【摘要】：財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付是中國現(xiàn)行中央對地方財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付體系中一種占有較大比重的轉(zhuǎn)移支付形式，是實現(xiàn)公共服務均等化和彌補財政失衡的重要政策工具。由于中國現(xiàn)行的財稅體制和中央對地方財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度還不完善，，因此在財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付的過程中，中央政府和地方政府由于目標函數(shù)的差異，存在動態(tài)的合作博弈行為。在博弈中，中央基于財政體制慣性與現(xiàn)狀、全國性公共產(chǎn)品供給和引導地方對于公共問題治理等基本邏輯，向地方政府撥付財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付；而地方基于財政資源不足、官員晉升以及博弈長遠利益的邏輯，想方設法獲取中央財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付。在博弈過程截面上看，中央運用轉(zhuǎn)移支付政策法規(guī)、配套資金支付時間前置和財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付資金監(jiān)管等策略來調(diào)動地方財政的積極性實現(xiàn)中央的政策目標，地方政府利用舉債、空轉(zhuǎn)以及虛假申報和配套等策略來籌措配套資金獲取中央的財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付，彌補地方財政缺口。財政配套性轉(zhuǎn)移支付過程的博弈在一定程度上提升了公共產(chǎn)品的供給水平，也派生出財政資源替代效應、財政橫向失衡、擾亂地方在財政支出自主性，衍生出一些腐敗行為。
[Abstract]:Fiscal transfer payment is an important policy tool to realize the equalization of public services and to make up for the imbalance of public finance, which is a form of transfer payment with a large proportion in the current financial transfer payment system between the central government and the local government. Since China's current fiscal and taxation system and the central-to-local fiscal transfer payment system are still not perfect, in the process of fiscal matching transfer payment, the central government and the local government have different objective functions. There is dynamic cooperative game behavior. In the game, the central government, based on the inertia and current situation of the financial system, the supply of national public goods and the basic logic of guiding the local government to deal with public problems, allocates the fiscal matching transfer payment to the local government, while the local government is short of financial resources. Officials' promotion and the logic of game long-term interests, try to obtain the central finance supporting transfer payment. In the cross-section of the game process, the central government uses the policies and regulations of transfer payment, the supporting fund payment time leading and the financial supporting transfer payment fund supervision to mobilize the enthusiasm of local finance to achieve the central policy goal. The local government makes use of the strategies of borrowing, idling, false declaration and matching to raise the supporting funds to obtain the central financial transfer payment and make up for the gap of the local finance. The game of fiscal matching transfer payment improves the supply level of public goods to a certain extent, and also derives the substitution effect of financial resources, the horizontal imbalance of finance, disrupts the autonomy of local fiscal expenditure, and gives rise to some corrupt behaviors.
【學位授予單位】：南昌大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.45

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