本文選題：博弈論 + 汽車零部件��； 參考：《長安大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 我國汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)的快速增長帶動了汽車零部件行業(yè)迅速發(fā)展,汽車零部件零售企業(yè)實力不斷增強(qiáng)。隨著零售業(yè)集約化程度的提高以及行業(yè)競爭的加劇,在零售商具有一定的規(guī)模、資金和管理經(jīng)驗等后,為了尋求新的利潤增長點(diǎn),越來越多的汽車零部件零售商在銷售其他品牌產(chǎn)品的同時,開始試圖通過反向一體化戰(zhàn)略將經(jīng)營觸角延伸至生產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域開發(fā)零售商自有品牌是有可能的,一方面通過銷售其他制造商品牌的零部件產(chǎn)品來增加自己的利潤,另一方面,通過其他零部件廠商定制生產(chǎn)或貼牌自有品牌產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行銷售,來獲取利潤和樹立自己的品牌效應(yīng)。但是如何把握自有品牌和其他品牌之間的關(guān)系,這是本文研究的意義所在。 本文運(yùn)用博弈論相關(guān)理論研究了在一個零售商和兩個制造商組成的汽車零部件分配渠道中,零售商引入自有品牌對零售商和制造商的影響,博弈的過程是兩個制造商和零售商分別進(jìn)行博弈,屬于兩方博弈。零售商引入自有品牌之前,零售商僅僅銷售兩個相互競爭的制造商品牌產(chǎn)品;引入自有品牌后,零售商不僅銷售存在相互競爭的兩個制造商品牌產(chǎn)品,同時也銷售自有品牌產(chǎn)品。首先,論文分析了零售商引入自有品牌前后各品牌產(chǎn)品的市場需求量與價格關(guān)系,在考慮成本因素后,建立了兩種情形下零售商和制造商的博弈模型,并運(yùn)用斯坦克爾伯格動態(tài)博弈思想對模型進(jìn)行了求解;其次,運(yùn)用數(shù)理推導(dǎo)、matlab制圖和數(shù)值模擬計算分析了各參數(shù)對制造商品牌產(chǎn)品和自有品牌產(chǎn)品的價格、市場需求量和利潤的影響,并對引入自有品牌前后零售商和制造商的收益進(jìn)行了對比分析。論文分析結(jié)果表明:汽車零部件零售商引入自有品牌后,制造商品牌產(chǎn)品需求量下降,在一定條件下,自有品牌使得制造商品牌產(chǎn)品批發(fā)價格下降,從而降低制造商利潤,但是,在自有品牌市場基本需求量較小并與制造商品牌產(chǎn)品交叉價格敏感度較低時,自有品牌使制造商利潤上升;自有品牌對零售商來說,是把“雙刃劍”,當(dāng)自有品牌市場基本需求量較大,制造商品牌間交叉價格敏感度較小時,自有品牌將大大增加零售商利潤;反之,自有品牌使得零售商利潤下降。
[Abstract]:The rapid growth of automobile industry in China has led to the rapid development of auto parts industry, and the strength of automobile parts retail enterprises has been strengthened. With the intensification of retail trade and the intensification of competition in the industry, after retailers have certain scale, capital and management experience, in order to seek new profit growth, It is possible that more and more auto parts retailers, while selling other brand products, are trying to extend their reach to the production area through reverse integration strategy. On the one hand, it can increase its profit by selling other manufacturers' products, on the other hand, it can make profits and establish its own brand effect by other parts manufacturers to produce or label their own brand products. However, how to grasp the relationship between private brands and other brands is the significance of this study. In this paper, we use the game theory to study the influence of the retailers introducing their own brands on the retailers and manufacturers in the distribution channels of automobile parts, which are composed of one retailer and two manufacturers. The process of game is that two manufacturers and retailers play games, which belong to two parties. Before retailers introduce their own brands, retailers sell only two competing manufacturers' brand products; after the introduction of their own brands, retailers not only sell two competing manufacturers' brand products, At the same time also sell their own brand products. Firstly, the paper analyzes the relationship between the market demand and the price of each brand before and after the retailer introduces its own brand. After considering the cost factor, the game model between the retailer and the manufacturer is established. The model is solved by using the dynamic game theory of Steinkerberg. Secondly, the price of each parameter to the manufacturer's brand product and its own brand product is analyzed by mathematical derivation and numerical simulation. The influence of market demand and profit is analyzed, and the profit of retailers and manufacturers before and after the introduction of private brand is compared. The results show that the demand of manufacturer brand products decreases after the automobile parts retailer introduces its own brand, and under certain conditions, the wholesale price of the manufacturer brand product decreases, thereby reducing the manufacturer's profit. However, when the basic demand in the private brand market is small and the cross-price-sensitivity with the manufacturer's brand product is low, the private brand makes the manufacturer's profit rise, and the private brand is a "double-edged sword" for the retailer. When the demand of private brand market is large and the cross-price sensitivity between manufacturers is low, the self-brand will greatly increase the retailer's profit; conversely, the private brand will make the retailer's profit decline.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長安大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F274;F426.471;F224.32

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

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2 屠冉冉;洪躍;龔曉婧;;基于Stackelberg博弈策略下的多渠道供應(yīng)鏈決策研究[J];數(shù)學(xué)的實踐與認(rèn)識;2012年01期

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1 朱倩;基于博弈論的企業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈管理[D];長安大學(xué);2010年

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本文編號：1976721