本文關鍵詞： 乳制品供應鏈 第三方物流 契約設計 激勵機制 博弈論　出處：《浙江工商大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：乳制品行業(yè)近些年來取得突飛猛進的發(fā)展,已成為人們?nèi)粘Ｊ称沸枨笾胁豢苫蛉钡慕M成部分。隨著大眾健康意識的提高,人們在消費乳制品時不僅關注所獲得的乳制品的價格,更加關注乳制品的質(zhì)量問題,例如：乳制品的運輸條件,存儲條件,新鮮程度等。這些都對乳制品的物流服務質(zhì)量提出了更高的要求。目前,我國乳制品的流通主要以自運為主,由于其物流缺乏專業(yè)性及物流建設方面無法投入過多精力,所以無法保障乳制品的物流服務質(zhì)量,而專業(yè)的乳制品第三方物流的興起為乳制品物流服務質(zhì)量的提高提供了一個有力保證。然而,乳制品第三方物流的加入在保證服務質(zhì)量的同時能否實現(xiàn)乳制品供應鏈的優(yōu)化,以及由于第三方物流所具有的信息優(yōu)勢可能帶來的信息不對稱問題及如何應對都迫切需要解決。對這些問題的研究對于乳制品供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展具有重要意義。針對以上問題,本文主要研究以下幾方面內(nèi)容：(1)針對乳制品供應鏈結構選擇決策問題,考慮有無第三方物流參與兩種情形,以乳制品生產(chǎn)企業(yè)為領導者、乳制品經(jīng)銷商為跟隨者,分別建立Stackelberg博弈模型,分析兩種情形下物流服務成本系數(shù)與物流服務質(zhì)量、物流服務成本系數(shù)與乳制品需求量、供應鏈總收益和物流服務成本分擔比例之間的相互關系,為供應鏈決策者選擇更好的乳制品供應鏈結構提供理論依據(jù)；(2)針對第三方物流參與下的乳制品供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題,考慮第三方物流企業(yè)物流服務成本信息對稱與信息不對稱兩種情況,分別建立第三方物流成本信息對稱與不對稱供應鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型,分析兩種情形下物流服務成本系數(shù)變動對物流服務質(zhì)量、乳制品需求量、第三方物流企業(yè)利潤、供應鏈其它成員利潤及供應鏈總利潤變化的影響,為優(yōu)化乳制品供應鏈物流服務質(zhì)量、保障乳制品供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)提供理論依據(jù)；(3)針對乳制品第三方物流企業(yè)謊報行為,考慮對該行為的防范,基于邁爾森的顯示原理建立契約激勵機制及模型,分析轉(zhuǎn)移支付分擔比例與總收益分配之間的關系,從而為設計最佳激勵機制提供依據(jù),促使具有信息優(yōu)勢的第三方物流企業(yè)真實申報其成本信息,最終實現(xiàn)乳制品供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:The dairy industry in recent years has achieved rapid development, has become an indispensable part of people's daily food needs. With public health awareness, people not only pay attention to the price of dairy products in the consumption of dairy products, pay more attention to the quality problems of dairy products such as dairy products transportation conditions, storage conditions fresh degree. All of the dairy products logistics service quality put forward higher requirements. At present, China's dairy products circulation mainly from transport mainly due to the lack of professional logistics and logistics construction aspect can not put too much effort, so can not guarantee the dairy products logistics service quality, and provide a strong guarantee of professional dairy products of third party logistics for the rise of dairy products logistics services to improve the quality of dairy products. However, the third party logistics service quality assurance in the same Can realize the optimization of dairy supply chain, as well as the urgent need the problem of asymmetric information with third party logistics information advantage may bring and how to deal with the problem. It is important to study on these issues for the coordinated development of dairy supply chain. For the above problems, this paper mainly studies the following aspects: (1) for the dairy supply chain decision-making problem, there is no third party logistics involved in two cases, with dairy production enterprises as a leader, dairy products dealers is the follower, established Stackelberg game model, analysis of the logistics service cost coefficient and logistics service quality in two case, logistics service and cost coefficient demand for dairy products, total profit of the supply chain and logistics service cost sharing relationship between proportion, choose a better dairy supply for supply chain decision makers Provide a theoretical basis for the chain structure; (2) for the dairy supply chain coordination of the third party logistics involved, consider the third party logistics service cost information symmetry and asymmetry of the two case, respectively set up the third party logistics cost information symmetry and asymmetry of supply chain coordination model, analysis of the logistics service cost coefficient of two cases under the change of logistics service quality, demand for dairy products, the profit of third party logistics enterprises, the impact of supply chain profits and other members of the total supply chain profit change, in order to optimize the dairy supply chain logistics service quality, ensure coordination of dairy supply chain and provide a theoretical basis for dairy products; (3) the third party logistics enterprises false behavior, consider to prevent this behavior, the establishment of incentive mechanism and display model based on the Myerson principle, analysis of transfer payment proportion and total profit distribution between the Therefore, it can provide a basis for designing the best incentive mechanism, and urge the third party logistics enterprises with information superiority to declare their cost information, and ultimately achieve the coordination of dairy supply chain.

【學位授予單位】：浙江工商大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274;F426.82

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本文編號：1505678