本文選題：政治激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：地方官員　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：越來越多的文獻(xiàn)關(guān)注到了政治激勵(lì)對(duì)于中國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在中國目前市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制還不健全的情況下,政治激勵(lì)對(duì)于促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長起到了顯著作用。本文認(rèn)為,政治激勵(lì)背后的邏輯不僅可以用來解釋官員促進(jìn)地方經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,也適用于解釋地方官員在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的其他行為,比如說,推動(dòng)政府信息公開。推動(dòng)政府財(cái)政預(yù)決算和“三公經(jīng)費(fèi)”的公開,是中央政府近年來十分關(guān)注的事情。在中央政府和高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的大力倡導(dǎo)和推動(dòng)下,各學(xué)術(shù)研究機(jī)構(gòu)觀測到不同地方政府的財(cái)政透明度卻不盡相同。本文通過實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn),地方政府官員在面臨不同程度的政治激勵(lì)時(shí),他們公開本地財(cái)政預(yù)算信息的動(dòng)力有著很大的不同。具體來說,在中央政府和高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人大力推動(dòng)政府信息公開的時(shí)候,地方政府官員面臨的政治激勵(lì)越大,他們?cè)诠_政府財(cái)政預(yù)算信息這件事情上表現(xiàn)得越積極,從而使得當(dāng)?shù)卣呢?cái)政透明度更高。針對(duì)本文的樣本來說,對(duì)于省委書記而言,擔(dān)任中央候補(bǔ)委員和中央委員的省委書記所在省份的財(cái)政透明度要顯著高于中央政治局委員所在省份的財(cái)政透明度；對(duì)于省長而言,非委員的省長和擔(dān)任候補(bǔ)委員的省長對(duì)于促進(jìn)財(cái)政信息公開比擔(dān)任中央委員的省長更加積極。 另外,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)地方政府官員的其他個(gè)人背景也會(huì)影響到政府財(cái)政信息的公開。相對(duì)于從外地來就任的官員,那些曾經(jīng)在本地任職過,從而與本地勢力聯(lián)系緊密的地方官員在態(tài)度上傾向于不公開財(cái)政預(yù)算信息。此外,地方政府官員的年齡也是影響財(cái)政透明度的重要因素,年齡越大的官員有著不積極公開財(cái)政預(yù)算信息的傾向。在對(duì)官員任期的研究中我們發(fā)現(xiàn),在位時(shí)間更長的官員會(huì)更加積極地公開財(cái)政信息。官員的受教育程度對(duì)于官員選擇積極公開信息或者不公開信息沒有特別顯著的影響。最后,本文的實(shí)證研究并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)地方的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平和財(cái)政支出結(jié)構(gòu)會(huì)顯著影響政府財(cái)政透明度的證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:More and more literatures have paid attention to the influence of political incentive on China's economic development. The study found that political incentive has played a significant role in promoting economic growth under the condition that China's current market economy system is not perfect. The logic behind political incentives can be used not only to explain officials' promotion of local economic growth, but also to explain other actions of local officials in economic development, for example, It is a matter of great concern to the central government in recent years to promote the disclosure of government information and the disclosure of the government's budget and the "three public funds." under the vigorous advocacy and promotion of the central government and senior leaders, The financial transparency of different local governments is different from that observed by academic research institutions. The empirical analysis shows that local government officials are faced with different levels of political incentives. Their motivation to disclose local budget information is very different. Specifically, when the central government and senior leaders vigorously promote the disclosure of government information, local government officials face greater political incentives. The more active they are in publicizing government budget information, the more transparent the local government will be. For the sample in this article, for the party secretary of the province, The financial transparency of the provinces where the provincial party committee secretaries serve as alternate members of the central committee and members of the central committee are significantly higher than those of the provinces where the members of the political Bureau of the Central Committee are located; as far as governors are concerned, Non-committee governors and alternate governors are more active in promoting the disclosure of financial information than in central governors. In addition, we found that other personal backgrounds of local government officials also affected the disclosure of government financial information. As a result, local officials with close ties to local forces tend not to disclose budgetary information in their attitudes. In addition, the age of local government officials is also an important factor affecting financial transparency. Older officials tend not to actively disclose budgetary information. In a study of the tenure of officials, we found that. Officials who have been in office for a longer period of time will be more active in making public financial information. The official's educational level has not had a particularly significant impact on the official's choice of whether to actively disclose information or not to disclose it. Finally, The empirical study of this paper does not find evidence that the level of local economic development and the structure of fiscal expenditure will significantly affect the transparency of government finances.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F812.2

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