本文選題：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) + 公司績效��； 參考：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代股份制公司的出現(xiàn)滿足了企業(yè)規(guī)�；�、規(guī)范化及專業(yè)化的要求,但同時(shí)由于所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離,引發(fā)了委托代理、內(nèi)部人控制、大股東侵占中小股東利益等一系列問題。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ),決定了股東治理的范圍、權(quán)限、積極性等,合理的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對改善公司治理提高公司治理效率并最終提升公司業(yè)績具有重要的作用。 改革開放以來,我國股份制公司的改造已取得很大的進(jìn)展,但隨著改革不斷進(jìn)行,上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)暴露出了股權(quán)過于集中、大股東監(jiān)管不利、中小股東“搭便車”等諸多問題。由于這些問題的存在,使得公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)難以改善公司價(jià)值難以提升。在這種情況下,結(jié)合我國國情對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究對改善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、提高公司治理效率,并最終提升公司價(jià)值具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文運(yùn)用理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方法,以上證和深證制造業(yè)上市公司為研究對象,分別從股權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度三個(gè)方面詮釋股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系,以期為優(yōu)化上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)提出良好的政策建議。全文可分為以下六個(gè)方面： (一)緒論。闡述本文的研究背景、研究意義、研究方法思路及論文框架。 (二)文獻(xiàn)綜述。回歸與整理國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效關(guān)系的研究成果,以期從現(xiàn)有的研究成果中獲得啟發(fā)與思考。 (三)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的基本理論。界定本文相關(guān)的概念,闡述股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的理論基礎(chǔ),包括兩權(quán)分離理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論以及委托代理理論,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析二者之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系,為實(shí)證研究部分做好鋪墊。 (四)研究設(shè)計(jì)。在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)以進(jìn)一步探析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系。本部分為實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)之前的準(zhǔn)備工作,即提出研究假設(shè)、選取研究對象、確定研究變量、并構(gòu)建相應(yīng)的研究模型。 (五)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。運(yùn)用實(shí)證分析方法,借助SPSS19.0統(tǒng)計(jì)分析軟件分析我國制造業(yè)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對公司績效的影響。 (六)結(jié)論與政策建議。根據(jù)理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果得出本文的研究結(jié)論,并提出相關(guān)政策建議。 本文選擇的樣本是2009-2011年上證和深證A股制造業(yè)上市公司。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)： 在股權(quán)屬性方面,國家股比例和公司績效呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,法人股比例和公司績效也呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。 在股權(quán)集中度方面,分別采用第一大股東持股比例、前五大股東持股比例之和以及前十大股東的持股比例之和來衡量,其與公司績效皆存在假設(shè)中的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。 在股權(quán)制衡度方面,無論采用第二大到第五大股東持股份額之和與第一大股東持股份額的比值還是第二大到第十大股東持股份額之和與第一大股東持股比例的比值來衡量,其與公司績效都存在假設(shè)中的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。 針對上述結(jié)論,本文提出如下建議：(1)適當(dāng)進(jìn)行國有股減持。(2)降低法人股的持股比例。(3)適當(dāng)降低股權(quán)集中度。(4)完善內(nèi)部制衡與監(jiān)管機(jī)制。(5)建立健全有效的外部監(jiān)管機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:The emergence of modern joint-stock companies meets the requirements of scale, standardization and specialization of enterprises, but at the same time, the separation of ownership and management rights leads to a series of problems such as principal-agent, internal control, and large shareholders invade the interests of small and medium shareholders. The ownership structure is the property right basis of corporate governance, and determines the scope of shareholders' governance. Reasonable ownership structure plays an important role in improving corporate governance, improving corporate governance efficiency and ultimately enhancing company performance.
Since the reform and opening up, the reform of the shareholding companies in China has made great progress, but with the continuous reform, the stock ownership structure of the listed companies has exposed a lot of problems such as the overconcentration of equity, the adverse supervision of the large shareholders and the "hitchhiking" of the small and medium shareholders. Because of the existence of these problems, the corporate governance structure is difficult to improve the company's value. In this case, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between the ownership structure and the company performance in order to improve the ownership structure, improve the corporate governance efficiency and ultimately enhance the company's value.
This paper, using the method of combining theoretical analysis and empirical test, takes Shanghai and Shenzhen's listed companies as the research object, and interprets the relationship between stock ownership structure and corporate performance from three aspects of equity ownership, ownership concentration and equity balance, in order to make a good policy suggestion for optimizing the equity structure of the listed company. It is divided into the following six aspects:
(1) introduction, describing the background, significance, methodology and framework of the research.
(two) literature review. Returns and collation of domestic and foreign scholars on the relationship between stock ownership structure and corporate performance, in order to get inspiration and thinking from the existing research results.
(three) the basic theory of equity structure and company performance. It defines the concepts related to this article, expounds the theoretical basis of the ownership structure and corporate performance, including the two rights separation theory, the property right theory and the principal-agent theory. On this basis, it analyzes the relationship between the two and pave the way for the empirical research.
(four) research and design. On the basis of theoretical analysis, empirical test is carried out to further explore the relationship between ownership structure and company performance. This part is the preparation work before the empirical test, that is to put forward the research hypothesis, select the research object, determine the research variables, and build the corresponding research model.
(five) empirical test. Using empirical analysis method and SPSS19.0 statistical analysis software, we analyze the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance of China's manufacturing listed companies.
(six) conclusions and policy recommendations. Based on theoretical analysis and empirical results, the conclusions of this study are obtained and relevant policy recommendations are put forward.
The sample is 2009-2011 years' Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies.
In terms of ownership attributes, the proportion of state shares and corporate performance are negatively correlated, and the proportion of corporate shares and corporate performance are also negatively correlated.
In terms of ownership concentration, the proportion of the first large shareholders, the sum of the top five shareholders and the sum of the top ten shareholders are measured, and the negative correlation exists between the first ten shareholders and the company performance.
In terms of equity balance, no matter the ratio of the sum of second to fifth large shareholders and the share of the first large shareholders or the ratio of the sum of the second to the tenth large shareholders and the proportion of the first large shareholders, there is a positive correlation between the company performance and the company performance.
In view of the above conclusions, the following suggestions are made as follows: (1) properly carrying out the reduction of state-owned shares. (2) reducing the shareholding ratio of the legal person shares. (3) to reduce the ownership concentration properly. (4) to improve the internal balance and supervision mechanism. (5) to establish a sound and effective external regulatory mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F425

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本文編號：1915508