本文選題：零售商驅動 + Stackelberg博弈��； 參考：《山東理工大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著經濟的快速發(fā)展,行業(yè)間的競爭愈加激烈,人們對社會環(huán)境保護意識的不斷提高,以及對社會資源可持續(xù)發(fā)展認識的不斷深入,制造型企業(yè)越來越重視對于廢舊產品的回收及再制造。然而,由于客戶需求變化多樣及市場需求極不穩(wěn)定,市場供需關系由賣方市場不斷向買方市場轉移,使得零售商在閉環(huán)供應鏈中占據越來越重要的地位,閉環(huán)供應鏈中的主導權開始由制造商向零售商轉移,因此零售商驅動型閉環(huán)供應鏈越來越受到大家的重視,逐漸成為研究熱點。由于閉環(huán)供應鏈各成員之間通常獨立決策自己的經濟活動,相互之間有著各自不同的利益,同時在相互合作過程中有著不同的運作目標。因此閉環(huán)供應鏈在運作過程中效率低下,整體利潤偏低,處于失調狀態(tài),那么引入收入共享契約對于零售商處于驅動地位的閉環(huán)供應鏈能夠起到良好的協(xié)調作用。本文在此思想的基礎上,從由零售商、制造商、專業(yè)第三方回收物流企業(yè)(3P)及消費者組成的閉環(huán)供應鏈入手,針對如何合理使用相關契約使得第三方回收再制造閉環(huán)供應鏈實現(xiàn)協(xié)調的問題,應用博弈論等相關理論研究在確定性市場需求(市場需求是產品銷售價的線性函數)下零售商驅動型閉環(huán)供應鏈運作模型,對于閉環(huán)供應鏈各成員的決策行為用收益共享契約進行協(xié)調,得出該契約的適用范圍。通過研究,對各種情況下閉環(huán)供應鏈參與主體的決策行為、運行規(guī)律進行歸納總結;同時對如何有效進行協(xié)調閉環(huán)供應鏈,提高閉環(huán)供應鏈整體競爭優(yōu)勢提供理論指導,因此具有一定的理論和現(xiàn)實意義。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, the competition between industries is becoming more and more fierce, people's awareness of social environmental protection has been improved, and the understanding of the sustainable development of social resources has been deepened. Manufacturing enterprises pay more and more attention to recycling and remanufacturing of used products. However, due to the variety of customer demand and the instability of market demand, the relationship between supply and demand in the market is constantly transferred from the seller's market to the buyer's market, which makes retailers play a more and more important role in the closed-loop supply chain. The leading power in the closed-loop supply chain begins to shift from manufacturer to retailer, so the retailer driven closed-loop supply chain is paid more and more attention to, and gradually becomes the research hotspot. Because the members of the closed-loop supply chain usually make independent decisions on their own economic activities, they have different interests and different operational objectives in the process of mutual cooperation. Therefore, the closed-loop supply chain is inefficient, the whole profit is on the low side, and it is in the state of imbalance, so the introduction of revenue-sharing contract can play a good coordinating role in the closed-loop supply chain, which is driven by retailers. Based on this idea, this paper starts with the closed-loop supply chain composed of retailers, manufacturers, professional third-party recycling logistics enterprises and consumers. In order to solve the problem of how to make use of the relevant contracts reasonably to coordinate the third party recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, Based on the game theory and other relevant theories, this paper studies the retailer driven closed-loop supply chain operation model under deterministic market demand (which is a linear function of product sales price). The decision behavior of the members of the closed-loop supply chain is coordinated by the revenue-sharing contract, and the applicable scope of the contract is obtained. Through the research, the decision-making behavior and operation law of the participants in the closed-loop supply chain under various circumstances are summarized, and the theoretical guidance on how to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain effectively and improve the overall competitive advantage of the closed-loop supply chain is provided. Therefore, it has certain theoretical and practical significance.
【學位授予單位】：山東理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1910053