本文關(guān)鍵詞： 官員任期 晉升錦標(biāo)賽 五星級酒店 行業(yè)發(fā)展 所有制差異　出處：《中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報》2017年10期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：筆者以年份2000—2014期間中國省際五星級酒店的面板數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,立足于微觀層面的政府官員視角,涵蓋五星級酒店數(shù)量與收入雙重維度,采用實(shí)證研究方法,探究地方官員任期、晉升錦標(biāo)賽對五星級酒店行業(yè)發(fā)展的影響,并將研究視角延伸至政府反腐政策、官員更替背景下晉升壓力對五星級酒店收入影響的可持續(xù)性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),任期較短的官員傾向于投建國有、外商五星級酒店,但短期任期驅(qū)動下的五星級酒店"擴(kuò)建熱"并未提升五星級酒店的收入水平。晉升錦標(biāo)賽導(dǎo)致國有、私營五星級酒店的數(shù)量擴(kuò)張,并因官員的政績訴求推動了五星級酒店的收入增長;在高壓反腐以及官員更替時期,晉升壓力對五星級酒店收入的提振效應(yīng)弱化,呈現(xiàn)出收入增長的不可持續(xù)性。研究結(jié)果表明,五星級酒店的不合理投建、短視行為以及不同所有制酒店的不公平競爭等問題的解決須重視官員經(jīng)濟(jì)行為中的道德風(fēng)險。本研究成果驗(yàn)證了任期對官員經(jīng)濟(jì)行為影響的存在性,為多情景視角下晉升錦標(biāo)賽的持續(xù)影響增添了中觀層面的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:The author takes the panel data of five-star hotels in China from 2000 to 2014 as a sample, based on the micro-level perspective of government officials, covering the number of five-star hotels and income dual dimensions. Using empirical research methods to explore the tenure of local officials promotion championships on the five-star hotel industry development and the perspective of the research extended to the government anti-corruption policy. The impact of promotion pressure on the income of five-star hotels under the background of official turnover. The study found that officials with short tenure tend to vote for Jianguo, foreign five-star hotels. But the "expansion boom" of five-star hotels, driven by short-term tenure, has not raised the income level of five-star hotels. Promotion tournaments have led to an expansion in the number of state-owned and private five-star hotels. And because of the official performance appeal promoted the five-star hotel income growth; In the period of high pressure anti-corruption and official turnover, the promotion pressure weakens the boost effect of the five-star hotel income, showing the unsustainable income growth. The research results show that the five-star hotel unreasonable investment and construction. In order to solve the problems of short-sighted behavior and unfair competition of hotels under different ownership, we should pay attention to the moral hazard in the economic behavior of officials. The results of this study verify the existence of the influence of tenure on the economic behavior of officials. It adds meso-level empirical evidence for the sustained impact of promotion championships in multiple scenarios.
【作者單位】： 北京第二外國語學(xué)院財務(wù)管理系;致同會計師事務(wù)所;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項目“國有企業(yè)股權(quán)多元化、權(quán)力配置與產(chǎn)品市場——基于治理粘性視角”(項目編號:71402004) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)研究青年基金項目“披露動機(jī)、策略與風(fēng)險信息功能研究:基于風(fēng)險預(yù)警與謀利工具視角”(項目編號:14YJC630215) 北京旅游發(fā)展研究基地項目“中國旅游企業(yè)國際化戰(zhàn)略及績效研究”(項目編號:LYFZ16B002)
【分類號】：D630.3;F719.2

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