本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè) + 關(guān)系　； 參考：《管理世界》2017年04期

【摘要】：本文基于CGSS和世界銀行等數(shù)據(jù)的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),與體制外關(guān)系的影響截然相反,體制內(nèi)的關(guān)系圈子顯著抑制個體的創(chuàng)業(yè)意愿。進一步研究揭示,由于"特權(quán)"利益的潛在"誘惑",體制內(nèi)關(guān)系會驅(qū)動個體尋求體制內(nèi)就業(yè)而非進行創(chuàng)業(yè);體制內(nèi)關(guān)系對創(chuàng)業(yè)意愿的抑制作用在制度成本高的城市更加明顯,在政府重點扶持從而商業(yè)機會較多的城市則明顯減弱甚至消失。此外,體制內(nèi)關(guān)系對創(chuàng)業(yè)的抑制作用主要體現(xiàn)于生存型創(chuàng)業(yè)而非尋租空間較大的機會型創(chuàng)業(yè)。本文研究刻畫了關(guān)系資本的"逐利"本性,揭示了抑制創(chuàng)業(yè)活力的制度根源。破除"特權(quán)"利益、建立以"親"、"清"為核心的新型政商關(guān)系有利于從根本上規(guī)避關(guān)系圈子的不正當尋租,激發(fā)"草根創(chuàng)業(yè)"的活力。本文也回應了當下"創(chuàng)新政府配置資源方式"的改革舉措。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of CGSS and the World Bank, this paper finds that, contrary to the influence of the extrainstitutional relationship, the relationship circle within the system significantly inhibits the entrepreneurial willingness of individuals. Further studies have revealed that because of the potential "temptation" of "privileged" interests, intra-institutional relationships drive individuals to seek employment within the system rather than undertaking entrepreneurship, and the inhibition of intra-institutional relationships on entrepreneurial willingness is more pronounced in cities with high institutional costs. In cities where the government has given priority to business opportunities, it has weakened or even disappeared. In addition, the inhibition effect of intra-system relationship on entrepreneurship is mainly embodied in survival entrepreneurship rather than opportunity venture with large rent-seeking space. This paper describes the nature of relational capital and reveals the institutional root of restraining entrepreneurial vitality. To break down the interests of "privilege" and establish a new relationship between government and business with the core of "pro" and "Qing" is conducive to avoiding the improper rent-seeking of the relationship circle and stimulating the vitality of "grassroots entrepreneurship". This paper also responds to the current reform measures of "innovating the way the government allocates resources".
【作者單位】： 中國特色社會主義經(jīng)濟建設(shè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心、南開大學經(jīng)濟學院;南開大學跨國公司研究中心;南開大學經(jīng)濟學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金重點課題“網(wǎng)絡(luò)及不確定環(huán)境下創(chuàng)業(yè)者的行為認知與決策機制研究”(71532005);國家自然科學基金資助項目“社會關(guān)系—市場資產(chǎn)的轉(zhuǎn)化機制及二者的整合效應研究”(71102046) 中國特色社會主義經(jīng)濟建設(shè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心 教育部哲學社會科學研究重大課題攻關(guān)項目“中國自由貿(mào)易區(qū)制度創(chuàng)新與保障體系研究”(14JZD020);教育部新世紀優(yōu)秀人才支持計劃(NCET-13-0298)的資助
【分類號】：D630.9

【相似文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 徐向東;石志坤;;腐敗與反腐敗的成本收益分析[J];經(jīng)濟與社會發(fā)展;2003年07期

，

本文編號：2094877