本文關(guān)鍵詞： 現(xiàn)金股利 多個(gè)大股東 終極控制權(quán) 投資者保護(hù)　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股利政策作為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理的核心內(nèi)容之一,直接關(guān)系到公司短期利益與長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展之間的協(xié)調(diào),一種合理的股利政策能夠起調(diào)和股東、債權(quán)人及其他利益群體之間矛盾的作用,同時(shí)緩解各方利益者之間的代理成本。因此,近年來(lái)尋求這種股利政策受到國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者的關(guān)注。 資本市場(chǎng)上不僅僅只存在100%小股東或者單一大股東這兩種資本結(jié)構(gòu),還存在多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),這種股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在國(guó)內(nèi)外的資本市場(chǎng)上都是普遍存在的,并且因?yàn)榭毓晒蓶|以外大股東的存在對(duì)公司價(jià)值和公司績(jī)效產(chǎn)生影響,具有多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司其價(jià)值和公司績(jī)效與其他股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)存在差異。而多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與現(xiàn)金股利政策是否存在關(guān)系,以及存在何種關(guān)系還未得知。因此,本文采用理論和實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法,從終極控制權(quán)的角度出發(fā),引入現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)概念,探討多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下控股股東控制權(quán)、大股東之間的現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)以及法律保護(hù)程度等因素對(duì)上市公司現(xiàn)金股利分配政策的影響。 本文以2007-2009三年間的具有多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)上市公司作為研究樣本,得出以下幾個(gè)結(jié)論：在多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,控股股東持股比例與上市公司現(xiàn)金股利分配水平負(fù)相關(guān)；大股東之間的現(xiàn)金流量權(quán)分散度與上市公司現(xiàn)金股利呈負(fù)相關(guān)；投資者保護(hù)程度與多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下現(xiàn)金股利之間并不是單純的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,而是當(dāng)公司收益較好時(shí),法律對(duì)投資者的保護(hù)程度與現(xiàn)金股利支付率之間呈負(fù)相關(guān),當(dāng)收益率低時(shí),法律對(duì)投資者的保護(hù)程度與現(xiàn)金股利支付率之間呈正相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:As one of the core contents of modern enterprise financial management, dividend policy is directly related to the coordination between the short-term interests and long-term development of the company. A reasonable dividend policy can reconcile shareholders. The role of contradiction between creditors and other interest groups as well as the cost of agency between different stakeholders is alleviated. Therefore, in recent years, seeking this kind of dividend policy has attracted the attention of scholars at home and abroad. In the capital market, there are not only two kinds of capital structure: 100% minority shareholder or single large shareholder, but also many large shareholder equity structure. This kind of ownership structure is common in the capital market both at home and abroad, and because of the existence of large shareholders other than controlling shareholders, it has an impact on the company value and corporate performance. The value and corporate performance of the company with multiple large shareholder ownership structure are different from other equity structure, and whether there is a relationship between the stock ownership structure of multiple large shareholders and the cash dividend policy. Therefore, this paper uses the combination of theory and empirical method, from the perspective of ultimate control, the introduction of the concept of cash flow rights. This paper discusses the influence of the controlling shareholder's control right, the cash flow right among the majority shareholders and the degree of legal protection on the cash dividend distribution policy of the listed company under the ownership structure of many large shareholders. This paper takes the listed companies with large shareholder equity structure as the research sample from 2007 to 2009, and draws the following conclusions: under the equity structure of multiple large shareholders. The proportion of controlling shareholders is negatively related to the level of cash dividend distribution of listed companies; The dispersion of cash flow rights among major shareholders is negatively correlated with cash dividends of listed companies; The relationship between the degree of investor protection and the cash dividend under the structure of multiple large shareholders is not a simple positive correlation, but when the company returns better. There is a negative correlation between the degree of legal protection for investors and the rate of cash dividend payment. When the rate of return is low, there is a positive correlation between the degree of legal protection of investors and the rate of cash dividend payment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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