本文關(guān)鍵詞： 電信業(yè)務(wù) 壟斷定價 競爭定價 網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量 轉(zhuǎn)移成本　出處：《電子科技大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：電信服務(wù)日漸成為人們?nèi)粘Ｉ畋夭豢缮俚耐ㄐ攀侄危娦艠I(yè)是我國實(shí)現(xiàn)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)增長、承接產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)移的重要戰(zhàn)略性產(chǎn)業(yè)。隨著電信業(yè)的不斷深化改革，越來越多的競爭機(jī)制引入電信市場，政府逐漸放松管制力度，電信企業(yè)擁有越來越大的定價決策權(quán)力。與此同時隨著電信業(yè)規(guī)模的不斷增長，消費(fèi)者的差異化個性化需求逐漸增加。在此背景下，一方面原有的價格管制方法不能很好的適用于當(dāng)今電信市場，，需要更多的考慮企業(yè)決策的視角；另一方面，現(xiàn)有的電信定價決策理論方法并不完善，沒有綜合考慮市場結(jié)構(gòu)、成本、需求等因素對電信定價決策的影響。因此，本文從微觀企業(yè)決策的視角出發(fā)，構(gòu)建電信業(yè)務(wù)定價決策體系，綜合考慮系列因素進(jìn)行定價決策模型研究。 本文首先研究電信壟斷業(yè)務(wù)的定價模型。核心思想是：電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量日漸不足的現(xiàn)實(shí)已深刻影響到運(yùn)營商的最優(yōu)定價與利潤。在無網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量約束下，構(gòu)建壟斷運(yùn)營商基于二部制定價的利潤函數(shù)模型，求解其最優(yōu)定價與利潤；在有網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量約束，不考慮短期擴(kuò)容的情況下，構(gòu)建壟斷運(yùn)營商約束下的利潤函數(shù)模型，求解其最優(yōu)定價與利潤，探討網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量約束對運(yùn)營商定價與利潤的影響；在有網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量約束，考慮短期擴(kuò)容的情況下，構(gòu)建壟斷運(yùn)營商約束下的利潤函數(shù)模型，探討短期擴(kuò)容對運(yùn)營商定價與利潤的影響。研究表明：有網(wǎng)絡(luò)容量約束的情況會導(dǎo)致運(yùn)營商的定價升高，利潤降低；考慮是否進(jìn)行短期擴(kuò)容取決于收益彈性與成本彈性的對比，可以一定程度彌補(bǔ)運(yùn)營商利潤損失。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文研究電信競爭業(yè)務(wù)的定價模型。核心思想是：消費(fèi)者的選擇過程即為運(yùn)營商的定價過程，消費(fèi)者的行為影響著運(yùn)營商的定價決策。研究將消費(fèi)者選擇過程分為兩個階段，首先在用戶新入網(wǎng)階段，構(gòu)建雙寡頭壟斷運(yùn)營商競爭業(yè)務(wù)的利潤函數(shù)模型，求解其均衡定價；進(jìn)而在用戶重新選擇網(wǎng)絡(luò)階段，基于用戶轉(zhuǎn)移成本的約束，構(gòu)建運(yùn)營商約束下的利潤函數(shù)模型，討論用戶的行為對運(yùn)營商競爭業(yè)務(wù)定價的影響。研究表明：用戶新入網(wǎng)階段雙寡頭運(yùn)營商的均衡定價存在且唯一；用戶重新選擇網(wǎng)絡(luò)階段，運(yùn)營商是否重新定價取決于用戶轉(zhuǎn)移成本，且用戶人均消費(fèi)量對運(yùn)營商的重新定價有直接的影響。
[Abstract]:Telecommunication service is becoming an indispensable means of communication in people's daily life. Telecommunications industry is an important strategic industry to realize the growth of national economy and to undertake the transfer of industrial structure. More and more competition mechanisms are introduced into the telecommunications market, the government gradually deregulates, and telecom enterprises have more and more power to make pricing decisions. At the same time, as the scale of the telecommunications industry continues to grow, Under this background, on the one hand, the original price control method can not be applied to the telecom market well, so it needs more perspective to consider the enterprise decision; on the other hand, The existing theories and methods of telecom pricing decision are not perfect, and the influence of market structure, cost, demand and other factors on telecom pricing decision is not considered synthetically. The pricing decision system of telecom service is constructed, and the pricing decision model is studied by considering a series of factors. This paper first studies the pricing model of telecom monopoly business. The core idea is that the reality of the increasing shortage of telecom network capacity has deeply affected the optimal pricing and profit of operators. The profit function model of monopoly operators based on two-part pricing is constructed to solve the optimal pricing and profit, and the profit function model is constructed under the constraints of network capacity without considering the short-term expansion. The optimal pricing and profit are solved, the influence of network capacity constraints on operators' pricing and profit is discussed, and the profit function model of monopoly operators is constructed under the condition of network capacity constraints and short term capacity expansion. This paper discusses the effect of short-term capacity expansion on operators' pricing and profit. The results show that the network capacity constraint will lead to higher pricing and lower profit, and the consideration of short-term capacity expansion depends on the comparison between revenue elasticity and cost elasticity. Can make up the loss of profit of operator to a certain extent. On this basis, this paper studies the pricing model of telecom competitive services. The core idea is that the process of consumer selection is the pricing process of operators. The behavior of consumers affects the pricing decision of operators. The study divides the process of consumer selection into two stages. Firstly, in the stage of new users entering the network, the profit function model of duopoly monopoly operators' competitive business is constructed, and the equilibrium pricing is solved. Then, in the stage of re-selecting the network, the profit function model under the constraints of operator constraints is constructed based on the constraints of user transfer costs. This paper discusses the influence of users' behavior on the pricing of competitive services of operators. The research shows that the equilibrium pricing of duopoly operators exists and is unique in the new network entry phase, and the users re-select the network stage. Whether the operator repricing or not depends on the user transfer cost, and the per user consumption has a direct impact on the operator repricing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F626

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