基于BOOST模式的已建社區(qū)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補(bǔ)貼定價(jià)機(jī)制研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-16 21:13
【摘要】：隨著中國老齡化問題的凸顯,養(yǎng)老設(shè)施供給嚴(yán)重不足,但由政府投資進(jìn)行養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)會(huì)帶給政府巨大的財(cái)政壓力,政府亟需引入社會(huì)資本參與其開發(fā),政企合作進(jìn)行養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)已成為趨勢。在已建社區(qū)配套開發(fā)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施是解決社區(qū)養(yǎng)老問題的有效途徑,其依托社區(qū)資源并直接服務(wù)于社區(qū)老年群體的開發(fā)方式針對(duì)性強(qiáng)。然而,由于養(yǎng)老設(shè)施的低收益性,私營機(jī)構(gòu)不一定能通過運(yùn)營養(yǎng)老設(shè)施獲取目標(biāo)利潤,政府的補(bǔ)貼就成為了影響?zhàn)B老設(shè)施持續(xù)供給的關(guān)鍵。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文立足于公共政策視角,深入分析了基于BOOST的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)模式,構(gòu)建了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補(bǔ)貼定價(jià)模型,以實(shí)現(xiàn)各參與方的利益均衡,保障養(yǎng)老設(shè)施社會(huì)福利性的同時(shí)保持其供給的穩(wěn)定性,推動(dòng)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)的持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。首先,分析了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施BOOST模式的融資結(jié)構(gòu)及其開發(fā)流程,并從政府財(cái)政、社會(huì)資本投資和私營機(jī)構(gòu)融資的角度出發(fā),對(duì)BOOST開發(fā)動(dòng)因及開發(fā)效用進(jìn)行闡述。同時(shí),對(duì)作為“管制者”的政府及由開發(fā)商、投資商和運(yùn)營商組成的私營機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行職能分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析了BOOST模式的運(yùn)作條件及運(yùn)作思路,設(shè)計(jì)了“改造+新建”的運(yùn)作模式,該模式有效降低了私營機(jī)構(gòu)開發(fā)成本,進(jìn)而降低養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)格。其次,基于市場供需理論、社會(huì)保障理論和“帕累托最優(yōu)”理論對(duì)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)值形成進(jìn)行分析,梳理了基于項(xiàng)目成本、項(xiàng)目期望收益和項(xiàng)目實(shí)際收益的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)格構(gòu)成,厘清了政府對(duì)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施項(xiàng)目的補(bǔ)貼構(gòu)成。在此基礎(chǔ)上,采用以二部定價(jià)法為主的成本導(dǎo)向定價(jià)法和支付能力導(dǎo)向定價(jià)法,結(jié)合養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)格構(gòu)成中的補(bǔ)償性收益,構(gòu)建了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施BOOST模式綜合定價(jià)模型。在養(yǎng)老設(shè)施定價(jià)的基礎(chǔ)上,分別構(gòu)建政府對(duì)私營機(jī)構(gòu)的一次性床位補(bǔ)貼、基于公正報(bào)酬率定價(jià)的運(yùn)營補(bǔ)貼及經(jīng)營性養(yǎng)老服務(wù)補(bǔ)貼模型,結(jié)合政府對(duì)老年用戶補(bǔ)貼模型,綜合構(gòu)建了政府對(duì)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施項(xiàng)目補(bǔ)貼定價(jià)模型。再次,養(yǎng)老設(shè)施以保障老年用戶基本養(yǎng)老權(quán)益為根本目的,為了避免私營機(jī)構(gòu)提高養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)格,設(shè)定了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施低價(jià)規(guī)制策略及補(bǔ)貼修正模型;基于不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈理論,分別對(duì)私營機(jī)構(gòu)和政府進(jìn)行低價(jià)規(guī)制策略分析,厘清了低價(jià)規(guī)制的實(shí)施手段和激勵(lì)作用;基于低價(jià)規(guī)制建立私營機(jī)構(gòu)三級(jí)成本績效評(píng)估體系,構(gòu)建以成本績效規(guī)制為導(dǎo)向的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補(bǔ)貼修正模型。最后,以徐州市奎園社區(qū)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)項(xiàng)目為原型,結(jié)合研究中的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施定價(jià)模型及補(bǔ)貼定價(jià)模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證了分析。實(shí)證研究得出BOOST模式下運(yùn)作的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價(jià)格處于徐州市養(yǎng)老市場的較低水平,能有效保障養(yǎng)老用戶的基本養(yǎng)老權(quán)益。政府對(duì)私營機(jī)構(gòu)的經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)貼使其能獲取目標(biāo)利潤,政府對(duì)老年用戶的補(bǔ)貼進(jìn)一步保障其養(yǎng)老權(quán)益。
[Abstract]:With the aging problem in China, the supply of pension facilities is seriously insufficient, but the development of pension facilities invested by the government will bring huge financial pressure to the government. The government urgently needs to introduce social capital to participate in its development. Government-enterprise cooperation in the development of pension facilities has become a trend. Developing endowment facilities in established communities is an effective way to solve the problem of providing for the aged in the community, which relies on the resources of the community and serves the elderly groups in the community directly. However, due to the low profitability of pension facilities, private institutions may not be able to obtain the target profits through the operation of pension facilities. Government subsidies have become the key to the sustainable supply of pension facilities. On this basis, based on the perspective of public policy, this paper deeply analyzes the development model of pension facilities based on BOOST, and constructs the pricing model of pension facilities subsidies, in order to achieve the benefit balance of the participants. To ensure the social welfare of pension facilities and maintain the stability of their supply, promote the sustainable and healthy development of pension facilities. Firstly, this paper analyzes the financing structure and development process of BOOST model, and expounds the development motivation and utility of BOOST from the perspectives of government finance, social capital investment and private sector financing. At the same time, the government as a "regulator" and the private sector, composed of developers, investors and operators, are analyzed. On this basis, the operating conditions and operation ideas of BOOST mode are analyzed, and the operation mode of "reform and new construction" is designed, which effectively reduces the development cost of private institutions and then reduces the price of old-age facilities. Secondly, based on the theory of market supply and demand, social security theory and Pareto optimal theory, this paper analyzes the formation of the value of old-age facilities, combing the price structure of pension facilities based on project cost, project expected income and project actual income. It clarifies the composition of the government's subsidy to pension facilities. On this basis, a comprehensive pricing model of old-age facilities based on BOOST model is constructed by adopting the cost-oriented pricing method and the pay-ability oriented pricing method, which are mainly based on the two-part pricing method, and combined with the compensatory income in the price composition of the old-age facilities. On the basis of the pricing of old-age facilities, the one-off bed subsidy, the operating subsidy based on fair rate of return and the operating pension service subsidy model are constructed, respectively, and combined with the government subsidy model for the elderly users. The model of government subsidy pricing for pension facilities is constructed. Thirdly, the basic purpose of the old-age facilities is to protect the basic rights and interests of the elderly users. In order to avoid the private sector to raise the price of pension facilities, the paper sets up the low-price regulation strategy and the subsidy revision model of the old-age facilities. Based on the static game theory of incomplete information, this paper analyzes the low price regulation strategy of private sector and government, and clarifies the implementation means and incentive function of low price regulation. Based on the low price regulation, the third level cost performance evaluation system of private sector is established. This paper constructs a revised model of pension facility subsidy based on cost performance regulation. Finally, based on the prototype of the community pension service project in Kuiyuan, Xuzhou City, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the pricing model of pension facilities and subsidy pricing model. Empirical research shows that the price of pension facilities operating under the BOOST model is at a low level of the pension market in Xuzhou, which can effectively protect the basic pension rights and interests of the aged users. Government subsidies to the private sector enable them to obtain targeted profits, and government subsidies to elderly users further protect their pension rights and interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45;D669.6
本文編號(hào)：2275641
[Abstract]:With the aging problem in China, the supply of pension facilities is seriously insufficient, but the development of pension facilities invested by the government will bring huge financial pressure to the government. The government urgently needs to introduce social capital to participate in its development. Government-enterprise cooperation in the development of pension facilities has become a trend. Developing endowment facilities in established communities is an effective way to solve the problem of providing for the aged in the community, which relies on the resources of the community and serves the elderly groups in the community directly. However, due to the low profitability of pension facilities, private institutions may not be able to obtain the target profits through the operation of pension facilities. Government subsidies have become the key to the sustainable supply of pension facilities. On this basis, based on the perspective of public policy, this paper deeply analyzes the development model of pension facilities based on BOOST, and constructs the pricing model of pension facilities subsidies, in order to achieve the benefit balance of the participants. To ensure the social welfare of pension facilities and maintain the stability of their supply, promote the sustainable and healthy development of pension facilities. Firstly, this paper analyzes the financing structure and development process of BOOST model, and expounds the development motivation and utility of BOOST from the perspectives of government finance, social capital investment and private sector financing. At the same time, the government as a "regulator" and the private sector, composed of developers, investors and operators, are analyzed. On this basis, the operating conditions and operation ideas of BOOST mode are analyzed, and the operation mode of "reform and new construction" is designed, which effectively reduces the development cost of private institutions and then reduces the price of old-age facilities. Secondly, based on the theory of market supply and demand, social security theory and Pareto optimal theory, this paper analyzes the formation of the value of old-age facilities, combing the price structure of pension facilities based on project cost, project expected income and project actual income. It clarifies the composition of the government's subsidy to pension facilities. On this basis, a comprehensive pricing model of old-age facilities based on BOOST model is constructed by adopting the cost-oriented pricing method and the pay-ability oriented pricing method, which are mainly based on the two-part pricing method, and combined with the compensatory income in the price composition of the old-age facilities. On the basis of the pricing of old-age facilities, the one-off bed subsidy, the operating subsidy based on fair rate of return and the operating pension service subsidy model are constructed, respectively, and combined with the government subsidy model for the elderly users. The model of government subsidy pricing for pension facilities is constructed. Thirdly, the basic purpose of the old-age facilities is to protect the basic rights and interests of the elderly users. In order to avoid the private sector to raise the price of pension facilities, the paper sets up the low-price regulation strategy and the subsidy revision model of the old-age facilities. Based on the static game theory of incomplete information, this paper analyzes the low price regulation strategy of private sector and government, and clarifies the implementation means and incentive function of low price regulation. Based on the low price regulation, the third level cost performance evaluation system of private sector is established. This paper constructs a revised model of pension facility subsidy based on cost performance regulation. Finally, based on the prototype of the community pension service project in Kuiyuan, Xuzhou City, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the pricing model of pension facilities and subsidy pricing model. Empirical research shows that the price of pension facilities operating under the BOOST model is at a low level of the pension market in Xuzhou, which can effectively protect the basic pension rights and interests of the aged users. Government subsidies to the private sector enable them to obtain targeted profits, and government subsidies to elderly users further protect their pension rights and interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45;D669.6
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