscribing for the new shares is smaller than the proportion of the shares held before the issuance of the new shares. It shows that when there is wealth transfer in the process of IPO, when the majority shareholders subscribe for the new shares, the performance of the stock price will be weaker than that of the market before the benchmark day of pricing, that is, the excess return will be negative. This shows that there is a possibility of wealth transfer by large shareholders. The discount level of large shareholders is the highest when they fully subscribe for the new shares, and the discount level of large shareholders is the lowest when they do not participate in the subscription, and there are significant differences between groups. That is, the majority shareholders of a listed company may use the discount of directional additional offering to carry out wealth transfer / transfer (that is, the difference between the proportion of new shares subscribed by large shareholders and the proportion of shares held by listed companies before the IPO). ) A significant positive correlation with the discount level of a directional additional offering is noted. (5) the market response of the majority shareholders when they subscribe for the new shares by way of assets is weaker than the market response when the shares are subscribed in a non-asset-based manner. In the process of directional issuance, large shareholders will transfer wealth by manipulating discounts and using asset subscriptions.
【學位授予單位】：華南理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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