【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制源于外部性、內(nèi)部性、市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入壁壘與市場(chǎng)勢(shì)力等導(dǎo)致的市場(chǎng)失靈,經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制的主要目標(biāo)是糾正市場(chǎng)失靈,提高資源配置效率,增進(jìn)社會(huì)福利。質(zhì)量規(guī)制和價(jià)格規(guī)制是經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制政策中兩個(gè)重要的規(guī)制手段。然而,經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)取決于經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制政策的實(shí)施效果,因此通過(guò)規(guī)制影響評(píng)價(jià)的研究來(lái)分析經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)制政策的實(shí)施效果,從而提高規(guī)制實(shí)施質(zhì)量就顯得尤為重要。論文基于中國(guó)國(guó)情,從不同市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的角度,研究了質(zhì)量規(guī)制和價(jià)格規(guī)制的社會(huì)福利效應(yīng)。其中,以食品行業(yè)為例研究了最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制,以醫(yī)療服務(wù)市場(chǎng)為例研究了價(jià)格規(guī)制,并將政企行為納入了研究框架對(duì)最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制的研究進(jìn)行了拓展。論文首先通過(guò)構(gòu)建數(shù)理模型分別在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)和壟斷市場(chǎng)下研究最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制介入前后,市場(chǎng)平均產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平和社會(huì)福利效應(yīng)的變化,對(duì)比分析不同市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)于最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)閾值以及社會(huì)福利的影響。隨后,將政府和企業(yè)的行為邏輯納入博弈模型,對(duì)壟斷市場(chǎng)下的最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制進(jìn)行了拓展研究,對(duì)比分析政府完全執(zhí)行規(guī)制政策、政府不完全執(zhí)行規(guī)制政策、政府與企業(yè)共謀三種情形下的市場(chǎng)均衡結(jié)果,剖析政府規(guī)制執(zhí)行行為和企業(yè)遵從行為影響最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制實(shí)施效果的機(jī)理。最后,結(jié)合我國(guó)醫(yī)療衛(wèi)生改革的基本制度,采用Hotelling模型來(lái)研究醫(yī)療服務(wù)市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格規(guī)制,對(duì)比分析“政府單一化模式”、“完全市場(chǎng)化模式”和“多元化競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模式”下的醫(yī)療服務(wù)市場(chǎng)均衡結(jié)果,以社會(huì)福利水平最大化為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提出醫(yī)療服務(wù)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化的路徑。論文研究結(jié)果表明:(1)最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制提高了社會(huì)福利水平,但是在不同的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)中效應(yīng)不同,政府應(yīng)根據(jù)消費(fèi)者和市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的特征,有針對(duì)性地制定適合的最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制政策;(2)政府的規(guī)制執(zhí)行和企業(yè)的遵從行為共同決定著最低質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)制的實(shí)施效果,政府不完全執(zhí)行規(guī)制政策和企業(yè)的不遵從行為都會(huì)給社會(huì)福利造成損失;(3)單純依靠?jī)r(jià)格規(guī)制或是完全放松規(guī)制都很難達(dá)到預(yù)期的規(guī)制效果,只有在充分發(fā)揮價(jià)格規(guī)制和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制各自優(yōu)勢(shì)的基礎(chǔ)上,通過(guò)政府與市場(chǎng)的有機(jī)結(jié)合,才能較大程度地提高社會(huì)福利水平。
[Abstract]:Economic regulation originates from the market failure caused by externality, internality, market barriers and market forces. The main goal of economic regulation is to correct market failure, improve the efficiency of resource allocation and promote social welfare. Quality regulation and price regulation are two important means of regulation in economic regulation policy. However, the realization of the goal of economic regulation depends on the effect of the implementation of economic regulation policy, so it is very important to analyze the effect of economic regulation policy through the research of regulation impact evaluation, so as to improve the quality of regulation implementation. Based on the situation of China, the social welfare effects of quality regulation and price regulation are studied from the perspective of different market structures. Among them, the food industry as an example to study the minimum quality standard regulation, the medical service market as an example to study the price regulation, and the government and enterprise behavior into the framework of the research on the minimum quality standard regulation has been expanded. Firstly, the paper studies the changes of market average product quality level and social welfare effect before and after the intervention of minimum quality standard regulation in competitive market and monopoly market by constructing mathematical models. The effects of different market structures on minimum quality threshold and social welfare are analyzed. Then, the behavior logic of government and enterprise is brought into the game model, and the regulation of minimum quality standard in monopoly market is studied. The comparison and analysis of the government's complete implementation of regulatory policy, the government's incomplete implementation of regulatory policy. The market equilibrium results of government and enterprise collusion are analyzed, and the mechanism of government regulation enforcement behavior and enterprise compliance behavior affecting the effect of minimum quality standard regulation is analyzed. Finally, combining with the basic system of health care reform in our country, we adopt Hotelling model to study the price regulation of medical service market, and compare and analyze the "government unifying mode". The equilibrium result of medical service market under "complete marketization mode" and "pluralistic competition mode" is put forward according to the criterion of maximization of social welfare level, and the way to optimize the market structure of medical service is put forward. The results show that: (1) the minimum quality standard regulation has improved the social welfare level, but the effect in different market structure is different, the government should according to the characteristics of consumer and market structure. To formulate appropriate minimum quality standard regulation policy; (2) the enforcement of government regulation and the compliance behavior of enterprises jointly determine the implementation effect of the minimum quality standard regulation, and the failure of the government to implement the regulation policy and the non-compliance behavior of the enterprise will cause losses to social welfare; (3) it is difficult to achieve the expected regulatory effect by simply relying on price regulation or completely relaxing regulation, only on the basis of giving full play to the respective advantages of price regulation and competition mechanism, through the organic combination of government and market. In order to raise the level of social welfare to a greater extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D632.1

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