【摘要】：改革開放以來,地方政府一直充當著推動經濟增長的引擎作用,其“公司化”傾向不斷增強。地方政府利用財政信用的擴張,添補了市場主體紛紛去杠桿化導致的市場信用萎縮,從而避免了大量的企業(yè)倒閉、工人失業(yè)、農民返鄉(xiāng)等不利后果,使得中國經濟在國際經濟危機中率先擺脫了危機陰影。但與此同時,大擴張也帶來了政府投融資平臺過度借貸、產能過剩、政府間惡性競爭和銀行不良貸款等“后遺癥”。這說明我國地方財政投資中仍存在著突破預算約束的沖動,反映出我國政府財政投資決策、監(jiān)督、問責等體制尚不健全�，F階段亟須對我國地方政府財政投資軟預算約束的動因做進一步分析,以實現逐步硬化預算約束、規(guī)范地方政府財政投資行為的目標。 本文從軟預算約束的視角來研究地方財政投資行為,首先對建國以來我國地方財政投資行為特征及軟預算約束情況進行梳理,總結出投資軟預算約束的表現與特點；然后從政績考核機制、財政投資體制、預算管理體制、金融信貸審批機制、監(jiān)管機制等方面深入剖析了我國地方財政投資存在軟預算約束的制度成因,并運用動態(tài)博弈論對地方政府與項目代理人、中央政府、同級其他地方政府之間的博弈過程進行分析,最后對比國外相關經驗,提出硬化預算約束、規(guī)范地方財政投資行為的政策建議。 制度帶有根本性、全局性,研究我國地方財政投資行為中預算軟約束形成的原因必須從制度入手。作者認為現有財政體制下地方財權與事權不對等以及不科學的政績考核制度促使地方官員產生了突破財政投資預算約束的動機,而不科學的投資決策體制、不健全的預算管理機制、不嚴格的金融信貸審批制度和缺失的外部監(jiān)管機制均給地方政府突破投資預算約束留下了制度操作空間。地方政府與財政投資項目代理人進行救助博弈時往往因為考慮到項目破產所帶來的負面影響而被迫給予項目救助；中央與地方政府間的信息不對稱以及委托代理關系使得兩者博弈時地方政府存在一定的優(yōu)勢；地方政府相互間的博弈因為官員追求晉升而陷入不斷擴大投資規(guī)模的囚徒困境。這些連續(xù)博弈的最終結果均是財政投資預算約束的軟化。 硬化我國地方財政投資預算約束,首先要轉變政府職能定位,建立有限與有效的政府,為市場經濟有效運行提供良好的基礎；其次,構建科學合理的政績考核體系,理順政府間支出責任和收入分配,完善財政投資決策機制、問責機制,構建投資規(guī)模適度判定指標體系；最后,要加快《預算法》的修訂,引入社會監(jiān)管,建立地方預算績效評價制度,從制度上約束和規(guī)范地方財政投資行為,提高財政投資效率。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the local government has been the engine of promoting economic growth, and its "corporate" tendency has been strengthened constantly. The local government has made use of the expansion of financial credit to supplement the market credit shrinking caused by the leveraging of the main body of the market, thus avoiding the failure of a large number of enterprises, the unemployment of the workers, and the return of the peasants to the countryside. As a result, the Chinese economy has taken the lead in getting rid of the shadow of the crisis in the international economic crisis. But at the same time, the expansion also brings the "sequelae" of the government investment and financing platform over borrowing, overcapacity, vicious competition between the government and the bank's bad loans. This shows that there is still an impulse to break through the budget constraints in the local financial investment. The government's financial investment decision-making, supervision, accountability and other systems are still not sound. At this stage, it is urgent to further analyze the reasons for the soft budget constraints of local government financial investment in order to achieve the gradual hardening of budget constraints and standardize the target of local government financial investment behavior.
This paper studies the behavior of local financial investment from the perspective of soft budget constraints. First, the characteristics of local financial investment behavior and soft budget constraints have been combed, and the performance and characteristics of the soft budget constraints are summed up. Then, the performance assessment mechanism, financial investment system, budget management system, and financial credit examination and approval machine are made. The institutional causes of local financial investment in China are deeply analyzed, and the game theory is used to analyze the game process between local government and project agents, central government and other local governments at the same level by dynamic game theory. Policy recommendations for fiscal investment behavior.
The system is fundamental and overall. The reasons for the formation of the soft budget constraints in our local financial investment must start with the system. The author thinks that the local financial power and power and the unscientific performance appraisal system under the existing financial system and the unscientific performance appraisal system have caused the local officials to break through the budget constraints of the financial investment, but not the motive. The investment decision-making system, the imperfect budgetary management mechanism, the unstrict financial credit examination and approval system and the missing external regulatory mechanism all leave the local government to break through the investment budget constraints. The local government and the financial investment project agents often take into account the project bankruptcy. The negative influence is forced to give the project assistance; the information asymmetry between the central and local governments and the principal-agent relationship make the local government have certain advantages when the two games are game; the game between the local government is trapped in the constant expansion of the investment scale because of the officials' pursuit of promotion. The result is the softening of fiscal budget constraints.
In order to harden our local financial investment budget constraints, we should first change the position of government functions, establish a limited and effective government, provide a good foundation for the effective operation of the market economy. Secondly, build a scientific and reasonable performance appraisal system, rationalize the Intergovernmental expenditure responsibility and income distribution, perfect the financial investment decision-making mechanism, accountability mechanism, and build the system. In the end, we should accelerate the revision of the "budget law", introduce the social supervision, establish the local budget performance evaluation system, restrict and standardize the local financial investment behavior, and improve the efficiency of financial investment.
【學位授予單位】：北京交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F812.45

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