本文選題：稅務(wù)稽查 + 博弈��； 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：尋找稅務(wù)稽查中博弈問(wèn)題的均衡解,對(duì)于稅務(wù)稽查人員正確認(rèn)識(shí)稅收籌劃、幫助企業(yè)提高稅務(wù)實(shí)務(wù)能力、在行業(yè)內(nèi)形成良好納稅風(fēng)氣及政府制定稅收政策都有積極的意義。本文運(yùn)用博弈論、行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等的基本原理和模型,結(jié)合稅務(wù)稽查理論、行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、管理學(xué)等內(nèi)容,采用動(dòng)態(tài)雙向博弈模型和加入委托代理機(jī)’構(gòu)的基本博弈模型進(jìn)行分析,根據(jù)模型結(jié)果得出納稅人逃稅所得、委托代理機(jī)構(gòu)行賄概率及稅務(wù)稽查機(jī)關(guān)罰款數(shù)額等多個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)指數(shù)之間的相互關(guān)系,推導(dǎo)出作為不同的稅務(wù)活動(dòng)主體在納稅過(guò)程中的條件與選擇,尋找到活動(dòng)主體之間追求的均衡解。決策過(guò)程中,納稅主體、稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)和委托代理機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)圍繞稅務(wù)稽查成功率、賄賂成本、處罰金額等因素作出有利于自身的分析決策。該博弈模型可以為稅務(wù)稽查機(jī)關(guān)制定政策、制止非法納稅行為、引導(dǎo)建立良好納稅環(huán)境提供良好的理論依據(jù)。 本文最后針對(duì)稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)、納稅人和委托代理機(jī)構(gòu)分別提出了諸如改善稽查方法、運(yùn)用激勵(lì)機(jī)制抑制委托代理機(jī)構(gòu)及稽查人員涉稅風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、采取舉報(bào)保護(hù)機(jī)制提高納稅人監(jiān)督積極性、降低稽查成本等提高稽查效率和效果的措施和建議。
[Abstract]:Finding a balanced solution to the game problem in tax inspection is of positive significance for tax inspectors to correctly understand tax planning, to help enterprises improve their ability in tax practice, to form a good tax atmosphere in the industry and to formulate tax policies by the government. This paper applies the basic principles and models of game theory, behavioral economics, tax audit theory, behavioral economics, management and so on, and adopts the dynamic two-way game model and the basic game model with principal-agent machine. According to the results of the model, the relationship between the taxpayer's tax evasion income, the probability of paying bribes and the amount of the fine of the tax inspection authority is obtained. This paper deduces the conditions and choices in the process of tax payment as different subjects of tax activity, and finds out the equilibrium solution pursued between them. In the decision-making process, tax payers, tax authorities and agency agencies will make favorable analysis decisions around the success rate of tax audit, the cost of bribery, the amount of punishment and so on. The game model can provide a good theoretical basis for the tax inspection authorities to formulate policies, stop illegal tax paying behavior, and guide the establishment of a good tax environment. Finally, aiming at tax authorities, tax payers and principal-agent organizations, this paper puts forward some methods such as improving auditing methods and using incentive mechanism to restrain the tax-related risks of entrustment agencies and inspectors. Measures and suggestions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of audit are put forward, such as improving the enthusiasm of taxpayers' supervision and reducing the cost of audit.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D922.22;F812.42;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：2020419