本文關(guān)鍵詞： 信息不對稱 合同主體 博弈論 關(guān)系協(xié)調(diào)　出處：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：大型建設(shè)項目作為一個國家經(jīng)濟協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的重要保障,是一個多元合同主體的綜合體。目前,雖然像EPC、DB等項目管理模式已涌進大型建設(shè)項目的市場,但是DBB作為傳統(tǒng)的承包模式,在國內(nèi)建筑市場仍然一直在沿用。并且在合作的過程中各方合同主體都追求自身利益的最大化,以致于常會發(fā)生利益沖突。這些沖突從潛在慢慢地走向激化,成為合同管理的問題。此時,合同管理的主要任務(wù)是通過對合同主體關(guān)系的協(xié)調(diào)管理來弱化主體之間的矛盾沖突,將他們的關(guān)系由對立轉(zhuǎn)化為合作。因此,本文以DBB模式為例,分析如何協(xié)調(diào)非對稱信息下大型建設(shè)項目中合同主體間的關(guān)系,協(xié)調(diào)各方主體間的利益需求。首先,文章基于國內(nèi)外合同主體關(guān)系協(xié)調(diào)的研究基礎(chǔ),從業(yè)主角度出發(fā),運用博弈論探討由于信息的不對稱和合同的不完備引起的合同主體關(guān)系不協(xié)調(diào)的問題。其次,通過理論分析和現(xiàn)狀調(diào)研表明,合同主體關(guān)系不協(xié)調(diào)的根源在于利益目標(biāo)的不一致。然后,根據(jù)不同的假設(shè)條件、不同的行動順序以及不同的信息結(jié)構(gòu),運用不同的博弈模型,即不完全信息動態(tài)博弈、不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈,分別對合同簽訂階段和合同履行階段的合同主體關(guān)系進行博弈研究。通過博弈模型的分析,根據(jù)博弈的均衡結(jié)果得出結(jié)論,建立相應(yīng)的激勵合同機制,在合同內(nèi)部設(shè)置獎懲措施。通過獎懲措施來降低監(jiān)理方和承包商間尋租行為發(fā)生的概率,從而在一定程度上協(xié)調(diào)了合同主體之間的利益關(guān)系,最終使各方實現(xiàn)有效的合作和利益的和諧共贏,對提高合同管理水平以及項目的順利實施有一定的理論意義和參考價值。
[Abstract]:Large-scale construction projects, as an important guarantee for the coordinated development of the national economy, are a complex of multiple contract subjects. At present, although project management models such as EPC-DB have poured into the market of large-scale construction projects, However, as a traditional contracting mode, DBB is still used in the domestic construction market. As a result, conflicts of interest often occur. These conflicts are gradually becoming more and more serious and become a problem of contract management. At this time, the main task of contract management is to weaken the conflict between subjects through the coordinated management of the relationship between contract subjects. Therefore, this paper takes the DBB model as an example to analyze how to coordinate the relationship between the parties in large construction projects under asymmetric information, and to coordinate the interests and needs of the parties. Based on the research foundation of the coordination of contract subject relationship at home and abroad and from the angle of owner, this paper uses game theory to probe into the problem of uncoordinated relationship between contract subject caused by asymmetric information and incomplete contract. Secondly, Through theoretical analysis and current investigation, it is shown that the root of the incongruity of contract subject relationship lies in the inconsistency of interest objectives. Then, according to different hypothetical conditions, different action sequence and different information structure, different game models are used. That is, dynamic game with incomplete information, static game with incomplete information, game research on the relationship between contract subject in contract signing stage and contract performance stage respectively. Through the analysis of game model, the conclusion is drawn according to the equilibrium result of game. Set up the corresponding incentive contract mechanism, set up the reward and punishment measure inside the contract, through the reward and punishment measure to reduce the probability of the rent-seeking behavior between the supervisor and the contractor, thus to a certain extent coordinate the benefit relation between the contract main body, Finally, it is of theoretical significance and reference value to improve the level of contract management and the smooth implementation of the project.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：TU723.1

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本文編號：1509816