【摘要】：隨著大數(shù)據(jù)時(shí)代的降臨和科學(xué)技術(shù)的飛速發(fā)展,經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化已成常態(tài),國(guó)內(nèi)外市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)趨于白熱化,愈加強(qiáng)勁的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手和日益復(fù)雜的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境將會(huì)成為企業(yè)不得不面對(duì)的兩大難題。現(xiàn)如今,任何一種產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)都不是由一個(gè)公司來(lái)完成的,而是由不同的企業(yè)協(xié)作完成的。'這一系列相互聯(lián)系、相互制約的企業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)就構(gòu)成了供應(yīng)鏈。企業(yè)想要在產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)占據(jù)一席之地,其最強(qiáng)有力的保障就是所在的供應(yīng)鏈。本文主要探討的是裝配系統(tǒng)的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同機(jī)制,這個(gè)問(wèn)題是供應(yīng)鏈中的具有鮮明特點(diǎn)的案例。文章構(gòu)建了由一個(gè)裝配商和n個(gè)零件供應(yīng)商的裝配系統(tǒng)模型。對(duì)于裝配系統(tǒng)中的供應(yīng)商/裝配商而言,都希望個(gè)人利益實(shí)現(xiàn)最大化,但是在這種"自私"的前提下會(huì)使供應(yīng)鏈整體效益低下。供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同機(jī)制是以整體最優(yōu)化為目標(biāo),使得裝配商和零件供應(yīng)商在獨(dú)自決策的時(shí)候不僅僅想到自身利益的最大化,還能夠顧全供應(yīng)鏈整體的利益,物盡其用實(shí)現(xiàn)整體績(jī)效的最大化。這種完美的協(xié)同機(jī)制就是供應(yīng)鏈契約,契約有很多種形式,本文主要討論了基于收益共享契約下的裝配系統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同問(wèn)題。在模型中,當(dāng)最終產(chǎn)品售出時(shí),裝配商需要從得到的收益當(dāng)中拿出一部分給予供應(yīng)商作為收益共享,供應(yīng)商根據(jù)自身的成本結(jié)構(gòu)和收益共享的多少來(lái)決定最終交貨量。這是一個(gè)Stackelberg博弈的過(guò)程,裝配商作為雙方博弈的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,有權(quán)利設(shè)定共享因子并且根據(jù)零件供應(yīng)商的反饋適當(dāng)?shù)恼{(diào)整契約因子,供應(yīng)商作為跟隨者,根據(jù)裝配商制定的契約調(diào)整自身的交貨量,這是裝配商和零件供應(yīng)商兩者之間的博弈過(guò)程。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),裝配商在可供選擇的契約集合中,一定存在一個(gè)帕累托最優(yōu)契約,盡管這個(gè)契約不一定保證整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)同,但最終能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)系統(tǒng)內(nèi)所有的參與者狀態(tài)達(dá)到最優(yōu),進(jìn)而系統(tǒng)總收益達(dá)到最優(yōu)。若供應(yīng)鏈契約中只加入收益共享因子,我們能夠得到這樣的結(jié)論:系統(tǒng)在集中決策時(shí)的最終產(chǎn)品交貨量是最大的,然而在各企業(yè)分散決策情況下是很難達(dá)到這個(gè)水平的,往往是低于這個(gè)最優(yōu)水平。我們將零件供應(yīng)商在集中決策下的最優(yōu)交貨量和分散決策下的進(jìn)行比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)分散決策系統(tǒng)的交貨量往往低于集中決策系統(tǒng)的交貨量,如此單一的契約無(wú)法使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)同。這是因?yàn)?信息的不對(duì)稱(chēng)導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)商在獨(dú)自做決策時(shí),只考慮自身利益的最大化,僅僅只是為了降低自身的損失就減少了零件交貨量,進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致最終產(chǎn)品的供貨量減少。為了使供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)同,本文對(duì)收益共享契約進(jìn)行了補(bǔ)充,加入了剩余補(bǔ)償因子,即對(duì)未售出的最終產(chǎn)品,裝配商也要付給零件供應(yīng)商一部分報(bào)酬作為補(bǔ)償,即所謂的剩余補(bǔ)償,由此我們得到了完美的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制---"收益共享+剩余補(bǔ)償"契約。這個(gè)契約不僅可以使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)同,還可以促進(jìn)供應(yīng)商的交貨量增加,進(jìn)一步使系統(tǒng)的總收益最大化。大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)資料都是基于報(bào)童模型的基礎(chǔ)上來(lái)探討利益最優(yōu)化,目標(biāo)函數(shù)是預(yù)期利潤(rùn)函數(shù),以此來(lái)尋求系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)。本文從一個(gè)新的出發(fā)點(diǎn)思考問(wèn)題,從相反的角度考慮,系統(tǒng)總收益最大化也等價(jià)于系統(tǒng)總損失最小化,目標(biāo)函數(shù)也需要相對(duì)應(yīng)地改為損失函數(shù)。現(xiàn)實(shí)情況中,零件供應(yīng)商交付的零件不一定能夠完全被裝配,由于之前的論述中我們假設(shè)未裝配的零件不存在,因此我們忽略了這部分損失,在接下來(lái)文章中我們從最小損失的角度構(gòu)造了損失函數(shù),分析了供應(yīng)商和裝配商的方差,并確定了使得系統(tǒng)達(dá)到最優(yōu)情況下供應(yīng)商方差和裝配商方差的關(guān)系。以往的文獻(xiàn)資料所探討的模型有一定的局限性,絕大部分都假設(shè)供應(yīng)鏈參與者是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性的,與現(xiàn)實(shí)生產(chǎn)生活的特性不符�；诠⿷�(yīng)商的自身性質(zhì)導(dǎo)致其更傾向于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的,供應(yīng)商對(duì)市場(chǎng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)變化非常敏感,為保證自身的利益它們期望市場(chǎng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)盡可能的小,由此可以看出,供應(yīng)商一般都是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避者。為了使本文的模型更加具有實(shí)踐性,文章基于CVaR進(jìn)一步探究了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)交貨量,發(fā)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)交貨量依賴(lài)于收益共享因子和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避系數(shù),隨著收益共享因子的增加而增加,同樣也隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避系數(shù)的增加而增加進(jìn)一步還發(fā)現(xiàn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)交貨量要小于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性供應(yīng)商的交貨量。
[Abstract]:With the advent of the era of big data and the rapid development of science and technology, economic globalization has become the norm, the competition in the domestic and foreign markets tends to be white-hot, more and more powerful competitors and increasingly complex competition environment will become the two major problems that enterprises have to face. Nowadays, any kind of product production is not by a company. The supply chain is formed by a series of interrelated and mutually restrictive enterprise networks. If an enterprise wants to occupy a place in the product market, the most powerful guarantee is the supply chain. This paper constructs an assembly system model with one assembler and N parts suppliers. For the suppliers/assemblers in the assembly system, they all want to maximize their personal interests, but on the premise of this selfishness, the overall benefit of the supply chain will be low. With the goal of global optimization, the assembler and part supplier not only think about maximizing their own interests, but also can take into account the overall interests of the supply chain and maximize the overall performance by making full use of the whole. In the model, when the final product is sold, the assembler needs to take part of the revenue from the final product and give it to the supplier as revenue sharing. The supplier decides the final delivery according to its cost structure and the amount of revenue sharing. In the process of Lberg game, the assembler, as the leader of the game, has the right to set the sharing factor and adjust the contract factor according to the feedback of the supplier. The supplier, as the follower, adjusts the delivery quantity according to the contract made by the assembler. This is the game process between the assembler and the supplier. It is found that there must be a Pareto optimal contract in the optional contract set. Although this contract does not necessarily guarantee the coordination of the whole supply chain, it can ultimately achieve the optimal state of all participants in the system, and then the total revenue of the system can be optimal. If only the revenue sharing factor is added to the supply chain contract. Subsequently, we can draw the conclusion that the final product delivery of the system is the largest in the centralized decision-making, but it is difficult to reach this level in the case of decentralized decision-making, often lower than this optimal level. It is found that the delivery volume of decentralized decision system is often lower than that of centralized decision system, so a single contract can not achieve coordination in supply chain. In order to coordinate the supply chain, this paper supplements the revenue sharing contract and adds the residual compensation factor, i.e. the assembler pays part of the compensation to the supplier of the unsold final product, which is called residual compensation. This contract can not only coordinate the supply chain, but also increase the delivery of suppliers and further maximize the total revenue of the system. From a new point of view, the maximization of the total revenue of the system is equivalent to the minimization of the total loss of the system, and the objective function needs to be changed to the loss function. In the previous discussion, we assumed that the unassembled parts did not exist, so we neglected this loss. In the following article, we constructed the loss function from the point of view of minimum loss, analyzed the variance of supplier and assembler, and determined the relationship between the variance of supplier and that of assembler under the optimal conditions. The models discussed in the literature have some limitations. Most of them assume that the participants in the supply chain are risk-neutral, which is inconsistent with the characteristics of real production and life. In order to make the model more practical, this paper further explores the optimal delivery volume of risk-averse suppliers based on CVAR. It is found that the optimal delivery volume of suppliers depends on the revenue sharing factor and the risk aversion coefficient, with the receipt. The increase of profit sharing factor also increases with the increase of risk aversion coefficient. It is also found that the optimal delivery volume of risk aversion supplier is less than that of risk neutral supplier.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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