【摘要】：非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目是政府利用財政性資金投資的工程建設項目。其投資規(guī)模巨大,并且對其他投資有引導性,因此一直是國內(nèi)外工程界和理論界關(guān)注的焦點問題。近年來我國為改善對其管理效果,對管理體制與管理模式進行了代建制改革,提倡現(xiàn)代工程管理方法,然而各種問題仍層出不窮,代建制管理中存在的弊端逐漸顯露。因此分析非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目參建主體間的利益訴求及博弈過程,并基于此優(yōu)化項目管理方法是一個值得研究的課題。 本研究首先搜集、查閱了非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目領(lǐng)域內(nèi)有關(guān)管理模式優(yōu)化的研究,通過對比研究內(nèi)容、研究方法及國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,提出從代建人角度改進管理工作效果十分必要。然后基于動態(tài)博弈理論,分別構(gòu)建了代建人、承包商及監(jiān)理單位的一次性動態(tài)博弈模型、有限次重復博弈模型及無限次重復博弈模型,并采用逆推法求得了不同模型的納什均衡解。本研究中的“承包商”是一個更為廣義的概念,包括了勘察設計單位、咨詢單位、施工單位及采購單位等多方。通過對納什均衡解的對比分析,得出可從引導均衡解向帕累托效率最優(yōu)方向移動的角度來優(yōu)化代建人的管理工作的結(jié)論。最后,構(gòu)建了非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目的管理方法,包括三個方面：在完善合約中的懲罰機制方面,給出了承包商及監(jiān)理常見的一般違約行為和嚴重違約行為,這是在合同中必須明確界定的；在代建人管理工作的網(wǎng)格化方面,提出了將網(wǎng)格化理論應用于代建人管理工作中,以提高監(jiān)管效率并降低監(jiān)管成本；在承包商與監(jiān)理單位的工作效果評價中,采用文獻分析法給出了二者的評價指標體系,以此促進長期合作機制的建立。 本研究全面分析了非經(jīng)營性政府項目的參建主體之間的利益訴求并構(gòu)建博弈模型；然后提出了基于上述博弈模型的非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目的管理方法,一方面加深了對非經(jīng)營性政府投資項目領(lǐng)域的博弈研究,也為優(yōu)化項目管理工作提供了理論參考及一定指導作用。
[Abstract]:Non-profit government investment project is an engineering construction project invested by the government using financial funds. Its investment scale is huge, and has the guidance to other investment, therefore has been the domestic and foreign engineering circles and the theorists concerned the focal point question. In recent years, in order to improve its management effect, our country has carried on the reform of the management system and the management mode, advocated the modern engineering management method, but each kind of question still appears one after another, the malpractice existing in the agent system management gradually reveals. Therefore, it is worth studying to analyze the interest demand and game process among the participants of non-profit-making government investment projects, and to optimize the project management method based on this. This study first collected and consulted the research on management model optimization in the field of non-profit-making government investment projects, and compared the research contents, research methods and domestic and foreign research status. It is necessary to improve the effect of management from the angle of agent. Then, based on the dynamic game theory, the one-off dynamic game model, the finite repeated game model and the infinite repeated game model of the agent, the contractor and the supervision unit are constructed, respectively. The Nash equilibrium solutions of different models are obtained by inverse method. The "contractor" in this study is a broader concept, including survey and design unit, consulting unit, construction unit and purchasing unit. Through the comparative analysis of Nash equilibrium solution, the conclusion is drawn that the management of agent can be optimized from the angle of guiding equilibrium solution to Pareto efficiency optimal direction. Finally, the paper constructs the management method of the non-operating government investment project, including three aspects: in perfecting the punishment mechanism in the contract, the common general breach of contract and serious breach of contract by the contractor and the supervision are given. This must be clearly defined in the contract; In the aspect of gridding of agent management, this paper puts forward the application of grid theory to the management of agent, in order to improve the efficiency of supervision and reduce the cost of supervision. In the evaluation of the working effect of contractor and supervision unit, the evaluation index system of the contractor and supervision unit is given by the method of literature analysis, so as to promote the establishment of long-term cooperation mechanism. This study comprehensively analyzes the interests of non-profit-making government project participants and builds a game model. Then, the paper puts forward the management method of non-profit-making government investment projects based on the above game model. On the one hand, it deepens the game research on the field of non-profit-making government investment projects. It also provides theoretical reference and guidance for optimizing project management.
【學位授予單位】：華北電力大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.45;F281

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 嚴玲;周國棟;;基于項目治理理論的政府投資項目代建制改革分析[J];北京理工大學學報(社會科學版);2008年06期

2 廖亮;;國內(nèi)政府投資項目代建制模式管理探論[J];中國工程咨詢;2011年10期

3 李廣華;鮑明慧;;電力工程監(jiān)理過程博弈分析[J];電力建設;2013年01期

4 王業(yè)春;劉玲;;關(guān)于完善政府投資項目代建制的對策研究[J];中國工程咨詢;2013年04期

5 孫陸鵬;楚志剛;肖漢;;網(wǎng)格化工商業(yè)市場監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)設計與實現(xiàn)[J];河南科學;2010年11期

6 楊孟暉;;提升代建制下政府投資項目工程質(zhì)量的對策研究[J];工程管理學報;2011年01期

7 宋震;黃如寶;;我國政府投資項目管理方式的制度變遷[J];建筑經(jīng)濟;2013年04期

8 洪巍;;大型工程業(yè)主與承包商基于質(zhì)量的利益激勵機制設計[J];建筑經(jīng)濟;2013年05期

9 樂云;張兵;關(guān)賢軍;李永奎;;基于演化博弈的政府投資項目制度與行為策略關(guān)系研究[J];工程管理學報;2013年03期

10 鄧曉梅;汪濤;;基于理性決策模型的政府投資非經(jīng)營性工程項目建設模式比較研究[J];清華大學學報(自然科學版);2010年12期

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前3條

1 強青軍;基于全壽命周期的政府投資項目投資控制與監(jiān)管模式研究[D];西安建筑科技大學;2011年

2 陸曉春;基于項目治理的代建項目成功因素研究[D];天津大學;2008年

3 王燕;政府投資項目建設市場化改革及其績效研究[D];中南大學;2012年

，

本文編號：2363846