本文選題：公共財政　切入點：地方政府競爭　出處：《浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：地方政府對于GDP的競爭在我國是一個普遍現(xiàn)象，這種競爭在一定程度上促進了經(jīng)濟的增長，但對公共服務(wù)的供給會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響呢？財政聯(lián)邦主義傳統(tǒng)觀點認為，地方政府間的非合作行為競爭可促進公共服務(wù)供給的效率，相應(yīng)提升居民的福利水平。同時，也有學(xué)者提出“逐底競爭”（race to the bottom），主要指地方政府通過降低稅率等優(yōu)惠政策來吸引投資，這種競爭將以降低財政收入為代價，影響地方政府對公共服務(wù)的供給能力。而我國的地方政府間競爭對公共服務(wù)的供給的影響機制是什么，會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響，需要我們進行系統(tǒng)研究。這對于規(guī)范我國地方政府競爭，優(yōu)化地方公共服務(wù)供給結(jié)構(gòu)與擴寬公共服務(wù)供給渠道提供一定的依據(jù)，對促進我國公共服務(wù)的有效供給有著重要意義。 本文研究地方政府競爭主要是地方對于GDP的競爭，借鑒前人理論的基礎(chǔ)上，分析這種競爭對于我國教育、醫(yī)療、社會保障方面的公共服務(wù)供給影響。 在梳理地方政府競爭對公共服務(wù)影響的相關(guān)文獻的基礎(chǔ)上，描述我國地方政府競爭的體制性特征、主體性特征和財政支出特征，分析現(xiàn)行制度安排下地方政府競爭對公共服務(wù)供給影響機制，包括政績考核、晉升博弈、任期短暫以及預(yù)算管理等因素的影響；借用Oates和Schwab（1988）財政分權(quán)模型和馬光榮、楊恩艷（2010）模型中的部分假設(shè)，分析地方GDP競爭對公共服務(wù)供給影響，，認為地方政府對于GDP的偏向行為將抑制公共服務(wù)（如教育、醫(yī)療和社會保障）供給。 本文選擇教育、醫(yī)療和社會保障三方面的公共服務(wù)供給水平為被解釋變量，地方政府競爭為解釋變量，人均GDP、財政分權(quán)、受教育程度和人口密度為控制變量，通過我國2000-2012年省級面板數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析，計量結(jié)果驗證了前文的模型分析與影響機理分析，但同時發(fā)現(xiàn)，地方政府競爭對不同經(jīng)濟帶的公共服務(wù)供給會產(chǎn)生相反的作用，地方政府競爭抑制了東部公共服務(wù)供給，促進了中西部地區(qū)公共服務(wù)的供給； 基于上述分析，從官員考核指標(biāo)體系、財政體制等方面提出優(yōu)化地方政府競爭、改善公共服務(wù)供給的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The competition of local government for GDP is a common phenomenon in our country, this kind of competition has promoted the economic growth to a certain extent, but how will the influence on the supply of public service? The traditional view of fiscal federalism is that non-cooperative behavior competition among local governments can promote the efficiency of public service supply and the welfare level of residents. Some scholars have also suggested that "bottom-by-bottom competition" means that local governments attract investment through preferential policies such as lower tax rates, which will be at the expense of lower fiscal revenues. What is the influence mechanism of the competition between local governments on the supply of public services, and what kind of influence will it have on the supply of public services? It is of great significance to standardize the competition of local governments, optimize the supply structure of local public services and broaden the supply channels of public services, and it is of great significance to promote the effective supply of public services in China. This paper studies the competition between local governments and GDP. Based on the previous theories, this paper analyzes the influence of this competition on the supply of public services in education, medical care and social security in China. On the basis of combing the relevant literature on the influence of local government competition on public service, this paper describes the institutional characteristics, subjective characteristics and fiscal expenditure characteristics of local government competition in China. This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of local government competition on the supply of public service under the current system arrangement, including the influence of the factors such as performance assessment, promotion game, short tenure and budget management, and borrows the fiscal decentralization model and Ma Guangong's model of fiscal decentralization from Oates and Schwabu 1988. Based on some hypotheses in Yang Enyan's 2010) model, this paper analyzes the influence of local GDP competition on the supply of public service, and concludes that local government's biased behavior towards GDP will restrain the supply of public service (such as education, medical treatment and social security). This paper chooses the public service supply level of education, medical treatment and social security as explained variable, local government competition as explanatory variable, per capita GDP, fiscal decentralization, education level and population density as controlling variables. Through the empirical analysis of provincial panel data from 2000 to 2012 in China, the econometric results verify the above model analysis and influence mechanism analysis, but at the same time, it is found that local government competition will have the opposite effect on the public service supply in different economic zones. The local government competition inhibits the supply of public services in the east and promotes the supply of public services in the central and western regions. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to optimize the competition of local government and improve the supply of public service from the index system of official assessment and the financial system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630;F812.2

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